Thomas Metzinger
“Consciousness”
Selected Bibliography
1970 - 2004
This is a bibliography of books and articles on
consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last
34 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited
collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each
divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of
research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject
headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for
articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division is
somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use.
This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas
Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical
anthologies on conscious experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it
has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available
as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file from his personal homepage at http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/.
Other formats are available upon request. This bibliography mainly attempts to
cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way
that makes it easy to “cut and paste” from the original file. To a certain
degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English
and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Please submit new entries, errata etc. to metzinger@uni-mainz.de.
Last update of current version: December 19th,
2004.
1.
Monographs
1.1
Philosophy of Mind
Armstrong, D.M. & Malcolm, N. (1984). Consciousness
and Causality. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Armstrong, D.M. (1981). The Nature of Mind.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Blackmore, S. (2004). Consciousness—An Introduction.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness.
Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Campbell, K.K. (1970). Body and Mind. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.
Carruthers, P. (1996). Language, Thought and
Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A
Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Chalmers, D.J. (1996). The Conscious Mind.
In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Churchland, P.M. (1984). Matter and Consciousness.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Churchland, P.M. (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective.
The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Churchland, P.M. (1995). The Engine of Reason, the
Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical
Journey into the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. German translation. (1997): Die Seelenmaschine.
Eine philosophische Reise ins Gehirn. Heidelberg: Spektrum Verlag.
Churchland, P.S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the
Mind-Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark, A. (1992). Sensory Qualities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. (2000). A Theory of Sentience.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cornman, J.W. (1971). Materialism and Sensations.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Culbertson, J.T. (1982). Consciousness: Natural and Artificial. Roslyn
Heights, New York: Libra.
Davidson,
D. (1993). Der Mythos des Subjektiven. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Dennett,
D.C. (1978[1981]). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and
Psychology. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Dennett, D.C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston/Toronto/London: Little, Brown and Company. Deutsch: Descartes, Potemkin und die
Büchse der Pandora - Eine neue Philosophie des menschlichen Bewußtseins. Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe.
Dennett, D.C. (1996). Kinds of Minds. Towards an Understanding of Consciousness. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Dennett, D.C. (2005). Sweet Dreams. Philosophical
Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Dewart, L. (1989). Evolution and Consciousness: The Role of Speech in the Origin and
Development of Human Nature. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. German translation
(1998): Naturalisierung des Geistes. Paderborn: mentis.
Ellis, R.D. (1986). An Ontology of Consciousness. Dordrecht:
Kluwer/Martinus Nijhoff.
Evans, C.O. (1970). The Subject of Consciousness.
London: George Allen & Unwin.
Fisette, D. (2000). Consciousness and
Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Flanagan, O. (1984; 2nd edition 1991).The Science
of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Flanagan, O. (1992). Consciousness Reconsidered.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Foster, J. (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist
Conception of Mind. London: Routledge.
Funke,
G. (1990). Abdankung der Bewußtseinsphilosophie? Bonn: Bouvier.
Gennaro,
R.J. (1996). Consciousness
and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of
Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Gloy,
K. (1998). Bewußtseinstheorien. Zur Problematik und Problemgeschichte des
Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins. Freiburg: Alber.
Goodman, N. (1977). The Structure of Appearance. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Gottschling,
V. (2003). Bilder im Geiste. Paderborn: mentis.
Gray, J. (2004). Consciousness - Creeping up on the
Hard Problem. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gunderson, K. (1971). Mentality and Machines.
New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.
Hannay, A. (1990). Human Consciousness. London: Routledge.
Hardcastle, V.G. (1995). Locating Consciousness.
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John
Benjamins.
Hardin, C.L. (1988; expanded edition 1993). Color
for Philosophers. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company.
Harrison, B. (1973). Form and Content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hill, C.S. (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hinton, J. (1973). Experiences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hodgson, D. (1991). The Mind Matters.
Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hofmann,
F. (2002). Natur und Begriff des Bewusstseins. Paderborn: mentis.
Hofstadter,
D.R. (1979). Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. New York: Basic Books. German translation.
(1981): Gödel, Escher, Bach: Ein Endloses, Geflochtenes Band. Stuttgart:
Klett-Cotta.
Honderich,
T. (1989). Mind and Brain. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Hurley, S.L. (1998). Consciousness in Action.
Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press.
Jackson, F.C. (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Jacob, P. (1997). Pourquoi les Choses Ont-elles un Sens? Paris: Odile Jacob.
Kim, J. (1993). Supervenience and Mind.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Kirk, R. (1994). Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kügler,
P. (2002). Die Philosophie der primären und sekundäre Qualitäten.
Paderborn: mentis.
Kutschera,
F. v. (2003). Jenseits des Materialismus. Paderborn: mentis.
Landesman, C. (1989). Color and Consciousness.
Philadelphia: Temple University
Press.
Lanz, P. (1996). Das phänomenale
Bewußtsein: Eine Verteidigung.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann.
Levin, M. (1979). Metaphysics and the Mind-Body
Problem. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Livingston,
P.M. (2004). Philosophical
History and the Problem of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lockwood, M. (1989). Mind, Brain, and
the Quantum. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Lund, D.H. (1994). Perception, Mind, and Personal Identity: A Critique of Materialism. Lanham: University
Press of America.
Lycan, W.G. (1987). Consciousness. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Lycan, W.G. (1996). Consciousness and Experience.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Madell, G. (1988). Mind and Materialism.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.
Marbach, E. (1993). Mental Representation and
Consciousness: Towards a
Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Margolis, J. (1978). Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Non-Reductive
Materialism. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Marks, C. (1980). Commissurotomy, Consciousness,
and the Unity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Matson, W.I. (1976). Sentience. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
McGinn, C. (1982). The Character of Mind.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McGinn, C. (1983). The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical
Thoughts. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
McGinn, C. (1991). The Problem of Consciousness: Essays toward a Resolution.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
McGinn, C. (1999). The Mysterious Flame - Conscious Minds in a Material
World. New York:
Basic Books.
McGinn, C. (2004). Consciousness and its Objects.
New York : Oxford University Press.
Meixner, U. (2004). The Two Sides of Being. Paderborn:
mentis.
Messing,
J. (1999). Allgemeine Theorie des Bewusstseins. Berlin: Weidler
Buchverlag.
Metzinger,
T. (1985). Neuere Beiträge zur Diskussion des Leib-Seele-Problems.
Frankfurt/Bern/New York: Peter Lang.
Metzinger,
T. (1993). Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen
Bewußtseins vor dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler
Repräsentation. Paderborn: mentis.
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One. The Self-Model
Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Deutsch. (1992): Der Blick von nirgendwo.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Nelkin,
N. (1996). Consciousness
and the Origins of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nemirow, L. (1979). Functionalism and the
Subjective Quality of Experience. Dissertation, Stanford University: University Microfilms International.
Nida-Rümelin,
M. (1993). Farben und phänomenales Wissen. St. Augustin: Academia.
Niklaus, S. (2004). Leerheit und
Bewusstsein. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag.
Papineau, D. (1993). Philosophical Naturalism.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking About Consciousness.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pauen,
M. (1999). Das Rätsel des
Bewußtseins. Eine Erklärungstrategie. Paderborn: mentis.
Peacocke,
C. (1983). Sense and
Content: Experience, Thought, and
their Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Penrose, R. (1989). The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deutsch. (1991): Computerdenken. Des Kaiser neue Kleider
oder Die Debatte um Künstliche Intelligenz, Bewußtsein und die Gesetze der
Physik. Heidelberg:
Spektrum Verlag.
Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deutsch.
(1995): Schatten des Geistes. Heidelberg: Spektrum Verlag.
Pohlenz,
G. (1994). Phänomenale Realität und Erkenntnis: Umrisse einer Theorie im Ausgang von der eigentümlichen
Natur des Qualia-Begriffs. Freiburg: Alber.
Poland, J. (1994). Physicalism: The
Empirical Foundations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Popper, K.R. (1994). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction. London: Routledge.
Prinz, J. (2004). Gut Reactions. A
Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Radner, D. & Radner, M. (1989). Animal Consciousness. Buffalo: Prometheus.
Revonsuo, A. (1995). On the Nature of
Consciousness: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations. Turku: Turun Yliopisto.
Robinson, H. (1982). Matter and Sense.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Robinson, W.S. (1988). Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and its Causal
Conditions. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Robinson, W.S. (2004). Understanding Phenomenal
Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Ros, A. (2004). Materie und Geist. Paderborn:
mentis.
Rosenberg, G. (2004). A Place for Consciousness. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Rossman, N. (1991). Consciousness: Separation and Integration. Albany: SUNY Press.
Schleichert, H. (1992). Der
Begriff des Bewußtseins. Eine Bedeutungsanalyse.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann.
Schlimgen,
E. (1999). Nietzsches Theorie des Bewußtseins. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.
Schütte,
M. (2004). Reduktion ohne Erklärung. Phänomenale Eigenschaften aus
der Perspektive des Aposteriori-Physikalismus. Paderborn: mentis.
Seager, W.E. (1992). Metaphysics of Consciousness.
London: Routledge.
Searle, J.
(1997). The Mystery of Consciousness. New York/London: Granta Books.
Searle, J.R. (1984). Minds, Brains and
Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. German translation. (1996):
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Shoemaker,
S. (1984). Identity, Cause, and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shoemaker, S. (1996). The First-Person Perspective
and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Siewert, C.E. (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sommerhoff, G. (1991). Life, Brain, and
Consciousness. Amsterdam: Elsevier
Strawson, G. (1994). Mental Reality. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Stubenberg, L. (1998). Consciousness and Qualia.
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John
Benjamins.
