Thomas Metzinger

 

 “Consciousness”


 Selected Bibliography

1970 - 2004

 

 

 

 

This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 34 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use.

This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file from his personal homepage at http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/. Other formats are available upon request. This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to “cut and paste” from the original file. To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Please submit new entries, errata etc. to metzinger@uni-mainz.de. Last update of current version: December 19th, 2004.


 

1. Monographs

 

1.1 Philosophy of Mind

 

 

 

Armstrong, D.M. & Malcolm, N. (1984). Consciousness and Causality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Armstrong, D.M. (1981). The Nature of Mind. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Blackmore, S. (2004). Consciousness—An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Campbell, K.K. (1970). Body and Mind. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.

Carruthers, P. (1996). Language, Thought and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. (1996). The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.

Churchland, P.M. (1984). Matter and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Churchland, P.M. (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective. The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Churchland, P.M. (1995). The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. German translation. (1997): Die Seelenmaschine. Eine philosophische Reise ins Gehirn. Heidelberg: Spektrum Verlag.

Churchland, P.S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Clark, A. (1992). Sensory Qualities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, A. (2000). A Theory of Sentience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cornman, J.W. (1971). Materialism and Sensations. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Culbertson, J.T. (1982). Consciousness: Natural and Artificial. Roslyn Heights, New York: Libra.

Davidson, D. (1993). Der Mythos des Subjektiven. Stuttgart: Reclam.

Dennett, D.C. (1978[1981]). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dennett, D.C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston/Toronto/London: Little, Brown and Company. Deutsch: Descartes, Potemkin und die Büchse der Pandora - Eine neue Philosophie des menschlichen Bewußtseins. Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe.

Dennett, D.C. (1996). Kinds of Minds. Towards an Understanding of Consciousness. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Dennett, D.C. (2005). Sweet Dreams. Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dewart, L. (1989). Evolution and Consciousness: The Role of Speech in the Origin and Development of Human Nature. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. German translation (1998): Naturalisierung des Geistes. Paderborn: mentis.

Ellis, R.D. (1986). An Ontology of Consciousness. Dordrecht: Kluwer/Martinus Nijhoff.

Evans, C.O. (1970). The Subject of Consciousness. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Fisette, D. (2000). Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Flanagan, O. (1984; 2nd edition 1991).The Science of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Flanagan, O. (1992). Consciousness Reconsidered. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Foster, J. (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. London: Routledge.

Funke, G. (1990). Abdankung der Bewußtseinsphilosophie? Bonn: Bouvier.

Gennaro, R.J. (1996). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Gloy, K. (1998). Bewußtseinstheorien. Zur Problematik und Problemgeschichte des Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins. Freiburg: Alber.

Goodman, N. (1977). The Structure of Appearance. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Gottschling, V. (2003). Bilder im Geiste. Paderborn: mentis.

Gray, J. (2004). Consciousness - Creeping up on the Hard Problem. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gunderson, K. (1971). Mentality and Machines. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.

Hannay, A. (1990). Human Consciousness. London: Routledge.

Hardcastle, V.G. (1995). Locating Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Hardin, C.L. (1988; expanded edition 1993). Color for Philosophers. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Harrison, B. (1973). Form and Content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Hill, C.S. (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hinton, J. (1973). Experiences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hodgson, D. (1991). The Mind Matters. Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hofmann, F. (2002). Natur und Begriff des Bewusstseins. Paderborn: mentis.

Hofstadter, D.R. (1979). Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. New York: Basic Books. German translation. (1981): Gödel, Escher, Bach: Ein Endloses, Geflochtenes Band. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Honderich, T. (1989). Mind and Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hurley, S.L. (1998). Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press.

Jackson, F.C. (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jacob, P. (1997). Pourquoi les Choses Ont-elles un Sens? Paris: Odile Jacob.

Kim, J. (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kirk, R. (1994). Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kügler, P. (2002). Die Philosophie der primären und sekundäre Qualitäten. Paderborn: mentis.

Kutschera, F. v. (2003). Jenseits des Materialismus. Paderborn: mentis.

Landesman, C. (1989). Color and Consciousness. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Lanz, P. (1996). Das phänomenale Bewußtsein: Eine Verteidigung. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Levin, M. (1979). Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Livingston, P.M. (2004). Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lockwood, M. (1989). Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lund, D.H. (1994). Perception, Mind, and Personal Identity: A Critique of Materialism. Lanham: University Press of America.

Lycan, W.G. (1987). Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lycan, W.G. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Madell, G. (1988). Mind and Materialism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Marbach, E. (1993). Mental Representation and Consciousness: Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Margolis, J. (1978). Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Non-Reductive Materialism. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Marks, C. (1980). Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and the Unity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Matson, W.I. (1976). Sentience. Berkeley: University of California Press.

McGinn, C. (1982). The Character of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McGinn, C. (1983). The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McGinn, C. (1991). The Problem of Consciousness: Essays toward a Resolution. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

McGinn, C. (1999). The Mysterious Flame - Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books.

McGinn, C. (2004). Consciousness and its Objects. New York : Oxford University Press.

Meixner, U. (2004). The Two Sides of Being. Paderborn: mentis.

Messing, J. (1999). Allgemeine Theorie des Bewusstseins. Berlin: Weidler Buchverlag.

Metzinger, T. (1985). Neuere Beiträge zur Diskussion des Leib-Seele-Problems. Frankfurt/Bern/New York: Peter Lang.

Metzinger, T. (1993). Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen Bewußtseins vor dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler Repräsentation. Paderborn: mentis.

Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deutsch. (1992): Der Blick von nirgendwo. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Nelkin, N. (1996). Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nemirow, L. (1979). Functionalism and the Subjective Quality of Experience. Dissertation, Stanford University: University Microfilms International.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1993). Farben und phänomenales Wissen. St. Augustin: Academia.

Niklaus, S. (2004). Leerheit und Bewusstsein. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag.