Tetens,
H. (1994). Geist, Gehirn, Maschine. Philosophische
Versuche über ihren Zusammenhang. Stuttgart: Reclam
(8999).
Tye, M. (1991). The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and Persons.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Unger, P. (1990). Identity, Consciousness and Value. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Valberg, J.J. (1992). The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human
Experience. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. German translation. (1992): Der Mittlere Weg der Erkenntnis.
Der Brückenschlag zwischen wissenschaftlicher Theorie un menschlicher Erfahrung.
München: Scherz.
Velmans, M. (2000). Understanding Consciousness.
London: Routledge.
Walde,
B. (2002). Metaphysik des Bewusstseins. Paderborn: mentis.
Werth,
R. (1983). Bewußtsein - Psychologische, neurobiologische und
wissenschaftstheoretische Aspekte. Berlin: Springer.
Wilkes, K.V. (1978). Physicalism. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
Wilkes, K.V. (1988). Real People: Personal
Identity without Thought Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wyss,
D. (1988). Traumbewußtsein? Grundzüge einer Ontologie des Traumbewußtseins.
Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht.
1.2 Selected Readings:
Cognitive Science & Psychology
Ackerman, D. (1990). A Natural History of the
Senses. Randhom House.
Austin, J.H. (1998). Zen and the Brain: Toward an
Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baars, B.J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of
Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Baars, B.J. (1997). In the Theater of
Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bachmann, T.
(2000). Microgenetic approach to the conscious mind. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John
Benjamins.
Bassin, F.W. (1970). Bewußtsein
und Unbewußtes. Leipzig: Hirzel.
Berthoz, A.
(1997). Le Sens du Mouvement. Paris: Odile
Jacob.
Blackmore, S.
(2003). Consciousness. An Introduction. Abingdon/Oxon:
Hodder&Stoughton.
Chafe, W.L.
(1994). Discourse, Consciousness, and Time: The Flow and Displacement of
Conscious Experience in Speaking and Writing. University of Chicago Press.
Changeux,
J.P. (1983). L'Homme Neuronal. Paris: Fayard.
Czikzsentmihalyi,
M. & Czikzsentmihalyi, I.S. (1988). Optimal
Experience: Psychological Studies
of Flow in Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Dawkins, M.S. (1993). Through our Eyes only. The Search for Animal Consciousness. Oxford, NY, Heidelberg: Freeman/Spektrum Verlag.
Delacour, J. (2001). Conscience et Cerveau: La
Nouvelle Frontière des Neurosciences. Bruxelles: De Boeck Université.
Di Francesco, M. (2000). La coscienza. Bari:
Laterza.
Dittrich,
A. (1985). Ätiologie-unabhängige Strukturen veränderter
Wachbewußtseinszustände. Stuttgart:
Enke.
Droege, P. (2003). Caging the Beast. A Theory of
Sensory Consciousess. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Ellis, R.D. (1995). Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery,
Cognition, and Emotion in the Human Brain. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Farthing, G.W. (1992). The Psychology of
Consciousness. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Gadenne,
V. & Oswald, M.E. (1991). Kognition und Bewußtsein. Berlin: Springer.
Gadenne,
V. (1996). Bewußtsein, Kognition und Gehirn: Einführung in die Psychologie
des Bewußtseins. Bern: Hans
Huber.
Goodale, M.
& Milner, A. (2003). Sight Unseen. An Exploration of Conscious and
Unconscious Vision. New York: Oxford University Press.
Green, C. & McGreery, C. (1994). Lucid
Dreaming: The Paradox of Consciousness During Sleep. London: Routledge.
Harth, E. (1993). The Creative Loop: How the Brain Makes a Mind.
Addison-Wesley.
Hilgard, E.R. (1977). Divided Consciousness:
Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action. New York: Wiley. Expanded edition published 1986.
Holzinger,
B. (1994). Der luzide Traum: Phänomenologie
und Physiologie. Wien: Wiener
Universitätsverlag.
Humphrey, N. (1984). Consciousness Regained.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Humphrey, N. (1992). A History of the Mind. Evolution and the Birth of
Consciousness. New York: Simon and Schuster. Deutsch. (1995): Die Naturgeschichte
des Ich. Hamburg:
Hoffmann und Campe.
Ihde, D. (1977). Experimental Phenomenology.
New York: Putnam.
Jackendoff, R. (1987). Consciousness and the
Computational Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jouvet,
M. (1994). Die Nachtseite des Bewußtseins. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
Klatzky,
R.L. (1984). Memory and
Awareness. New York: Freeman. German
translation. (1989): Gedächtnis und Bewußtsein. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Klein, D.B. (1984). The Concept of Consciousness: A Survey. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
Kosslyn, S.M. (1980). Image and Mind.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Kosslyn, S.M. (1994). Image and Brain.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kunzendorf, R.G. & Wallace, B. (1999). Individual
Differences in Conscious Experience. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Kurthen,
M. (1990). Das Problem des Bewußtseins in der Kognitionswissenschaft -
Perspektiven einer Kognitiven Neurowissenschaft. Stuttgart: Enke.
Kurthen,
M. (1992). Neurosemantik. Grundlagen einer Praxiologischen Kognitiven
Neurowissenschaft. Stuttgart: Enke.
Kurthen,
M. (1994). Hermeneutische Kognitionswissenschaft. Bonn: djre-Verlag.
LaBerge,
S. (1985). Lucid
Dreaming. Los Angeles: Jeremy Tarcher.
Levicki, P. (1986). Nonconscious Social Information Processing. New York: Academic Press.
Libet, B. (2004). Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in
Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lloyd, D.
(2004). Radiant Cool. A Novel Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Lyons, W. (1986). The Disappearance of Introspection.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mack, A. & Rock, I. (1998). Inattentional Blindness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Manzotti, R.
& Tagliasco, V. (2001). Coscienza e Realtà. Una Teoria della Coscienza
per Costruttori e Studiosi di Menti e Cervelli. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Marton, F. & Booth, S.A. (1997). Learning and
Awareness. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Morris, P. & Hampson, P.J. (1983). Imagery and
Consciousness. London and New York:
Academic Press.
Mueller, E. T. (1990). Daydreaming in Humans and
Machines: A Computer Model of the Stream of Thought. Ablex.
Nelson, T. O. (1992). Metacognition: Core Readings.
Allyn and Bacon.
Norretranders, T. (1991). The User Illusion:
Cutting Consciousness Down to Size. Viking Penguin.
Norretranders,
T. (1994). Spüre die Welt. Die Wissenschaft des Bewußtseins. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
Ornstein, R. (1977). The Psychology of
Consciousness. Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch.
Ornstein, R. (1991). The Evolution of
Consciousness: Of Darwin, Freud, and Cranial Fire: The Origins of the Way We
Think. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Ramachandran, V.S. & Blakeslee, S. (1998). Phantoms in the Brain. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
Rollin, B.E. (1989). The Unheeded Cry: Animal
Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenfield, I. (1992). The Strange, Familiar,
and Forgotten: An Anatomy of
Consciousness. London: Picador. German translation. (1992): Das Fremde, das
Vertraute und das Vergessene. Anatomie des Bewußtseins. Frankfurt am
Main: Fischer.
Rychlak,
J.F. (1997). In Defense of
Human Consciousness. Washington
DC: American Psychological Association.
Schurig,
V. (1976). Die Entstehung des Bewußtseins. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
Scott, A. (1995). Stairway to the Mind. The
Controversial New Science of Consciousness. New York & Berlin:
Springer.
Shevrin, H., Bond, J.A. Brakel, L.A. W, Hertel, R.K.
& Williams, W.J. (1996). Conscious and Unconscious Processes:
Psychodynamic, Cognitive, and Neurophysiological Convergences. New York:
Guilford.
Smythies, J.R. (1994). The Walls of Plato’s Cave.
The Science and Philosophy of Brain, Consciousness and Perception. Aldershot: Aversbury.
Sparti, D.
(2000). Identità e coscienza. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Stephan,
A. (1999). Emergenz. Von der Unvorhersagbarkeit zur Selbstorganisation. Dresden/München: Dresden University Press.
Taylor, J.G. (1998). The Race for Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Umilta, C. & Moscovitch, M. (1994). Attention and Performance 15, Conscious and Nonconscious Information Processing.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Velmans, M. (2000). Investigating Phenomenal
Consciousness: Methodologies and Maps. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Velmans, M. (2003). How Could Conscious Experiences
Affect Brains? Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Wolman, B.B. & Ullman, U. (1986). Handbook of
States of Consciousness. van Nostrand Reinhold.
1.3
Selected Readings: Neurosciences
Abeles, M. (1991). Corticonics: Neural Circuits of
the Cerebral Cortex. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bachmann, T. (1994). Psychophysiology of Visual
Masking. The Fine Structure of Conscious Experience. Commack, NY:
Nova Science Publishers.
Brown, J. (1991). Self and Process.
Brain-states and the Conscious Present. New York: Springer.
Calvin, W. (1990). The Cerebral Symphony: Seashore Reflections on the Structure
of Consciousness. Bantam. German translation. (1993): Die Symphonie des Denkens -
Wie aus Neuronen Bewußtsein entsteht. München: Carl Hanser.
Changeux, J.P. (1985). Neuronal Man: The
Biology of Mind. New York: Pantheon Books.
Churchland, P.S. & Sejnowski, T.J. (1992). The
Computational Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. German translation (1997);
Churchland, P.S. & Sejnowski, T. (1997). Grundlagen zu
Neuroinformatik und Neurobiologie. Stuttgart: Vieweg.
Cotterill,
R. (1998). Enchanted Looms. Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers. Cambrideg, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Dainton, B. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in
Conscious Experience. London,
New York: Routledge.
Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ Error. New York: Putnam/Grosset.
German
translation (1995): Descartes’ Irrtum. München und Leipzig: List.
Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens:
Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace & Company.
Dehaene, S. (2002). The Cognitive Neuroscience of
Consciousness. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Delacour, J. (1994). Biologie de la Conscience.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Eccles, J.C. (1984). The Human Mystery. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Edelman, G.E. (1987). Neural Darwinism:
The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection. New York: Basic Books. German translation. (1993): Unser Gehirn, ein
dynamisches System: Die Theorie
des neuronalen Darwinismus und die biologischen Grundlagen der Wahrnehmung.
München: Piper.
Edelman, G.M. & Mountcastle, V.B. (1978). The
Mindful Brain: Cortical
Organization and the Group-selective Theory of Higher Brain Function. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Edelman, G.M. & Tononi, G. (2000). A Universe of Consciousness. How Matter becomes
Imagination. New York:
Basic Books.
Edelman, G.M. (1989). The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York: Basic
Books.
Edelman, G.M. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. New York: Basic Books. German translation. (1995): Göttliche
Luft, vernichtendes Feuer: Wie der Geist im Gehirn entsteht. München: Piper.
Edelman, G.M. (2004). Wider than the Sky: The
Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Farah, M. (1991). Visual Agnosia: Disorders of Object Recognition and
What They Tell Us about Normal Vision. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Franke,
E. (1996). Was ist Bewusstsein? Aspekte einer allgemeinen Theorie
koordinierter Funktion cerebraler Neuronen. Berlin: VWB-Verlag.
Gazzaniga, M.S. & Le Doux, J.E. (1978). The Integrated Mind. New York: Plenum
Press.
Greenfield, S.A. (1995). Journey to the Centers of
the Mind: Towards A Science of Consciousness. New York: Freeman.
Griffin, D.R. (1981). The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental
Experience. New
York: Rockefeller University
Press.
Hameroff, S. (1987). Ultimate Computing:
Biomolecular Consciousness and Nanotechnology.
Hernegger,
R. (1995). Wahrnehmung und Bewußtsein. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zur
Neuropsychologie. Heidelberg: Spektrum Verlag.
Hobson, J.A. (1988). The Dreaming Brain. New York: Basic
Books.
Hobson, J.A. (1995). The Chemistry of Conscious States. Boston/Toronto/London: Little, Brown and Company.
Hobson, J.A. (1999). Consciousness. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company/Scientific
American Library.
Hobson, J.A. (2002). The Dream Drugstore:
Chemically Altered States of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jaynes, J. (1976). The Origins of Consciousness in
the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Deutsch. (1988): Der Ursprung des
Bewußtseins durch den Zusammenbruch der bikameralen Psyche. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
Koch, C. (2004). The Quest for Consciouness. Englewood, CO: Roberts and Company Publishers.
Kuhlenbeck,
H. (1973). Gehirn und Bewußtsein. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
LaBerge,
D. (1995). Attentional
Processing: The Brain’s Art of Mindfulness. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
Laughlin, C.D., McManus, J. & D’Aquili, E.G.
(1992). Brain, Symbol and Experience. Toward a Neurophenomeeology of
Human Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press.
Libet, B. (1993). Neurophysiology of Consciousness:
Selected Papers and New Essays. Boston: Birkhäuser.
MacPhail, E. (1998). The Evolution of Consciousness.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marks, L.E. (1978). The Unity of the Senses: Interrelations among the Modalities.
New
York: Academic Press.
Northoff,
G. (1995). Neuropsychiatrische Phänomene und das Leib-Seele Problem: Qualia
im Knotenpunkt zwischen Leib und Seele. Essen: Blaue Eule Verlag.
Penfield, W. (1975). The Mystery of the Mind: A Critical Study of Consciousness and
the Human Brain. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pöppel,
E. (1985). Grenzen des Bewußtseins. München: DTV.
Pöppel, E. (1988). Mindworks: Time
and Conscious Experience.
New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Popper, K.R. & Eccles, J.C. (1977). The Self and its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
German translation. (1982): Das
Ich und sein Gehirn. München: Piper.
Robertson, I.H. & Marshall, J.C. (1993). Unilateral Neglect:
Clinical and Experimental Studies. Hillsdale: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Rose, S. (1973). The Conscious Brain. New York: Knopf. Revised edition 1989.
Roth,
G. (1994). Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
Shallice,
T. (1988). From
Neuropsychology to Mental Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A Case-Study and Implications.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weiskrantz, L. (1997). Consciousness Lost and Found.
A
Neuropsychological Exploration. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Zeki, S. (1993). A Vision of the Brain.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Scientific Publications.
2.
Anthologies
2.1
Philosophy of Mind
Akins, K. (1996)[ed.]. Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Albertz,
J. (1994)[Hrsg.]. Das Bewußtsein - philosophische, psychologische und
physiologische Aspekte. Berlin: Freie Akademie.
Beckermann,
A., Flohr, H. & Kim, J. (1992)[eds.]. Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of
Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin, New
York: de Gruyter.
Bermúdez, J.L., Marcel, A. & Eilan, N.
(1995)[eds.]. The Body and
the Self. Cambrigde,
MA: MIT Press.
Bieri,
P. (1993)[Hrsg.]. Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Königstein: Hain 1981; 2. Auflage 1993; 3.
Auflage 1997, Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum.
Block, N. (1980)[ed.]. Readings in Philosophy of
Psychology. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Block, N. (1981)[ed.]. Readings in Philosophy of
Psychology. Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Block, N., Flanagan, O. & Güzeldere, G.
(1997)[eds.]. The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Carrier, M. & Machamer, P. (1997)[eds.]. Mindscapes:
Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh-Konstanz Series in the
Philosophy and History of Science. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Konstanz/Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press.
Casati, R., Smith, B. & White, S. (1995)[eds.]. Philosophy
and the Cognitive Sciences. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. German translation: Philosophie und die
kognitiven Wissenschaften. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Cheng, C. (1975)[ed.]. Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press.
CIBA Foundation. (1993). Experimental and Theoretical
Studies of Consciousness. CIBA
Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Cleeremans, A. (2003)[ed.]. The Unity of
Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Cornwell, J. (1998)[ed.]. Consciousness and Human Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cramer, K., Fulda, H.-F., Horstmann, R.-P. &
Pothast, U. (1990)[Hrsg.]. Theorie der Subjektivität.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Crane,
T. (1992)[ed.]. The Contents
of Experience: Essays on
Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dahlbom, B. (1993)[ed.]. Dennett and his Critics. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Davies, M. & Humphreys, G. (1993)[eds.]. Consciousness:
Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Dietrich, E. (1994)[ed.]. Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons: Essays on the Intentionality of
Machines. New York: Academic Press.
Dol, M., Kasanmoentalib, S., Lijmbach, S., Rivas, E.
& van den Bos, R. (1997)[eds.]. Animal consciousness and animal ethics. Assen: Van
Gorcum.
Esken, F. & Heckmann, H.-D. (1998)[Hrsg.]. Bewußtsein
und Repräsentation. Paderborn: mentis.
Fisette, D. (1998)[ed.]. Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and
Modalities of Attribution. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Gennaro, R. J. (2004)[ed.]. Higher-Order Theories
of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Globus, G.G., Maxwell, G. & Savodnik, I.
(1976)[eds.]. Consciousness and the Brain:
A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry. New
York: Plenum Press.
Guttmann,
G. & Langer, G. (1992)[eds.]. Das Bewußtsein: Multidimensionale Entwürfe. Berlin: Springer.
Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A., & Scott, A. (1996). Toward
a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Herrmann,
C., Pauen, M., Rieger, J. & Schicktanz, S. (2005)[Hrsg.]. Bewusstsein -
Perspektivenwechsel zwischen den Disziplinen. Frankfurt: UTB.
Hofstadter,
D.R. & Dennett, D.C. (1981)[eds.]. The Mind's I. New York: Basic
Books. German translation:. (1982), Einsicht in Ich.
Fantasien und Refelexionen über Selbst und Seele. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Hookway, C. & Peterson, D. (1994)[eds.]. Philosophy
and the Cognitive Sciences. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Ito, M., Myashita, Y. & Rolls, E.T. (1997)[eds.]. Cognition,
Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, F. (1998)[ed.]. Consciousness.
Brookfield: Ashgate.
Jokic, A. & Smith, Q. (2003)[eds.]. Consciousness:
New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Krämer,
S. (1994)[ed.]. Geist, Gehirn, Künstliche Intelligenz -
Zeitgenössische Modelle des Denkens. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.
Krämer,
S. (1996)[ed.]. Bewußtsein. Philosophische Beiträge. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp.
Lenk,
H. & Poser, H. (1993)[eds.]. Neue Realitäten: Herausforderungen der
Philosophie.VI: Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie Berlin 20.-24.
September 1993. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
Livet, P. (2000)[ed.]. De la Perception à L'Action.
Contenus Perceptifs et Perception de L'action. Paris: Vrin.
Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y. & Stoljar, D.
(2004)[eds.]. There’s Something about Mary. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lycan, W.G. (1990)[ed.]. Mind and Cognition.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Marcel, A. & Bisiach, E. (1988)[eds.]. Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McCauley, R.N. (1996)[ed.]. The Churchlands and Their Critics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Metzinger,
T. (1995a)[ed.]. Bewußtsein - Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie.
Paderborn: mentis.
Metzinger, T. (1995b)[ed.]. Conscious Experience. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic & Paderborn:
mentis.
Metzinger, T. (2000)[ed.]. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and
Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Myin, E. (1997)[ed.]. Approaching Consciousness I. Communication and
Cognition, 30.