Papineau, D. (1993). Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pauen, M. (1999). Das Rätsel des Bewußtseins. Eine Erklärungstrategie. Paderborn: mentis.

Peacocke, C. (1983). Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Penrose, R. (1989). The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deutsch. (1991): Computerdenken. Des Kaiser neue Kleider oder Die Debatte um Künstliche Intelligenz, Bewußtsein und die Gesetze der Physik. Heidelberg: Spektrum Verlag.

Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deutsch. (1995): Schatten des Geistes. Heidelberg: Spektrum Verlag.

Pohlenz, G. (1994). Phänomenale Realität und Erkenntnis: Umrisse einer Theorie im Ausgang von der eigentümlichen Natur des Qualia-Begriffs. Freiburg: Alber.

Poland, J. (1994). Physicalism: The Empirical Foundations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Popper, K.R. (1994). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction. London: Routledge.

Prinz, J. (2004). Gut Reactions. A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Radner, D. & Radner, M. (1989). Animal Consciousness. Buffalo: Prometheus.

Revonsuo, A. (1995). On the Nature of Consciousness: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations. Turku: Turun Yliopisto.

Robinson, H. (1982). Matter and Sense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Robinson, W.S. (1988). Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and its Causal Conditions. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Robinson, W.S. (2004). Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ros, A. (2004). Materie und Geist. Paderborn: mentis.

Rosenberg, G. (2004). A Place for Consciousness. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Rossman, N. (1991). Consciousness: Separation and Integration. Albany: SUNY Press.

Schleichert, H. (1992). Der Begriff des Bewußtseins. Eine Bedeutungsanalyse. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Schlimgen, E. (1999). Nietzsches Theorie des Bewußtseins. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.

Schütte, M. (2004). Reduktion ohne Erklärung. Phänomenale Eigenschaften aus der Perspektive des Aposteriori-Physikalismus. Paderborn: mentis.

Seager, W.E. (1992). Metaphysics of Consciousness. London: Routledge.

Searle, J. (1997). The Mystery of Consciousness. New York/London: Granta Books.

Searle, J.R. (1984). Minds, Brains and Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. German translation. (1996): Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Shoemaker, S. (1984). Identity, Cause, and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shoemaker, S. (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Siewert, C.E. (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sommerhoff, G. (1991). Life, Brain, and Consciousness. Amsterdam: Elsevier

Strawson, G. (1994). Mental Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Stubenberg, L. (1998). Consciousness and Qualia. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Tetens, H. (1994). Geist, Gehirn, Maschine. Philosophische Versuche über ihren Zusammenhang. Stuttgart: Reclam (8999).

Tye, M. (1991). The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and Persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Unger, P. (1990). Identity, Consciousness and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Valberg, J.J. (1992). The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. German translation. (1992): Der Mittlere Weg der Erkenntnis. Der Brückenschlag zwischen wissenschaftlicher Theorie un menschlicher Erfahrung. München: Scherz.

Velmans, M. (2000). Understanding Consciousness. London: Routledge.

Walde, B. (2002). Metaphysik des Bewusstseins. Paderborn: mentis.

Werth, R. (1983). Bewußtsein - Psychologische, neurobiologische und wissenschaftstheoretische Aspekte. Berlin: Springer.

Wilkes, K.V. (1978). Physicalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Wilkes, K.V. (1988). Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wyss, D. (1988). Traumbewußtsein? Grundzüge einer Ontologie des Traumbewußtseins. Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht.

 

 

1.2 Selected Readings: Cognitive Science & Psychology

 

 

Ackerman, D. (1990). A Natural History of the Senses. Randhom House.

Austin, J.H. (1998). Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Baars, B.J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baars, B.J. (1997). In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bachmann, T. (2000). Microgenetic approach to the conscious mind. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Bassin, F.W. (1970). Bewußtsein und Unbewußtes. Leipzig: Hirzel.

Berthoz, A. (1997). Le Sens du Mouvement. Paris: Odile Jacob.

Blackmore, S. (2003). Consciousness. An Introduction. Abingdon/Oxon: Hodder&Stoughton.

Chafe, W.L. (1994). Discourse, Consciousness, and Time: The Flow and Displacement of Conscious Experience in Speaking and Writing. University of Chicago Press.

Changeux, J.P. (1983). L'Homme Neuronal. Paris: Fayard.

Czikzsentmihalyi, M. & Czikzsentmihalyi, I.S. (1988). Optimal Experience: Psychological Studies of Flow in Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dawkins, M.S. (1993). Through our Eyes only. The Search for Animal Consciousness. Oxford, NY, Heidelberg: Freeman/Spektrum Verlag.

Delacour, J. (2001). Conscience et Cerveau: La Nouvelle Frontière des Neurosciences. Bruxelles: De Boeck Université.

Di Francesco, M. (2000). La coscienza. Bari: Laterza.

Dittrich, A. (1985). Ätiologie-unabhängige Strukturen veränderter Wachbewußtseinszustände. Stuttgart: Enke.

Droege, P. (2003). Caging the Beast. A Theory of Sensory Consciousess. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Ellis, R.D. (1995). Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition, and Emotion in the Human Brain. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Farthing, G.W. (1992). The Psychology of Consciousness. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Gadenne, V. & Oswald, M.E. (1991). Kognition und Bewußtsein. Berlin: Springer.

Gadenne, V. (1996). Bewußtsein, Kognition und Gehirn: Einführung in die Psychologie des Bewußtseins. Bern: Hans Huber.

Goodale, M. & Milner, A. (2003). Sight Unseen. An Exploration of Conscious and Unconscious Vision. New York: Oxford University Press.

Green, C. & McGreery, C. (1994). Lucid Dreaming: The Paradox of Consciousness During Sleep. London: Routledge.

Harth, E. (1993). The Creative Loop: How the Brain Makes a Mind. Addison-Wesley.

Hilgard, E.R. (1977). Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action. New York: Wiley. Expanded edition published 1986.

Holzinger, B. (1994). Der luzide Traum: Phänomenologie und Physiologie. Wien: Wiener Universitätsverlag.

Humphrey, N. (1984). Consciousness Regained. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Humphrey, N. (1992). A History of the Mind. Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness. New York: Simon and Schuster. Deutsch. (1995): Die Naturgeschichte des Ich. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe.

Ihde, D. (1977). Experimental Phenomenology. New York: Putnam.

Jackendoff, R. (1987). Consciousness and the Computational Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Jouvet, M. (1994). Die Nachtseite des Bewußtseins. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.

Klatzky, R.L. (1984). Memory and Awareness. New York: Freeman. German translation. (1989): Gedächtnis und Bewußtsein. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Klein, D.B. (1984). The Concept of Consciousness: A Survey. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Kosslyn, S.M. (1980). Image and Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kosslyn, S.M. (1994). Image and Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kunzendorf, R.G. & Wallace, B. (1999). Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Kurthen, M. (1990). Das Problem des Bewußtseins in der Kognitionswissenschaft - Perspektiven einer Kognitiven Neurowissenschaft. Stuttgart: Enke.

Kurthen, M. (1992). Neurosemantik. Grundlagen einer Praxiologischen Kognitiven Neurowissenschaft. Stuttgart: Enke.

Kurthen, M. (1994). Hermeneutische Kognitionswissenschaft. Bonn: djre-Verlag.

LaBerge, S. (1985). Lucid Dreaming. Los Angeles: Jeremy Tarcher.

Levicki, P. (1986). Nonconscious Social Information Processing. New York: Academic Press.

Libet, B. (2004). Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lloyd, D. (2004). Radiant Cool. A Novel Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lyons, W. (1986). The Disappearance of Introspection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mack, A. & Rock, I. (1998). Inattentional Blindness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Manzotti, R. & Tagliasco, V. (2001). Coscienza e Realtà. Una Teoria della Coscienza per Costruttori e Studiosi di Menti e Cervelli. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Marton, F. & Booth, S.A. (1997). Learning and Awareness. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Morris, P. & Hampson, P.J. (1983). Imagery and Consciousness. London and New York: Academic Press.

Mueller, E. T. (1990). Daydreaming in Humans and Machines: A Computer Model of the Stream of Thought. Ablex.

Nelson, T. O. (1992). Metacognition: Core Readings. Allyn and Bacon.

Norretranders, T. (1991). The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size. Viking Penguin.

Norretranders, T. (1994). Spüre die Welt. Die Wissenschaft des Bewußtseins. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.

Ornstein, R. (1977). The Psychology of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch.

Ornstein, R. (1991). The Evolution of Consciousness: Of Darwin, Freud, and Cranial Fire: The Origins of the Way We Think. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Ramachandran, V.S. & Blakeslee, S. (1998). Phantoms in the Brain. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.

Rollin, B.E. (1989). The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosenfield, I. (1992). The Strange, Familiar, and Forgotten: An Anatomy of Consciousness. London: Picador. German translation. (1992): Das Fremde, das Vertraute und das Vergessene. Anatomie des Bewußtseins. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.

Rychlak, J.F. (1997). In Defense of Human Consciousness. Washington DC: American Psychological Association.

Schurig, V. (1976). Die Entstehung des Bewußtseins. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.

Scott, A. (1995). Stairway to the Mind. The Controversial New Science of Consciousness. New York & Berlin: Springer.

Shevrin, H., Bond, J.A. Brakel, L.A. W, Hertel, R.K. & Williams, W.J. (1996). Conscious and Unconscious Processes: Psychodynamic, Cognitive, and Neurophysiological Convergences. New York: Guilford.

Smythies, J.R. (1994). The Walls of Plato’s Cave. The Science and Philosophy of Brain, Consciousness and Perception. Aldershot: Aversbury.

Sparti, D. (2000). Identità e coscienza. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Stephan, A. (1999). Emergenz. Von der Unvorhersagbarkeit zur Selbstorganisation. Dresden/München: Dresden University Press.

Taylor, J.G. (1998). The Race for Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Umilta, C. & Moscovitch, M. (1994). Attention and Performance 15, Conscious and Nonconscious Information Processing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Velmans, M. (2000). Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: Methodologies and Maps. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Velmans, M. (2003). How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains? Exeter: Imprint Academic.

Wolman, B.B. & Ullman, U. (1986). Handbook of States of Consciousness. van Nostrand Reinhold.

 

 

1.3 Selected Readings: Neurosciences

 

 

Abeles, M. (1991). Corticonics: Neural Circuits of the Cerebral Cortex. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bachmann, T. (1994). Psychophysiology of Visual Masking. The Fine Structure of Conscious Experience. Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers.

Brown, J. (1991). Self and Process. Brain-states and the Conscious Present. New York: Springer.

Calvin, W. (1990). The Cerebral Symphony: Seashore Reflections on the Structure of Consciousness. Bantam. German translation. (1993): Die Symphonie des Denkens - Wie aus Neuronen Bewußtsein entsteht. München: Carl Hanser.

Changeux, J.P. (1985). Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind. New York: Pantheon Books.

Churchland, P.S. & Sejnowski, T.J. (1992). The Computational Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. German translation (1997); Churchland, P.S. & Sejnowski, T. (1997). Grundlagen zu Neuroinformatik und Neurobiologie. Stuttgart: Vieweg.

Cotterill, R. (1998). Enchanted Looms. Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers. Cambrideg, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Dainton, B. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. London, New York: Routledge.

Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ Error. New York: Putnam/Grosset. German translation (1995): Descartes’ Irrtum. München und Leipzig: List.

Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace & Company.

Dehaene, S. (2002). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Delacour, J. (1994). Biologie de la Conscience. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Eccles, J.C. (1984). The Human Mystery. Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Edelman, G.E. (1987). Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection. New York: Basic Books. German translation. (1993): Unser Gehirn, ein dynamisches System: Die Theorie des neuronalen Darwinismus und die biologischen Grundlagen der Wahrnehmung. München: Piper.