Myin, E. (1998)[ed.]. Approaching Consciousness II. Communication
and Cognition, 31.
Oeser,
E. & Seitelberger, F. (1988)[eds.]. Gehirn, Bewußtsein und
Erkenntnis. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Otto,
H. & Tuedio, J. (1988)[eds.]. Perspectives on Mind. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Pauen,
M. & Stephan, A. (2002)[Hrsg.]. Phänomenales Bewusstsein – Rückkehr zur
Identitätstheorie? Paderborn:
mentis.
Peacocke, C. (1994)[ed.]. Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of
Consciousness. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Petitot, J., Varela, F., Pachoud, B. & Roy, J.M.
(1999)[eds.]. Naturalizing Phenomenology: Current Issues in Contemporary
Phneomenology and Cogntive Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Pöppel,
E. (1989)[ed.]. Gehirn und Bewußtsein. Weinheim: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft.
Proust,
J. (1997)[ed.]. Perception et
Intermodalité. Approches Actuelles de la Question de Molyneux. Paris: Presse Universitaire de France.
Revonsuo, A. & Kamppinen, M. (1994)[eds.]. Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Robinson, H. (1993)[ed.]. Objections to Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1991)[ed.]. The Nature of Mind.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenthal, D.M. (2000)[ed.]. Consciousness and Mind.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schumacher, R. (2004)[ed.]. Perception and Reality –
From Descartes to the Present. Paderborn: mentis.
Shear, J. (1997)[ed.]. Explaining Consciousness:
The Hard Problem. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Slezak, P. (1989)[ed.]. Computers, Brains and Minds. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Thompson, E. (2004)[ed.]. The Problem of
Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian
Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Calgary, AL: University of Alberta
Press.
Tomberlin, J. (1989)[ed.]. Philosophical
Perspectives, Vol. 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory.
Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.
Tomberlin, J. (1990)[ed.]. Philosophical
Perspectives, Vol. 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind.
Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.
Tomberlin, J. (1995)[ed.]. Philosophical
Perspectives, Vol. 9: AI, Connectionism and
Philosophical Psychology. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.
Tomberlin, J. (1998)[ed.]. Philosophical
Perspectives, Vol. 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology. Malden,
MA / Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Tress,
W. & Nagel, S. (1993)[eds.]. Psychoanalyse und Philosophie: Eine
Begegnung. Heidelberg:
Asanger.
Velmans, M. & Schneider, S. (2005)[eds.]. The
Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.
Villanueva, E. (1991)[ed.]. Consciousness: Philosophical Issues. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
Villanueva, E. (1996)[ed.]. Perception. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.
Warner, R. & Szubka, T. (1994)[eds.]. The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Zelazo, P.D., Moscovitch, M. & Thompson, E.
(2005)[eds.]. Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University
Press.
2.2 Selected Readings:
Cognitive Science & Psychology
Baars, B.J., Banks, W.P. & Newman, J.B.
(2003)[eds.]. Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baddeley, A.D. & Weiskrantz, L. (1993)[eds.]. Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beauregard, M. (2004)[ed.]. Consciousness,
Emotional Self-Regulation, and the Brain. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John
Benjamins.
Berry, D.C. & Dienes, Z. (1993)[eds.]. Implicit
Learning: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Blakemore, C. & Greenfield, S. (1987)[eds.]. Mindwaves:
Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Block, R.A. (1990)[ed.]. Cognitive Models of Psychological Time. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Bornstein, R.F. & Pittman, T.S. (1992)[eds.]. Perception
without Awareness: Cognitive, Clinical and Social Perspectives. New
York: Guilford.
Bowers, K.S. & Meichenbaum, D. (1984)[eds.]. The Unconscious Reconsidered. New York: Wiley.
Cavallero, C. & Foulkes, D. (1993)[eds.]. Dreaming as Cognition. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Challis, B.H. & Velichovsky, B.M. (1999)[eds.]. Stratification
in Cognition and Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
CIBA Foundation. (1993). Experimental and
Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA
Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Cleeremans, A. (2003)[ed.]. The Unity of
Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Cohen, J.D. & Schooler, J.W. (1997)[eds.]. Scientific
Approaches to Consciousness. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Davidson, J.M. & Davidson, R.J. (1980)[eds.]. The
Psychobiology of Consciousness. New York: Plenum.
Davidson,
R., Schwartz, G. & Shapiro, D. (1983)[eds.]. Consciousness and Self-regulation. Vol. 1. New York: Plenum.
Goldman, A.I. (1993)[ed.]. Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Greenberg, G. & Tobach, E. (1987)[eds.]. Cognition, Language, and Consciousness: Integrative Levels. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Grivois, H. & Proust, J. (1998)[eds.]. Subjectivité
et Conscience d’Agir. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A., & Scott, A. (1996)[eds.].
Toward a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A., & Scott, A.
(1998)[eds.]. Toward a Science of Consciousness II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Heyer, D., Mausfeld, R. (2003)[ed.]. Colour
Perception, Mind and thePhysical World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Hookway, C. (1984)[ed.]. Minds, Machines, and
Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ito, M., Myashita, Y. & Rolls, E.T. (1997)[eds.]. Cognition,
Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jiménez, L. (2003)[ed.]. Attention and Implicit
Learning. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Josephson, B.D. & Ramachandran, V.S. (1980)[eds.].
Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Kessel, K.S., Cole, P.M. & Johnson, D.L.
(1992)[eds.]. Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Klement,
H.-W. (1975)[Hrsg.]. Bewusstsein - Ein Zentralproblem der Wissenschaften.
Baden-Baden: Agis Verlag.
Marcel, A. & Bisiach, E. (1988)[eds.]. Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mausfeld, R., Heyer, D. (2003)[eds.]. Colour
Perception. Mind and thePhysical World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Metzinger, T. (2000)[ed.]. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and
Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ornstein, R. (1973)[ed.]. The Nature of Human Consciousness. A Book of Readings. San Francisco: Freeman.
Osaka, N. (2003)[ed.]. Neural Basis of
Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Pickering, J. & Skinner, M. (1990)[eds.]. From
Sentience to Symbols: Readings on Consciousness. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Pope, K.S. & Singer, J.L. (1978)[eds.]. The
Stream of Consciousness: Scientific Investigation into the Flow of Experience.
New York: Plenum.
Quen, J.M. (1986)[ed.]. Split Minds/Split Brains:
Historical and Current Perspectives. New York University Press.
Rescher, N. (1986)[ed.]. Current Issues in Teleology. University Press of America.
Revonsuo, A. & Kamppinen, M. (1994)[eds.]. Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Schwartz, G. & Shapiro D. (1976)[eds.]. Consciousness and Self-regulation. Vol.1. New York: Plenum.
Schwartz, G. & Shapiro D. (1978)[eds.]. Consciousness and Self-regulation. Vol 2.
New York: Plenum.
Slunecko,
T., Vitouch, O., Korunka, C., Bauer, H. & Flatschacher, B. (1999)[eds.]. Psychologie
des Bewusstseins - Bewusstsein der Psychologie. Wien: Wiener
Universitätsverlag.
Solso,
R. (1975)[ed.]. Information Processing and Consciousness. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Stamenov,
M.I. (1997)[ed.]. Language
Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Stein, D.J. (1997)[ed.]. Cognitive Science and the Unconscious. American Psychiatric Press.
Sugarman, A.A. & Tarter, R.E. (1978)[eds.]. Expanding
Dimensions of Consciousness. Springer.
Tratteur, G. (1995)[ed.]. Consciousness: Distinction and Reflection. Napoli:
Bibliopolis.
Umilta, C. & Moscovitch, M. (1995)[eds.]. Conscious and Nonconscious Information Processing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Underwood, G. & Stevens, R. (1979)[eds.].
Aspects of Consciousness. Vol. 1. Psychological Issues.
London: Academic Press.
Underwood, G. & Stevens, R. (1981)[eds.].
Aspects of Consciousness. Vol. 2. Structural Issues. London:
Academic Press.
Underwood, G. & Stevens, R. (1983)[ed.]. Aspects
of Consciousness. Vol. 3. Awareness and Self-awareness. London:
Academic Press.
Underwood, G. & Stevens, R. (1984)[ed.]. Aspects
of Consciousness. Vol. 4. Clinical Issues. London: Academic
Press.
Underwood, G. (1996). Implicit Cognition.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Velmans, M. (1996)[ed.]. The Science of Consciousness: Psychological,
Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews. London:
Routledge.
Velmans, M. & Schneider, S. (2005)[eds.]. The
Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.
Weiß,
H. & Pagel, G. (1989)[eds.]. Das Bewußtsein und das Unbewußte.
Beiträge zu ihrer Interpretation und Kritik. Würzburg: Königshausen &
Neumann.
Werth,
R. (1998). Hirnwelten. Berichte vom Rande des Bewußtseins. München: C.H.
Beck.
Zelazo,
P.D., Moscovitch, M. & Thompson, E. (2005)[eds.]. Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
2.3
Selected Readings: Neurosciences
Basar, E. & Bullock, T. (1992)[eds.]. Induced
Rhythms in the Brain. Boston: Birkhäuser.
Bock, G.R. & Marsh, J. (1993)[eds.]. Experimental
and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. New York: Wiley.
Bonke, B., Bovill, J.G., & Moerman, N.
(1996)[eds.]. Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia III. Van Gorcum.
Bonke, B., Fitch, W. & Millar, K. (1990)[eds.]. Memory
and Awareness in Anesthesia. Swets & Zeitlinger.
Buser, P.A. & Rougeul-Buser, A. (1978)[eds.]. Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. INSERM Symposium No. 6. Amsterdam: North
Holland/Elsevier.
CIBA Foundation. (1993). Experimental and Theoretical
Studies of Consciousness. CIBA
Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Cleeremans, A. (2003)[ed.]. The Unity of
Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Davidson, J.M. & Davidson, R.J. (1980)[eds.]. The
Psychobiology of Consciousness. New York: Plenum Press.
Gackenbach,
J. & LaBerge, S. (1988)[eds.]. Conscious Mind, Sleeping
Brain. New York/London: Plenum Press.
Gazzaniga, M. (1995)[ed.]. The Cognitive Neurosciences.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gazzaniga, M. (1999)[ed.]. The New Cognitive Neurosciences (2nd
edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gordon, G., Maxwell, G. & Savodnik, I.
(1976)[eds.]. Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and
Philosophical Inquiry. New York: Plenum Press.
Grossenbacher, P. (1999)[ed.]. Finding
Consciousness in the Brain: A neurocognitive Approach. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A., & Scott, A.
(1996)[eds.]. Toward a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Hobson, J.B. & Brazier, M.A. (1982)[eds.]. The
Reticular Formation Revisited. New York: Raven.
Ito, M., Myashita, Y. & Rolls, E.T. (1997)[eds.]. Cognition,
Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jasper, H.H, Descarries, L., Castellucci, V.F, &
Rossignol, S. (1998)[eds.]. Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience.
Advances in Neurology, 77. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott-Raven.
Koch, C. & Davis, J.L. (1994)[eds.]. Large-Scale
Neuronal Theories of the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T. (2000)[ed.]. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and
Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Milner, D. & Rugg, M. (1992)[eds.]. The Neuropsychology of Consciousness. London: Academic Press.
Oakley, D. (1985)[ed.]. Brain and Mind. Andover:
Methuen.
Pöppel,
E. (1989)[ed.].Gehirn und Bewußtsein. Weinheim: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft.
Prigatano,
G.P. & Schacter, D.L. (1991)[eds.]. Awareness of Deficit after Brain Injury: Clinical and
Theoretical Issues. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Revonsuo, A. & Kamppinen, M. (1994)[eds.]. Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Roediger III, H.L. & Craik, F.I.M. (1989)[eds.]. Varieties
of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of Endel Tulving.
Rosen, M., & Lunn, J.N. (1987)[eds.]. Consciousness,
Awareness, and Pain in General Anesthesia. Butterworths.
Sebel, P.S., Bonke, B. & Winograd, E.
(1993)[eds.]. Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia II. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Singer,
W. (1994)[ed.]. Gehirn und Bewußtsein. Heidelberg: Spektrum Verlag.
Velmans,
M. & Schneider, S. (2005)[eds.]. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.
Weiskrantz, L. (1986)[ed.]. Thought Without Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zelazo, P.D., Moscovitch, M. & Thompson, E.
(2005)[eds.]. Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University
Press.
3.
Articles
3.1 The
Concept of Consciousness
This section contains articles analyzing the concept
of consciousness, or attempting to determine what it is for an organism or a
mental state to be conscious, or distinguishing various kinds of consciousness.
Articles along these lines can also be found in sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and
elsewhere.
Allport, A. (1988). What concept of consciousness? In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1976). The subjectivity of sensation. Ajatus, 36,
1-18.
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3.2
Consciousness, Physicalism and the Mind-Body Problem
Is the existence of consciousness compatible with
physicalism? The articles in this section address this question, and take
various positions on this issue at the heart of the mind-body problem. This
issue is also addressed by papers in most other sections, especially section
3.7.
Bechtel, W.
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Journal of Philosophy, 61, 378-95.
Beckermann, A. & Stephan, A. (1994). Stichwort:
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Beckermann,
A. (1990). Zur Logik der Identitätstheorie. In G. Pasternack (Hrsg.), Philosophie
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Beckermann,
A. (1995). Mentale Zustände - emergent oder neurobiologisch erklärbar? Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften, 6, 79-82.
Beckermann, A. (2000). A perennial problem about the
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explanatory gap. In Metzinger
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Bieri, P. (1987). Pain: A case study for the mind-body problem. Acta
Neurochirurgica, Suppl. 38, 157-64. Deutsche,
gekürzte Fassung: Schmerz: Eine Fallstudie zum Leib-Seele-Problem. In Pöppel
1989.
Bieri,
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Birnbacher,
D. (1990). Das ontologischen Leib-Seele-Problem und seine
epiphänomenalistische Lösung. In K.-E. Bühler (ed.), Aspekte des
Leib-Seele-Problems. Philosophie, Medizin, Künstliche
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Birnbacher,
D. (1993). Eine Verteidigung des Epiphänomenalismus. In Philosophie
Psychischer Phänomene. Vorträge des 9. Hamburger
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Birnbacher,
D. (2002). Läßt sich Bewusstsein erklären? In
Pauen & Stephan 2002.
Block,
N. & Stalnaker, R. (1999). Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the
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Chalmers, D.J. (2000).What is a neural correlate of
consciousness? In Metzinger 2000.
Churchland, P.S. (1988). Reductionism and the
neurobiological basis of consciousness. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.
Clark, T.W. (1995). Function and phenomenology:
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241-54.
Elitzur, A. (1989). Consciousness and the
incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and
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Ellis, R.D. & Newton, N. (1998). Three paradoxes
of phenomenal consciousness: Bridiging the explanatory gap. Journal
of Consciousness Studies, 5, 419-42.
Ferber,
R. (1998). Zenon von Elea und das Leib-Seele-Problem. Allgemeine Zeitschrift
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In Lenk & Poser 1993.
Fodor, J.A. (1981). The mind-body problem. Scientific
American, 244, 114-25.
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Gomes, G. (1995). Self-awareness and the mind-brain problem. Philosophical
Psychology, 8, 155-65.
Goswami, A. (1990). Consciousness in quantum physics
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Gunderson, K. (1970). Asymmetries and mind-body
perplexities. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 4,
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Heidelberger,
M. (2002). Wie das Leib-Seele-Problem in den Logischen Empirismus kam. In Pauen & Stephan 2002.
Hill,
C.S. (2002). Imaginability, conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body
problem. Philosophical Studies, 87, 61-85. German translation in Pauen &
Stephan 2002.
Honderich, T. (1981). Psychophysical law-like
connections and their problems. Inquiry, 24, 277-303.
Howard, D.J. (1986). The new mentalism. International
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Kim,
J. (2002). Emergenz, Reduktionsmodelle und das Mentale. In Pauen & Stephan 2002.
Kirk,
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Kirk, R. (1977). Reply to Don Locke on Zombies and
materialism. Mind, 86, 262-4.
Kirk, R. (1979). From physical explicability to
full-blooded materialism. Philosophical Materialism, 29, 229-37.
Kirk, R. (1982). Physicalism, identity and strict
implication. Ratio, 24, 131-41.
Kirk, R. (1991). Why shouldn't we be able to solve the mind-body
problem? Analysis, 51, 17-23.
Kraemer, E.R. (1980). Imitation-man and the 'new' epiphenomenalism. Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 10, 479-87.
Kurthen,
M. & Linke, D.B. (1989). Der Emergentismus als Scheinlösung des
Bieri-Trilemmas. Psychotherapie, Medizinische Psychologie, Psychosomatik,
39, 480-2.
Lahav, R. & Shanks, N. (1992). How to be a
scientifically respectable 'property dualist'. Journal of Mind and Behavior,
13, 211-32.
Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The
explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354-61.
German translation in Pauen & Stephan 2002.
Levine, J. (1993). On leaving out what it's like. In
Davies & Humphreys 1993. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.
Locke, D. (1971). Must a materialist pretend he's
anaesthetized? Philosophical Quarterly, 21, 217-31.
Locke, D. (1976). Zombies, schizophrenics, and purely
physical objects. Mind,
83, 97-9.
Mayer,
U. (2002). Lassen sich phänomenologische Gesetze „im Prinzip“ auf
mikro-physikalische Theorien reduzieren? In Pauen &
Stephan 2002.
McGinn, C. (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem?
Mind, 98, 349-66. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.
McGinn, C. (1993). Consciousness and cosmology:
Hyperdualism ventilated. In Davies & Humphreys 1993.
McGinn, C. (1995). Consciousness and space. In Metzinger 1995b. Also in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 32,
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McGinn, C. (2003). What
constitutes the mind-body problem? (Consciousness). Nous, 13,
148-62.
McLaughlin,
B. (2002). Zur Verteidigung des New-Wave Materialismus. In Pauen & Stephan 2002.
Metzinger,
T. (1990). Kritierien für eine Theorie zur Lösung des Leib-Seele-Problems. Erkenntnis,
32, 127-45. Reprinted in Acta Universitatis Lodziensis, Folia
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Metzinger,
T. (1991). Das Leib-Seele-Problem in den achtziger Jahren. Conceptus, 64, 99-114.
Nagel, T. (1979). Panpsychism. In Mortal Questions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Nagel, T. (1993). What is the mind-body problem? In Experimental
and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA
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Nagel, T. (1994). Consciousness and objective reality.
In
Warner & Szubka 1994.
Nida-Rümelin,
M. (1997). Is the
naturalization of qualitative experience possible or sensible? In
Carrier & Machamer 1997.
Nida-Rümelin,
M. (2002). Erklärbare und nicht erklärbare Aspekte phänomenalen Erlebens. In Pauen &
Stephan 2002.
Nida-Rümelin, M. (2004). Phenomenal essentialism – A
problem for identity-theorists. In Schumacher 2004.
Noonan, H.W. (1999). Microphysical supervenience and
consciousness. Mind, 108, 755-9.
Papineau, D. (1998). Mind the gap. In Tomberlin 1998.
Papineau, D. (2003). Could there be a science of
consciousness? Philosophical Issues,
13, 205-20.