Edelman, G.M. & Mountcastle, V.B. (1978). The Mindful Brain: Cortical Organization and the Group-selective Theory of Higher Brain Function. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Edelman, G.M. & Tononi, G. (2000). A Universe of Consciousness. How Matter becomes Imagination. New York: Basic Books.

Edelman, G.M. (1989). The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York: Basic Books.

Edelman, G.M. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. New York: Basic Books. German translation. (1995): Göttliche Luft, vernichtendes Feuer: Wie der Geist im Gehirn entsteht. München: Piper.

Edelman, G.M. (2004). Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Farah, M. (1991). Visual Agnosia: Disorders of Object Recognition and What They Tell Us about Normal Vision. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Franke, E. (1996). Was ist Bewusstsein? Aspekte einer allgemeinen Theorie
koordinierter Funktion cerebraler Neuronen
.
Berlin: VWB-Verlag.

Gazzaniga, M.S. & Le Doux, J.E. (1978). The Integrated Mind. New York: Plenum Press.

Greenfield, S.A. (1995). Journey to the Centers of the Mind: Towards A Science of Consciousness. New York: Freeman.

Griffin, D.R. (1981). The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience. New York: Rockefeller University Press.

Hameroff, S. (1987). Ultimate Computing: Biomolecular Consciousness and Nanotechnology.

Hernegger, R. (1995). Wahrnehmung und Bewußtsein. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zur Neuropsychologie. Heidelberg: Spektrum Verlag.

Hobson, J.A. (1988). The Dreaming Brain. New York: Basic Books.

Hobson, J.A. (1995). The Chemistry of Conscious States. Boston/Toronto/London: Little, Brown and Company.

Hobson, J.A. (1999). Consciousness. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company/Scientific American Library.

Hobson, J.A. (2002). The Dream Drugstore: Chemically Altered States of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Jaynes, J. (1976). The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Deutsch. (1988): Der Ursprung des Bewußtseins durch den Zusammenbruch der bikameralen Psyche. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.

Koch, C. (2004). The Quest for Consciouness. Englewood, CO: Roberts and Company Publishers.

Kuhlenbeck, H. (1973). Gehirn und Bewußtsein. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

LaBerge, D. (1995). Attentional Processing: The Brain’s Art of Mindfulness. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.

Laughlin, C.D., McManus, J. & D’Aquili, E.G. (1992). Brain, Symbol and Experience. Toward a Neurophenomeeology of Human Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press.

Libet, B. (1993). Neurophysiology of Consciousness: Selected Papers and New Essays. Boston: Birkhäuser.

MacPhail, E. (1998). The Evolution of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marks, L.E. (1978). The Unity of the Senses: Interrelations among the Modalities. New York: Academic Press.

Northoff, G. (1995). Neuropsychiatrische Phänomene und das Leib-Seele Problem: Qualia im Knotenpunkt zwischen Leib und Seele. Essen: Blaue Eule Verlag.

Penfield, W. (1975). The Mystery of the Mind: A Critical Study of Consciousness and the Human Brain. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pöppel, E. (1985). Grenzen des Bewußtseins. München: DTV.

Pöppel, E. (1988). Mindworks: Time and Conscious Experience. New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Popper, K.R. & Eccles, J.C. (1977). The Self and its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Routledge and Kegan Paul. German translation. (1982): Das Ich und sein Gehirn. München: Piper.

Robertson, I.H. & Marshall, J.C. (1993). Unilateral Neglect: Clinical and Experimental Studies. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Rose, S. (1973). The Conscious Brain. New York: Knopf. Revised edition 1989.

Roth, G. (1994). Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Shallice, T. (1988). From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A Case-Study and Implications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weiskrantz, L. (1997). Consciousness Lost and Found. A Neuropsychological Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zeki, S. (1993). A Vision of the Brain. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Scientific Publications.

 

 

2. Anthologies

 

2.1 Philosophy of Mind

 

 

Akins, K. (1996)[ed.]. Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Albertz, J. (1994)[Hrsg.]. Das Bewußtsein - philosophische, psychologische und physiologische Aspekte. Berlin: Freie Akademie.

Beckermann, A., Flohr, H. & Kim, J. (1992)[eds.]. Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.

Bermúdez, J.L., Marcel, A. & Eilan, N. (1995)[eds.]. The Body and the Self. Cambrigde, MA: MIT Press.

Bieri, P. (1993)[Hrsg.]. Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Königstein: Hain 1981; 2. Auflage 1993; 3. Auflage 1997, Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum.

Block, N. (1980)[ed.]. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Block, N. (1981)[ed.]. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Block, N., Flanagan, O. & Güzeldere, G. (1997)[eds.]. The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Carrier, M. & Machamer, P. (1997)[eds.]. Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh-Konstanz Series in the Philosophy and History of Science. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Konstanz/Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Casati, R., Smith, B. & White, S. (1995)[eds.]. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. German translation: Philosophie und die kognitiven Wissenschaften. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.

Cheng, C. (1975)[ed.]. Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press.

CIBA Foundation. (1993). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Cleeremans, A. (2003)[ed.]. The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cornwell, J. (1998)[ed.]. Consciousness and Human Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cramer, K., Fulda, H.-F., Horstmann, R.-P. & Pothast, U. (1990)[Hrsg.]. Theorie der Subjektivität. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Crane, T. (1992)[ed.]. The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dahlbom, B. (1993)[ed.]. Dennett and his Critics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Davies, M. & Humphreys, G. (1993)[eds.]. Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Dietrich, E. (1994)[ed.]. Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons: Essays on the Intentionality of Machines. New York: Academic Press.

Dol, M., Kasanmoentalib, S., Lijmbach, S., Rivas, E. & van den Bos, R. (1997)[eds.]. Animal consciousness and animal ethics. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Esken, F. & Heckmann, H.-D. (1998)[Hrsg.]. Bewußtsein und Repräsentation. Paderborn: mentis.

Fisette, D. (1998)[ed.]. Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Gennaro, R. J. (2004)[ed.]. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Globus, G.G., Maxwell, G. & Savodnik, I. (1976)[eds.]. Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry. New York: Plenum Press.

Guttmann, G. & Langer, G. (1992)[eds.]. Das Bewußtsein: Multidimensionale Entwürfe. Berlin: Springer.

Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A., & Scott, A. (1996). Toward a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Herrmann, C., Pauen, M., Rieger, J. & Schicktanz, S. (2005)[Hrsg.]. Bewusstsein - Perspektivenwechsel zwischen den Disziplinen. Frankfurt: UTB.

Hofstadter, D.R. & Dennett, D.C. (1981)[eds.]. The Mind's I. New York: Basic Books. German translation:. (1982), Einsicht in Ich. Fantasien und Refelexionen über Selbst und Seele. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Hookway, C. & Peterson, D. (1994)[eds.]. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ito, M., Myashita, Y. & Rolls, E.T. (1997)[eds.]. Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F. (1998)[ed.]. Consciousness. Brookfield: Ashgate.

Jokic, A. & Smith, Q. (2003)[eds.]. Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Krämer, S. (1994)[ed.]. Geist, Gehirn, Künstliche Intelligenz - Zeitgenössische Modelle des Denkens. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.

Krämer, S. (1996)[ed.]. Bewußtsein. Philosophische Beiträge. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Lenk, H. & Poser, H. (1993)[eds.]. Neue Realitäten: Herausforderungen der Philosophie.VI: Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie Berlin 20.-24. September 1993. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

Livet, P. (2000)[ed.]. De la Perception à L'Action. Contenus Perceptifs et Perception de L'action. Paris: Vrin.

Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y. & Stoljar, D. (2004)[eds.]. There’s Something about Mary. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lycan, W.G. (1990)[ed.]. Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Marcel, A. & Bisiach, E. (1988)[eds.]. Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McCauley, R.N. (1996)[ed.]. The Churchlands and Their Critics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Metzinger, T. (1995a)[ed.]. Bewußtsein - Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn: mentis.

Metzinger, T. (1995b)[ed.]. Conscious Experience. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic & Paderborn: mentis.

Metzinger, T. (2000)[ed.]. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Myin, E. (1997)[ed.]. Approaching Consciousness I. Communication and Cognition, 30.

Myin, E. (1998)[ed.]. Approaching Consciousness II. Communication and Cognition, 31.

Oeser, E. & Seitelberger, F. (1988)[eds.]. Gehirn, Bewußtsein und Erkenntnis. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Otto, H. & Tuedio, J. (1988)[eds.]. Perspectives on Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Pauen, M. & Stephan, A. (2002)[Hrsg.]. Phänomenales Bewusstsein – Rückkehr zur Identitätstheorie? Paderborn: mentis.

Peacocke, C. (1994)[ed.]. Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Petitot, J., Varela, F., Pachoud, B. & Roy, J.M. (1999)[eds.]. Naturalizing Phenomenology: Current Issues in Contemporary Phneomenology and Cogntive Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Pöppel, E. (1989)[ed.]. Gehirn und Bewußtsein. Weinheim: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft.

Proust, J. (1997)[ed.]. Perception et Intermodalité. Approches Actuelles de la Question de Molyneux. Paris: Presse Universitaire de France.

Revonsuo, A. & Kamppinen, M. (1994)[eds.]. Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Robinson, H. (1993)[ed.]. Objections to Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1991)[ed.]. The Nature of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosenthal, D.M. (2000)[ed.]. Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schumacher, R. (2004)[ed.]. Perception and Reality – From Descartes to the Present. Paderborn: mentis.

Shear, J. (1997)[ed.]. Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Slezak, P. (1989)[ed.]. Computers, Brains and Minds. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Thompson, E. (2004)[ed.]. The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Calgary, AL: University of Alberta Press.

Tomberlin, J. (1989)[ed.]. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.

Tomberlin, J. (1990)[ed.]. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.

Tomberlin, J. (1995)[ed.]. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9: AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.

Tomberlin, J. (1998)[ed.]. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology. Malden, MA / Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Tress, W. & Nagel, S. (1993)[eds.]. Psychoanalyse und Philosophie: Eine Begegnung. Heidelberg: Asanger.

Velmans, M. & Schneider, S. (2005)[eds.]. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.

Villanueva, E. (1991)[ed.]. Consciousness: Philosophical Issues. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.

Villanueva, E. (1996)[ed.]. Perception. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.

Warner, R. & Szubka, T. (1994)[eds.]. The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Zelazo, P.D., Moscovitch, M. & Thompson, E. (2005)[eds.]. Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.

 

 

 

2.2 Selected Readings: Cognitive Science & Psychology

 

 

Baars, B.J., Banks, W.P. & Newman, J.B. (2003)[eds.]. Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Baddeley, A.D. & Weiskrantz, L. (1993)[eds.]. Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beauregard, M. (2004)[ed.]. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation, and the Brain. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Berry, D.C. & Dienes, Z. (1993)[eds.]. Implicit Learning: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Blakemore, C. & Greenfield, S. (1987)[eds.]. Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Block, R.A. (1990)[ed.]. Cognitive Models of Psychological Time. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Bornstein, R.F. & Pittman, T.S. (1992)[eds.]. Perception without Awareness: Cognitive, Clinical and Social Perspectives. New York: Guilford.

Bowers, K.S. & Meichenbaum, D. (1984)[eds.]. The Unconscious Reconsidered. New York: Wiley.

Cavallero, C. & Foulkes, D. (1993)[eds.]. Dreaming as Cognition. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Challis, B.H. & Velichovsky, B.M. (1999)[eds.]. Stratification in Cognition and Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

CIBA Foundation. (1993). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Cleeremans, A. (2003)[ed.]. The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, J.D. & Schooler, J.W. (1997)[eds.]. Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Davidson, J.M. & Davidson, R.J. (1980)[eds.]. The Psychobiology of Consciousness. New York: Plenum.