Pauen,
M. (1996). Mythen des Materialismus. Der Eliminative Materialismus und die
Theorie der psychophysischen Identität. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, XLIV, 77–100.
Pauen, M. (19989. Is there an empirical answer to the
explanatory gap argument? Commentary on
J. G. Taylor, Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap. Consciousness
and Cognition, 7,
202-205.
Pauen, M. (1999). Phenomenal Experience and Science:
Separated by a “brick wall”? Commentary
on: Stephen E. Palmer, Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 968.
Pauen, M. (2000). Painless Pain: Property-Dualism and
the Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 51-64.
Pauen, M. (2003). Is type identity incompatible with
multiple realization? Grazer Philosophische Studien, 65, 37-49.
Perkins, M. (1970). Matter, sensation, and
understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly, 8, 1-12.
Perkins, M. (1971). Sentience. Journal of Philosophy, 68, 329-37.
Place, U.T. (1977). Twenty years on - Is consciousness
still a brain process? Open Mind, 6, 3-10. [See also: Place, U.T.
(1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology,
47, 44-50. German translation in Pauen & Stephan 2002.]
Place, U.T. (1988). Thirty years on - Is consciousness
still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66,
208-19.
Place, U.T. (1989). Thirty five years on - Is
consciousness still a brain process? In J. Brandl & W.L. Gombocz (eds.), The
Mind of Donald Davidson. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 36, 17-29.
Place, U.T. (1995). 'Is consciousness a brain
process?' Some misconceptions about the article. In B. Borstner & J.
Shawe-Taylor (eds.), Consciousness at the Crossroads of Cognitive Science
and Philosophy: Selected Proceedings of the final meeting of the Tempus Project
'Phenomenology and Cognitive Science', Slovenia 1994. Bound with Consciousness
Research Abstracts. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic.
Robinson, H. (1976). The mind-body problem in
contemporary philosophy. Zygon, 11, 346-60.
Robinson, W.S. (1982). Causation, sensation, and
knowledge. Mind, 91, 525-40.
Ruhnau, E. (1995). Time-Gestalt and the observer. In
Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.
Schröder,
J. (2002). Phänomenales Bewusstsein, reduktive Erklärung und der Mythos der
Erklärungslücke. In Pauen & Stephan 2002.
Sellars, W. (1981). Is consciousness physical? Monist,
64, 66-90.
Smith, A.D. (1993). Non-reductive physicalism?
In Robinson 1993.
Sperry, R. (1980). Mind-brain interaction: mentalism
yes, dualism no. Neuroscience, 5, 195-206.
Squires, R. (1974). Zombies vs materialists II. Aristotelian Society
Supplement, 48, 153-63.
Stephan, A. (1992/93). Der Mythos der
reduzierbar emergenten Eigenschaften. Conceptus, 68/69, 191-200.
Stephan,
A. (1993). C.D. Broads a priori-Argument für die Emergenz phänomenaler
Qualitäten. In Lenk & Poser 1993.
Stephan,
A. (1994). Theorien der Emergenz – Metaphysik oder? Grazer Philosophische
Studien, 48, 105-15.
Stephan,
A. (2000). Naturalisierung, Reduktion und reduktive Erklärung. Facta Philosophica, 2, 237-248.
Stephan, A. (2001). How to Lose the Mind-Body Problem.
Grazer Philosophische Studien,
61, 277-281.
Stephan,
A. (2002). Phänomenaler Pessimismus. In
Pauen & Stephan 2002.
Strawson, G. (1994). The experiential and
the non-experiential. In Warner & Szubka 1994.
Tye,
M. (1983). On the
possibility of disembodied existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
61, 275-82.
Tye, M. (1999). Phenomenal consciousness: the
explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion. Mind, 108, 705-25.
Van Cleve, J. (1990). Mind - dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 215-26.
Van Gulick, R. (1985). Physicalism and the
subjectivity of the mental. Philosophical Topics, 12, 51-70.
Van Gulick, R. (1992). Nonreductive materialism
and the nature of intertheoretical constraint.
In Beckermann et al. 1992.
Van Gulick, R. (1993). Understanding the phenomenal
mind: Are we all just armadillos? In Davies & Humphreys 1993.
Revised versions in Block et al. 1997.
Van
Gulick, R. (2002). Nichtreduktiver Materialismus – noch immer das beste Angebot
auf dem Leib-Seele Basar. In Pauen & Stephan 2002.
Velmans, M. (1990). Consciousness, brain, and the
physical world. Philosophical Psychology, 3, 77-99.
Velmans, M. (1995). The relation of consciousness to
the material world. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 255-65.
Velmans, M. (1998). Goodbye to reductionism. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak
& A. Scott (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness II: The Second
Tucson Discussions and Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Velmans, M.
(2001). A natural account of phenomenal consciousness. Communication
and Cognition, 34(1&2), 39-59.
White, S. (1989). Transcendentalism and its
discontents. Philosophical Topics, 17, 231-61.
3.3
Consciousness as Higher-Order Thought
A popular way to make sense of consciousness has been
to analyze it in terms of the existence of some higher-order mental state -
that is, a mental state that is itself directed at another mental state.
Sometimes this higher-order state is taken to be a state of “inner perception”
of another mental state, but more frequently (especially in the work of David
Rosenthal) it has been taken to be a state of thought about another mental
state. The papers cited here develop and critically address these suggestions.
The issues are also addressed in chapters of some monographs in section 1.1,
including Dennett 1991, Dretske 1995, Gennaro 1996 and Siewert 1994. See also
the collection of texts in Gennaro 2004.
Aquila, R. (1990). Consciousness as higher-order
thought: Two objections. American Philosophical Quarterly, 27, 81-7.
Armstrong, D.M. (1981). What is consciousness? In
Armstrong 1981. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.
Byrne, A (1997). Some like it HOT: Consciousness and
higher-order thoughts. Philosophical Studies, 2, 103-29.
Carruthers, P. (1989). Brute experience. Journal of
Philosophy, 86, 258-69.
Carruthers, P. (1992). Consciousness and concepts. Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 66, 41-59.
Dretske, F. (1993). Conscious experience. Mind,
102, 263-83. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.
Francescotti, R.M. (1995). Higher-order thoughts and conscious experience. Philosophical
Psychology, 8, 239-54.
Gennaro, R.J. (1993). Brute experience and the
higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers, 22,
51.
Gennaro, R.J. (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT
theory of consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(4),
581-6.
Güzeldere, G. (1995). Is consciousness the perception
of what passes on one's own mind? In Metzinger 1995b. German
translation in Metzinger 1995a. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.
Güzeldere,
G. (1996). Consciousness
and the introspective link principle. In Hameroff et al. 1996.
Jamieson, D. & Bekoff, M. (1992). Carruthers on nonconscious experience. Analysis,
52, 23-8.
Kobes, B.W. (1995). Telic higher-order thoughts and
Moore's paradox. Philosophical Perspectives, 9, 291-312.
Kriegel, U. (2003). Consciousness, higher-order
content, and the individuation of vehicles. Synthese, 134(3),
477-504.
Lycan, W.G. & Ryder, Z. (2003). The loneliness of
the long-distance truck driver (Consciousness, mental states, higher-order
perception theories, HOP). Analysis, 63(2), 132-6.
Lycan, W.G. (1996). Consciousness as internal
monitoring, I. In Tomberlin 1995. Expanded version in Block et al. 1997.
Mellor, D.H. (1980). Consciousness and degrees of
belief. In D.H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, D.H., (1977-78). Conscious belief. Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 88, 87-101.
Natsoulas, T. (1992). Appendage theory - pro and con. Journal
of Mind and Behavior, 13(4), 371-96.
Natsoulas, T. (1993). The importance of being
conscious. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 14, 317-40.
Natsoulas, T. (1993). What is wrong with the appendage
theory of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology, 6, 137-54.
Nelkin, N. (1995). The dissociation of phenomenal
states from apperception. In Metzinger 1995b. German
translation in Metzinger 1995a.
Rosenthal,
D.M. (1986). Two concepts
of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 49, 329-59. Reprinted in
Rosenthal 1990 and Rosenthal 2000.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). Higher-order thoughts and the appendage theory of
consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 6, 155-67.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). State consciousness and
transitive consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 355-63.
Reprinted in Rosenthal 2000.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). Thinking that one thinks. In
Davies & Humphreys 1993. Reprinted in Rosenthal 2000.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1995). Moore’s paradox and
consciousness. In Tomberlin 1995. Reprinted in Rosenthal 2000.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In Block et al. 1997. Spanish translation in Villanueva & Diaz 1995.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1999). State consciousness and What It’s Like. In Rosenthal
2000.
Rosenthal, D.M. (2002). Explaining Consciousness. In
D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings.
Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Seager, W. (1994). Dretske on HOT theories of consciousness,
Analysis, 54, 270-76.
Shoemaker, S. (1993). Functionalism and consciousness.
In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
3.4
Consciousness and Intentionality
There is plausibly a close relationship between
consciousness and intentionality, but what exactly is the relationship? Is
consciousness (or the potential for consciousness) required for intentionality?
Do conscious states have intentional content, and if so, what sort of intentional
content do they have? These questions and others are addressed in the papers in
this section.
Baldwin, T. (1992). The projective theory of sensory
content. In Crane 1992.
Block, N. (1996). Mental paint and mental latex. In Villanueva 1996.
Cam, P. (1984). Consciousness and content-formation. Inquiry, 27,
381-98.
Carruthers, P. (2004). HOP over FOR, HOT theory. In R.
Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Chalmers, D.J. (2003). The content and epistemology of
phenomenal belief. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New
Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D.J. (2004). The representational character
of experience. In B. Leiter (ed.), The Future of Philosophy. Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press.