Davidson, R., Schwartz, G. & Shapiro, D. (1983)[eds.]. Consciousness and Self-regulation. Vol. 1. New York: Plenum.

Goldman, A.I. (1993)[ed.]. Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Greenberg, G. & Tobach, E. (1987)[eds.]. Cognition, Language, and Consciousness: Integrative Levels. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Grivois, H. & Proust, J. (1998)[eds.]. Subjectivité et Conscience d’Agir. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A., & Scott, A. (1996)[eds.]. Toward a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A., & Scott, A. (1998)[eds.]. Toward a Science of Consciousness II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Heyer, D., Mausfeld, R. (2003)[ed.]. Colour Perception, Mind and thePhysical World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Hookway, C. (1984)[ed.]. Minds, Machines, and Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ito, M., Myashita, Y. & Rolls, E.T. (1997)[eds.]. Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jiménez, L. (2003)[ed.]. Attention and Implicit Learning. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Josephson, B.D. & Ramachandran, V.S. (1980)[eds.]. Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Kessel, K.S., Cole, P.M. & Johnson, D.L. (1992)[eds.]. Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum

Klement, H.-W. (1975)[Hrsg.]. Bewusstsein - Ein Zentralproblem der Wissenschaften. Baden-Baden: Agis Verlag.

Marcel, A. & Bisiach, E. (1988)[eds.]. Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mausfeld, R., Heyer, D. (2003)[eds.]. Colour Perception. Mind and thePhysical World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Metzinger, T. (2000)[ed.]. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ornstein, R. (1973)[ed.]. The Nature of Human Consciousness. A Book of Readings. San Francisco: Freeman.

Osaka, N. (2003)[ed.]. Neural Basis of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Pickering, J. & Skinner, M. (1990)[eds.]. From Sentience to Symbols: Readings on Consciousness. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Pope, K.S. & Singer, J.L. (1978)[eds.]. The Stream of Consciousness: Scientific Investigation into the Flow of Experience. New York: Plenum.

Quen, J.M. (1986)[ed.]. Split Minds/Split Brains: Historical and Current Perspectives. New York University Press.

Rescher, N. (1986)[ed.]. Current Issues in Teleology. University Press of America.

Revonsuo, A. & Kamppinen, M. (1994)[eds.]. Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Schwartz, G. & Shapiro D. (1976)[eds.]. Consciousness and Self-regulation. Vol.1. New York: Plenum.

Schwartz, G. & Shapiro D. (1978)[eds.]. Consciousness and Self-regulation. Vol 2. New York: Plenum.

Slunecko, T., Vitouch, O., Korunka, C., Bauer, H. & Flatschacher, B. (1999)[eds.]. Psychologie des Bewusstseins - Bewusstsein der Psychologie. Wien: Wiener Universitätsverlag.

Solso, R. (1975)[ed.]. Information Processing and Consciousness. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Stamenov, M.I. (1997)[ed.]. Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Stein, D.J. (1997)[ed.]. Cognitive Science and the Unconscious. American Psychiatric Press.

Sugarman, A.A. & Tarter, R.E. (1978)[eds.]. Expanding Dimensions of Consciousness. Springer.

Tratteur, G. (1995)[ed.]. Consciousness: Distinction and Reflection. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

Umilta, C. & Moscovitch, M. (1995)[eds.]. Conscious and Nonconscious Information Processing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Underwood, G. & Stevens, R. (1979)[eds.]. Aspects of Consciousness. Vol. 1. Psychological Issues. London: Academic Press.

Underwood, G. & Stevens, R. (1981)[eds.]. Aspects of Consciousness. Vol. 2. Structural Issues. London: Academic Press.

Underwood, G. & Stevens, R. (1983)[ed.]. Aspects of Consciousness. Vol. 3. Awareness and Self-awareness. London: Academic Press.

Underwood, G. & Stevens, R. (1984)[ed.]. Aspects of Consciousness. Vol. 4. Clinical Issues. London: Academic Press.

Underwood, G. (1996). Implicit Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Velmans, M. (1996)[ed.]. The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews. London: Routledge.

Velmans, M. & Schneider, S. (2005)[eds.]. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.

Weiß, H. & Pagel, G. (1989)[eds.]. Das Bewußtsein und das Unbewußte. Beiträge zu ihrer Interpretation und Kritik. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

Werth, R. (1998). Hirnwelten. Berichte vom Rande des Bewußtseins. München: C.H. Beck.

Zelazo, P.D., Moscovitch, M. & Thompson, E. (2005)[eds.]. Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.

 

 

2.3 Selected Readings: Neurosciences

 

 

Basar, E. & Bullock, T. (1992)[eds.]. Induced Rhythms in the Brain. Boston: Birkhäuser.

Bock, G.R. & Marsh, J. (1993)[eds.]. Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. New York: Wiley.

Bonke, B., Bovill, J.G., & Moerman, N. (1996)[eds.]. Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia III. Van Gorcum.

Bonke, B., Fitch, W. & Millar, K. (1990)[eds.]. Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia. Swets & Zeitlinger.

Buser, P.A. & Rougeul-Buser, A. (1978)[eds.]. Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. INSERM Symposium No. 6. Amsterdam: North Holland/Elsevier.

CIBA Foundation. (1993). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Cleeremans, A. (2003)[ed.]. The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, J.M. & Davidson, R.J. (1980)[eds.]. The Psychobiology of Consciousness. New York: Plenum Press.

Gackenbach, J. & LaBerge, S. (1988)[eds.]. Conscious Mind, Sleeping Brain. New York/London: Plenum Press.

Gazzaniga, M. (1995)[ed.]. The Cognitive Neurosciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gazzaniga, M. (1999)[ed.]. The New Cognitive Neurosciences (2nd edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gordon, G., Maxwell, G. & Savodnik, I. (1976)[eds.]. Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry. New York: Plenum Press.

Grossenbacher, P. (1999)[ed.]. Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A neurocognitive Approach. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Hameroff, S., Kaszniak, A., & Scott, A. (1996)[eds.]. Toward a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hobson, J.B. & Brazier, M.A. (1982)[eds.]. The Reticular Formation Revisited. New York: Raven.

Ito, M., Myashita, Y. & Rolls, E.T. (1997)[eds.]. Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jasper, H.H, Descarries, L., Castellucci, V.F, & Rossignol, S. (1998)[eds.]. Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Advances in Neurology, 77. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott-Raven.

Koch, C. & Davis, J.L. (1994)[eds.]. Large-Scale Neuronal Theories of the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Metzinger, T. (2000)[ed.]. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Milner, D. & Rugg, M. (1992)[eds.]. The Neuropsychology of Consciousness. London: Academic Press.

Oakley, D. (1985)[ed.]. Brain and Mind. Andover: Methuen.

Pöppel, E. (1989)[ed.].Gehirn und Bewußtsein. Weinheim: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft.

Prigatano, G.P. & Schacter, D.L. (1991)[eds.]. Awareness of Deficit after Brain Injury: Clinical and Theoretical Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Revonsuo, A. & Kamppinen, M. (1994)[eds.]. Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Roediger III, H.L. & Craik, F.I.M. (1989)[eds.]. Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of Endel Tulving.

Rosen, M., & Lunn, J.N. (1987)[eds.]. Consciousness, Awareness, and Pain in General Anesthesia. Butterworths.

Sebel, P.S., Bonke, B. & Winograd, E. (1993)[eds.]. Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia II. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Singer, W. (1994)[ed.]. Gehirn und Bewußtsein. Heidelberg: Spektrum Verlag.

Velmans, M. & Schneider, S. (2005)[eds.]. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.

Weiskrantz, L. (1986)[ed.]. Thought Without Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zelazo, P.D., Moscovitch, M. & Thompson, E. (2005)[eds.]. Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3. Articles

 

 

3.1 The Concept of Consciousness

 

This section contains articles analyzing the concept of consciousness, or attempting to determine what it is for an organism or a mental state to be conscious, or distinguishing various kinds of consciousness. Articles along these lines can also be found in sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and elsewhere.

 

 

Allport, A. (1988). What concept of consciousness? In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.

Anscombe, G.E.M. (1976). The subjectivity of sensation. Ajatus, 36, 1-18.

Atkinson, A.P., Thomas, M.S.C., & Cleeremans, A. (2000). Consciousness: Mapping the theoretical landscape. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 372-82.

Averill, E.W. (1982). The primary-secondary quality distinction. Philosophical Review, 91, 343-61.

Bayne, T. & Chalmers, D.J. (2003). What is the unity of consciousness? In Cleeremans 2003.

Beckermann, A. (1997). Was macht Bewußtsein für Philosophen zum Problem? Logos, N.F. 4, 1-19.

Bieri, P. (1995). Why is consciousness puzzling? In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a, Singer 1994 and in Spektrum der Wissenschaft, Oktober 1992.

Bisiach, E. (1988). The (haunted) brain and consciousness. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.

Block, N. (1990). Consciousness and accessibility. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 596-8.

Block, N. (1994). Consciousness. In S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.

Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about the function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227-87. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Burge, T. (1995). Zwei Arten von Bewußtsein. In Metzinger 1995a.

Butcharov, P. (1980). Adverbial theories of consciousness. In French, P.A., Uehling, T.E. & Wettstein, H (eds.), Studies in Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Carruthers, P. (1998). Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy, 6, 203-22.

Chalmers, D.J. (1997). Availability: The cognitive basis of experience? In Block et al. 1997.

Churchland, P.M. (1996). The rediscovery of light. Journal of Philosophy, 93, 211-28.

Churchland, P.S. (1983). Consciousness: The transmutation of a concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 80-93.

Churchland, P.S. (1995). Die Neurobiologie des Bewußtseins: Können wir etwas von ihr lernen? In Metzinger 1995a.

Davies, M. & Humphreys, G. (1993). Introduction. In Davies & Humphreys 1993.

de Quincey, C. (1994). Consciousness all the way down? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1, 217-29.

Diemer, A. (1971). Bewusstsein. In J. Ritter (ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Band 1. Basel und Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co. Verlag.

Dretske (1997). What good is consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 27, 1-17. German translation in Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Dretske, F. (1996). Phenomenal externalism, or if meanings ain't in the head, where are qualia? In Villanueva 1996.

Flanagan, O. & Güzeldere, G. (1997). Consciousness: a philosophical tour. In Ito et al. 1997.

Flanagan, O. & Polger, T. (1995). Zombies and the function of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 313-21.

Flanagan, O.J. (1995). Consciousness and the natural method. Neuropsychologia, 33, 1103-15.

Flohr, H. (1996). Ignorabimus? In G. Roth & W. Prinz (Hrsg.), Kopf-Arbeit – Gehirnfunktionen und kognitive Leistungen. Heidelberg, Berlin, Oxford: Spektrum Verlag.

Gennaro, R.J. (1995). Does mentality entail consciousness? Philosophia, 24, 331.

Goldman, A. (1993). Consciousness, folk psychology and cognitive science. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 364-82. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Hastedt, H. (1985). Bewußtsein. In E. Martens & H. Schnädelbach (eds.), Philosophie. Ein Grundkurs. Band 2. Reinbek: Rowohlt.

Heckmann, H.-D. & Esken, F. (1998). Generelle Einführung: Bewußtsein und Repräsentation. Bemerkungen über zwei Schlüsselbegriffe, ihre Ausdifferenzierung und ihren Zusammenhang. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Honderich, T. (1995). Consciousness, neural functionalism, and real subjectivity. American Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 369-81.

Jack, A.I. & Shallice, T. (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition, 79, 161-96.