Clark, R. (1973). Sensuous judgments. Nous, 7, 45-56.
Clark, R. (1981). Sensing, perceiving, thinking. In E.
Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Grazer philosophische Studien, 12, 273-95.
Crane, T. (1992). The nonconceptual content of
experience. In Crane
1992.
Crane, T. (2003). The intentional structure of
consciousness. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New
Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford/NY: Oxford University Press.
Davies, M. (1995). Consciousness and the varieties of aboutness. In C.
MacDonald & G. MacDonald (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology: Debates
on Psychological Explanation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Davies, M. (1996). Externalism and experience. In A.
Clark, J. Ezquerro & J.M. Larrazabal (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive
Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.
DeBellis, M. (1991). The representational content of
musical experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 51, 303-24.
Esken,
F. (1998). Schwierigkeiten mit Glaubenszuschreibungen bei Tieren. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.
Falk, B. (1993). Consciousness, cognition, and the
phenomenal. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 67, 55-73.
Fellmann,
F. (1996). Intentionalität und zuständliches Bewußtsein. In Krämer 1996.
Fodor, J. & Lepore, E. (1994). What is the
Connection Principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54,
837-45.
Gennaro, R. (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory
of consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 581-6.
Gillett, G.R. (1992). Consciousness, intentionality and internalism. Philosophical
Psychology, 5, 173-80.
Gunderson, K. (1990). Consciousness and
intentionality: Robots with and without the right stuff. In C.A. Anderson &
J. Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language,
Logic, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.
Hamlyn, D.W. (1994). Perception, sensation, and
non-conceptual content. Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 139-53.
Hardcastle, V. g. (2004). HOT theories of
consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astray. In R.
Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories
of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Jacquette, D. (1984). Sensation and intentionality. Philosophical
Studies, 47, 229-40.
Kriegel, U. (2003). Is intentionality dependent upon
consciousness? Philosophical Studies, 116(3), 271-307.
Levine, J. (2003). Experience and representation. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness:
New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Lloyd, D. (1991). Leaping to conclusions:
Connectionism, consciousness, and the computational mind.
In T. Horgan & J. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the
Philosophy of Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Loar, B. (2003). Transparent experience and the
availability of qualia. In A. Jokic
& Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives.
Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, E.J. (1992). Experience and its objects. In Crane
1992.
Lycan, W. (2004). The superiority of HOP to HOT. In R.
Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories
of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Lycan, W.G. (1996). Layered perceptual representation.
In Villanueva 1996.
Lycan, W.G. (1998). In defense of the representational
theory of qualia (Replies to Neander, Rey, and Tye). In Tomberlin 1998.
Maloney, J.C. (1986). Sensuous content. Philosophical
Papers, 15, 131-54.
McGinn, C. (1988). Consciousness and content. Proceedings
of the British Academy, 74, 219-39. Reprinted in McGinn 1991.
McLaughlin, B. (2003). Color, consciousness, and color
consciousness. In A. Jokic & Q.
Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Mellor, D.H. (1977-8). Conscious belief. Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, 78, 87-101.
Metzinger, T. (2005). Conscious volition and mental
representation: Towards a more fine-grained analysis. In N. Sebanz & W.
Prinz (ed.), Disorders of Volition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Natsoulas, T. (1992). Intentionality, consciousness,
and subjectivity. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 13, 281-308.
Neander, K. (1998). The division of phenomenal labor:
A problem for representational theories of consciousness. In Tomberlin 1998.
Nelkin, N. (1989). Propositional attitudes and
consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49,
413-30.
Nelkin, N. (1993). The connection between
intentionality and consciousness. In Davies & Humphreys 1993.
Nida-Rümelin,
M. 2003). Phänomenale Begriff. In U. Haas-Spohn
(Hrsg.), Intentionalität zwischen Subjektivität und Weltbezug. Paderborn: mentis.
Pacherie, E. (1995). Théories représentationnelles de
l'intentionnalité perceptive et Leibhaftigkeit de l'objet dans la
perception. Archives de Philosophie, 58, 1-12.
Peacocke, C. (1984). Colour concepts and colour
experience. Synthese, 58, 365-82.
Peacocke, C. (1992). Scenarios, concepts, and projection.
In Crane 1992.
Peacocke, C. (1998). Bewußte
Einstellungen, Aufmerksamkeit und Selbsterkenntnis. In Esken & Heckmann 1998. Reprinted [as “Conscious attitudes, attention and
self-knowledge”] in McDonald, C., Smitt, B. & Wright, C. (eds.), Knowing
our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pendlebury, M. (1987). Perceptual representation. Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society 87, 91-106.
Pendlebury, M. (1990). Sense experiences and their
contents: A defense of the propositional account. Inquiry, 33,
215-30.
Rey, G. (1998). A narrow representationalist account
of qualitative experience. In Tomberlin 1998.
Rosenthal, D. (2004). Varieties of higher-order
theory. In R. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order
Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1998). The colors and shapes of visual experience. In Fisette
1998. Reprinted in Rosenthal 1999.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1999). Why are verbally expressed thoughts conscious? In
Rosenthal 1999.
Seager, W. (2004). A cold look at HOT theory. In R.
Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories
of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Searle, J.R. (1989). Consciousness, unconsciousness,
and intentionality. Philosophical Topics, 17, 193-209.
Searle, J.R. (1990). Consciousness, explanatory
inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13,
585-642.
Searle, J.R. (1994). The connection principle and the
ontology of the unconscious: A reply to Fodor and Lepore. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 54, 847-55.
Snowdon, P. (1990). The objects of perceptual
experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement, 64,
121-50.
Sosa, E. (1986). Experience and intentionality. Philosophical
Topics, 14, 67-83.
Sosa, E. (2003). Privileged access. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness:
New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Stalnaker, R. (1996). On a defense of the hegemony of
representation. In Villanueva 1996.
Textor,
M. (1998). Unbewußte Überzeugungen, subdoxastische Zustände und die
Allgemeinheitsprinzipien. In Esken
& Heckmann 1998.
Tye, M. (1992). Visual qualia and visual content. In
Crane 1992. Revised version in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind.
Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford/New York: Oxford University
Press.
Tye, M. (1994). Do pains have representational
content? In Casati, Smith & White 1994.
Tye, M. (1996). Orgasms again. In Villanueva 1996.
Tye, M. (1998). Inverted Earth, Swampman, and
representationism. In Tomberlin
1998.
Tye, M. (2003). Blurry images, double vision, and
other oddities: New problems for representationalism? In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness:
New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Valberg, J.J. (1992). The puzzle of experience. In Crane 1992.
Van Gulick, R. (1988). Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality,
and self-understanding machines. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.
Van Gulick, R. (1995). How should we understand the
relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical
Perspectives, 9, 271-89.
Van Gulick, R. (1995). Understanding the relation
between intentionality and consciousness. In Tomberlin 1995.
Van Gulick, R. (2003). Maps, gaps and traps. In A. Jokic
& Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van Gulick, R. (2004). Higher-order global states HOGS: an
alternative higher-order model of consciousness. In R. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
3.5
Dennett on Consciousness
An important reductive account of consciousness has
been developed by Daniel Dennett over a period of many years, and has received
wide attention from other researchers. Because these papers often do not fit
naturally into the other subject-oriented sections, we have collected them into
a single section here.
Akins, K. & Winger, S. (1996). Ships in the night:
Churchland and Ramachandran on Dennett's theory of consciousness. In Akins
1996.
Akins, K. (1996). Lost the plot? Reconstructing
Dennett's multiple drafts theory of consciousness. Mind and Language, 11,
1-43.
Arbib, M. (1972). Consciousness: The secondary role of
language. Journal of Philosophy, 69, 579-91.
Baars, B.J. & McGovern, K. (1993). Does philosophy
help or hinder scientific work on consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition,
2, 18-27.
Baker, L.R. (1995). Content meets consciousness. Philosophical
Topics, 22, 1-22.
Block, N. (1995). What is Dennett’s theory a theory of?
Philosophical Topics, 22, 23-40.
Bricke, J. (1984). Dennett's eliminative arguments. Philosophical
Studies, 45, 413-29.
Bricke, J. (1985). Consciousness and Dennett’s
intentionalist net. Philosophical Studies, 48, 249-56.
Cam, P. (1985). Phenomenology and speech dispositions.
Philosophical Studies, 47, 357-68.
Churchland, P.S. & Ramachandran, V.S. (1993).
Filling in: Why Dennett is wrong. In
Dahlbom 1993. Also in Revonsuo & Kamppinen 1994.
Clark,
S.R.L. (1993). Minds, memes,
and rhetoric. Inquiry, 36, 3-16.
Dennett, D. (2003). Explaining the “Magic” of
Consciousness. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology, 1,
7-19.
Dennett,
D.C. & Kinsbourne, M. (1991). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 183-247. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.
Dennett, D.C. (1976). Are dreams experiences? Philosophical Review, 73,
151-71. Reprinted in Dennett 1978.
Dennett,
D.C. (1978). Reply to Arbib and Gunderson. In Dennett 1978.
Dennett,
D.C. (1978). Toward a
cognitive theory of consciousness. In Dennett 1978.
Dennett, D.C. (1978). Why you can't make a computer that feels pain. Synthese, 38, 415-56. Reprinted in Dennett 1978.
Dennett, D.C. (1979). On the absence of phenomenology. In D. Gustafson &
B. Tapscott (eds.), Body, mind and method: Essays in Honor of Virgil Aldrich.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Dennett, D.C. (1979). The onus re experiences: A reply to Emmett. Philosophical Studies, 35, 315-8.
Dennett, D.C. (1981). Wondering where the yellow went. Monist, 64, 102-08.
Dennett, D.C. (1982). How to study human consciousness empirically, or
nothing comes to mind. Synthese, 59, 159-80.
Dennett, D.C. (1986). Julian Jaynes' software
archaeology. Canadian Psychology, 27, 149-54.
Dennett, D.C. (1988). Quining qualia. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988. Reprinted
in Block et al. 1997.
Dennett,
D.C. (1988). The evolution
of consciousness. In J. Brockman (ed.), Speculations. The Reality
Club. New York: Prentice Hall Press.
Dennett, D.C. (1991). Lovely and suspect qualities. In Villanueva 1991.
Dennett,
D.C. (1993). Caveat emptor. Consciousness
and Cognition, 2,
48-57.
Dennett, D.C. (1993). Living on the edge. Inquiry, 36, 135-59.
Dennett, D.C. (1993). Précis of Consciousness
Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53,
889-92.
Dennett, D.C. (1993). The message is: There is no medium. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 53, 919-31.
Dennett, D.C. (1995). Get real. Philosophical Topics, 22,
505-60.
Dennett, D.C. (1996). Bewußtsein hat
mehr mit Ruhm als mit Fernsehen zu tun. In C. Maar, E. Pöppel & T.
Christaller (Hrsg.), Die Technik auf dem Weg zur Seele: Forschungen an der
Schnittstelle Gehirn / Computer. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt (rororo science 60133).
Dennett, D.C. (1996). Seeing is believing - or is it? In
Akins 1996.
Dennett,
D.C. (2003). Look out for
the dirty baby. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(1), 31-33.
Dennett, D.C. (2003). The self as a responding - and
responsible - Artifact. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1001,
39-50.
Dennett, D.C. (2003). Who's on first?
Heterophenomenology explained. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10),
19-30.
Dretske, F. (1995). Differences that make no
difference. Philosophical Topics, 22, 41-58.
Emmett, K. (1978). Oneiric experiences. Philosophical
Studies, 34, 445-50.
Fellows, R. & O'Hear, A. (1993). Consciousness
avoided. Inquiry, 36, 73-91.
Foster, J. (1993). Dennett's rejection of dualism. Inquiry,
36, 17-31.
Gunderson, K. (1972). Content and Consciousness and the mind-body
problem. Journal of Philosophy, 69, 591-604.
Jackson, F. (1993). Appendix A (for philosophers). Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 53, 899-903.
Kirk, R. (1993). “The best set of tools?” Dennett's
metaphors and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Quarterly, 43,
335-43.
Lockwood, M. (1993). Dennett's mind. Inquiry, 36,
59-72.
Lormand, E. (1995). Qualia! (Now showing at a theater near you.) Philosophical
Topics, 22, 127-56.
Mangan, B. (1993). Dennett, consciousness, and the
sorrows of functionalism. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 1-17.
Marbach, E. (1988). How to study consciousness
phenomenologically or quite a lot comes to mind. Journal of the British
Society for Phenomenology, 19, 252-68.
Marbach, E. (1994). Troubles with heterophenomenology.
In Casati, Smith & White 1994.
McCauley, R.N. (1993). Why the blind can't lead the
blind: Dennett on the blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness
and Cognition, 2, 155-64.
McGinn, C. (1995). Consciousness evaded: Comments on
Dennett. Philosophical Perspectives, 9, 241-49.
Radner, D. (1994). Heterophenomenology: Learning about
the birds and the bees. Journal of Philosophy, 91, 389-403.
Raffman, D. (1993). Qualms about Quining qualia. In D.
Raffman, Language, Music, and Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ramachandran, V.S. (1993). Filling in gaps in logic:
Some comments on Dennett. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 165-8.
Rey, G. (1995). Dennett’s unrealistic psychology. Philosophical Topics, 22, 259-90.
Robinson, W.S. (1972). Dennett's analysis of
awareness. Philosophical Studies, 23, 147-52.
Robinson, W.S. (1994). Orwell, Stalin, and determinate
qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75, 151-xxx.
Rorty, R. (1972). Dennett on awareness. Philosophical
Studies, 23, 153-62.
Rorty, R. (1993). Holism, intrinsicality, and the
ambition of transcendence. In Dahlbom
1993.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 53, 911-18.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1995). First-person operationalism and mental taxonomy. Philosophical
Topics, 22, 319-50. Expanded version in Rosenthal 1999.
Rosenthal, D.M. (1995). Multiple drafts and facts of the matter. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.
Ross, D. (1993). Quining qualia Quine’s way. Dialogue, 32,
439-59.
Ross, D. (1994). Dennett’s conceptual reform. Behavior and Philosophy, 22, 41-52.
Seager, W. (1993). The elimination of experience. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 53, 345-65.
Seager, W. (1993). Verification, skepticism, and consciousness.
Inquiry, 36, 113-36.
Shoemaker, S. (1993). Lovely and suspect ideas. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 53, 903-8.
Siewert, C. (1993). What Dennett can't
imagine and why. Inquiry, 36, 93-112.
Sprigge, T.L.S. (1993). Is Dennett a disillusioned
zimbo? Inquiry, 36, 33-57.
Toribio, J. (1993). Why there still has to be a theory
of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 28-47.
Tye, M. (1993). Reflections on Dennett and
consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53,
891-6.
Van Gulick, R. (1995). Dennett, drafts,
and phenomenal realism. Philosophical
Topics, 22,
443-56.
3.6
Consciousness: Miscellaneous
This section contains miscellaneous philosophical
articles on consciousness. These include very broad articles on the subject, as
well as articles on smaller specific topics that do not have sections of their
own.
Aleksander, I. & Dunmall, B. (2003). Axioms and
tests for the presence of minimal consciousness in agents. Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 10, 7-18.
Antony, M.V. (1994). Against functionalist theories of
consciousness. Mind & Language, 9, 105-23.
Atmanspacher, H. (2004). Quantum theory and
consciousness: An overview with selected examples. Discrete Dynamics in
Nature and Society, 1, 51-73.
Baars, B. & Dalton, T. (2003). Consciousness
regained – The scientific restoration of mind and brain. In R. Evans & T.
Dalton (eds.), The Life Cycle of Psychological Ideas: Understanding
Prominence and the Dynamics of Intellectual Change. Dordrecht:
Kluwer/Academic.
Baars, B.J. (1995). Understanding subjectivity: Global
workspace theory and the resurrection of the observing self. Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 3, 211-16.
Baars, B.J. (2003). How brain reveals mind - Neural
studies support the fundamental role of conscious experience. Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), 100-14.
Baas, N. (1996). A framework for higher-order
cognition and consciousness. In Hameroff et al. 1996.
Beckermann,
A. (1994). Metarepräsentationen und phänomenale Zustände. In Lenk & Poser 1994.
Beckermann, A. (1995). Visual information-processing
and phenomenal consciousness. In Metzinger 1995b. German
translation in Metzinger 1995a.
Bieri,
P. (1982). Nominalism
and inner experience. The Monist, 65, 68-87. German
translation: Nominalismus und innere Erfahrung. Zeitschrift für
philosophische Forschung, 36, 3-24.
Bieri,
P. (1986). Zeiterfahrung und Personalität. In H. Burger
(Hrsg.), Natur, Mensch und Zeit. Berlin: Arno Spitz.
Birnbacher,
D. (1994). Einige Gründe, das Hirntodkriterium zu akzeptieren.
In J. Hoff & J. in der Schmitten (Hrsg.), Wann ist der Mensch tot?
Organverpflanzung und “Hirntod”-Kriterium. Reinbek: Rowohlt.
Blackmore,
S. (2003). Consciousness in meme machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 19-30.
Bouratinos, E. (2003). A pre-epistemology of
consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(12), 38-41.
Braddon-Mitchell D. (2004). Masters of Our Meanings. Philosophical
Studies, 118, 133-52.
Breeur, R. (2003). Consciousness and the self. International
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 11(4), 415-36.
Burns, J. (1996). The possibility of empirical test of hypotheses about
consciousness. In Hameroff et al. 1996.
Cam, P. (1989). Notes toward a faculty
theory of cognitive consciousness. In Slezak 1989.
Cassam, Q. (1995). Introspection and bodily
self-ascription. In Bermúdez et al. 1995.
Chalmers D. (2004). Epistemic two-dimensional
semantics. Philosophical Studies, 118, 153-226.
Chalmers, D.J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of
consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 200-19. Also
in Hameroff et al. 1996. German translation in Esken &
Heckmann 1998.
Chalmers, D.J. (2002). Consciousness and its place in
nature. In D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. Classical and
Contemporary Readings. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Chisholm, R.M. (1990). Questions about the unity of
consciousness. In Cramer et al. 1990.
Church, J. (1998). Two sorts of consciousness? Communication
and Cognition, 31, 57-72.
Clark, T.W. (1995). Function and phenomenology:
Closing the explanatory gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2,
241-54.
Clement, F. & Malerstein, A.J. (2003). What is it
like to be conscious? The ontogenesis of consciousness. Philosophical
Psychology, 16(1), 67-85.
Cotterill, R.M. (2003). Conscious unity, emotion,
dreaming, and the solution of the hard problem. In Cleeremans 2003.
Dalton, T. (2000). The developmental roots of
consciousness and emotional experience. Consciousness and Emotion, 1,
55-90.
Davies M. (2004). Reference, contingency, and the
two-dimensional framework. Philosophical Studies, 118, 83-131.
de Vignemont, F. (2004). The co-consciousness hypothesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Sciences, 3(1), 97-114.
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3.7 Knowing What It's Like and the Knowledge Argume