Kemmerling, A. (1998). Eine Handvoll Bemerkungen zur begrifflichen Unübersichtlichkeit von “Bewußtsein”. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Krämer, S. (1994). Geist ohne Bewußtsein? Über einen Wandel in den Theorien vom Geist. In Krämer 1994.

Krämer, S. (1996). “Bewußtsein” als theoretische Fiktion und als Prinzip des Personverstehens. In Krämer 1996.

Kriegel, U. (2003). Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2(1), 1-26.

Kurthen, M. (1993). Kriterien der Bewußtseinszuschreibung bei natürlichen und künstlichen kognitiven Systemen. Kognitionswissenschaft, 3, 161-70.

Kurthen, M. (1996). Das harmlose Faktum des Bewußtseins. In Krämer 1996.

Lloyd, D. (1995). Consciousness: A connectionist manifesto. Minds and Machines, 5, 161-85.

Lormand, E. (1998). Consciousness. In E. Craig & L. Floridi (eds.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Lowe, E.J. (1995). There are no easy problems of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 266-71.

Lycan, W.G. (1991). Consciousness. Academic American Encyclopedia, 5, 200. Danbury: Grolier Incorporated.

Matthews, G. (1977). Consciousness and life. Philosophy, 52, 13-26.

McCulloch, G. (1990). Externalism and experience. Analysis, 50, 244-50.

McCulloch, G. (1993). The very idea of the phenomenological. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 67, 39-57.

Mellor, D.H. (1980). Consciousness and degrees of belief. In D.H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Metzinger, T. & Schumacher, R. (1999). Bewußtsein. In H.-J. Sandkühler (ed.), Enzyklopädie der Philosophie. Hamburg: Meiner.

Metzinger, T. (1994). Schimpansen, Spiegelbilder, Selbstmodelle und Subjekte. Drei Hypothesen über den Zusammenhang zwischen mentaler Repräsentation und phänomenalem Bewußtsein. In Krämer 1994.

Metzinger, T. (1994). Subjectivity and mental representation. In G. Meggle & U. Wessels (Hrsg.), ANALYOMEN 1 - Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.

Metzinger, T. (1995). Introduction: The problem of consciousness. In Metzinger 1995b. Original German version in Metzinger 1995a.

Metzinger, T. (2000). The subjectivity of subjective experience: a representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective. In Metzinger 2000.

Moody, T.C. (1986). Distinguishing consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47, 289-95.

Natsoulas, T. (1978). Consciousness. American Psychologist, 33, 906-14.

Natsoulas, T. (1983). A selective review of conceptions of consciousness with special reference to behavioristic contributions. Cognition and Brain Theory, 6, 417-47.

Natsoulas, T. (1986). On the radical behaviorist conception of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 7, 87-115.

Nelkin, N. (1993). What is consciousness? Philosophy of Science, 60, 419‑34.

Nikolinakos, D. (1994). General anesthesia, consciousness, and the skeptical challenge. Journal of Philosophy, 91, 88-104.

O’Shaughnessy, B. (1991). The anatomy of consciousness. In Villanueva 1991.

Parks, Z. (1972). Toward a logic of experience. Philosophia (Israel), 2, 183-94.

Place, U.T. (1992). Two concepts of consciousness: The biological/private and the linguistic/social. Acta Analytica, 8, 53-72.

Revonsuo, A. (2000). Prospects for a scientific research program on consciousness. In Metzinger 2000.

Rey, G. (1983). A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In Davidson et al. 1983.

Rey, G. (1988). A question about consciousness. In Otto & Tuedio 1988.

Ripley, C. (1984). Sperry's concept of consciousness, Inquiry, 27, 399-423.

Rorty, R. (1994). Consciousness, intentionality, and the philosophy of mind. In Warner & Szubka 1994.

Sartwell, C. (1995). Radical externalism concerning experience. Philosophical Studies, 8, 55-70.

Schleichert, H. (1985). On the concept of unity of consciousness. Synthese, 64, 411-20.

Schleichert, H. (1996). Über die Bedeutung von “Bewußtsein”. In Krämer 1996.

Searle, J.R. (1993). The problem of consciousness. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley. Also in Revonsuo & Kamppinen 1994.

Shannon, B. (1990). Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 11, 137-51.

Sprigge, T.L.S. (1994). Consciousness. Synthese, 98, 73-93.

Thomas, A. (2003). An adverbial theory of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2(3), 161-85.

Toulmin, S. (1982). The genealogy of “consciousness”. In P.F. Secord (ed.), Explaining Human Behaviour. Consciousness, Human Action and Social Structure. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Tye, M. (1995). The burning house. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Van Gulick, R. (1988). A functionalist plea for self-consciousness. The Philosophical Review, 97, 149-81.

van Gulick, R. (1995). Explaining consciousness: what would count? In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Velmans, M. (1990). Consciousness, brain, and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology, 3, 77-99.

Velmans, M. (1996). What and where are conscious experiences? In M. Velmans (ed.), The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological and Clinical Reviews. London: Routledge.

Velmans, M. (2000). A psychologist’s map of consciousness studies. In M. Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

von der Malsburg, C. (1997). The coherence definition of consciousness. In Ito et al. 1997.

Wilkes, K.V. (1984). Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35, 224-43.

Wilkes, K.V. (1988). ----, yishi, duh, um, and consciousness. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.

Wilkes, K.V. (1995). Losing consciousness. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Young, A.W. & Block, N. (1996). Consciousness. In V. Bruce (ed.), Unsolved Mysteries of the Mind. Hove, UK: Erlbaum.

 

 

3.2 Consciousness, Physicalism and the Mind-Body Problem

 

Is the existence of consciousness compatible with physicalism? The articles in this section address this question, and take various positions on this issue at the heart of the mind-body problem. This issue is also addressed by papers in most other sections, especially section 3.7.

 

Bechtel, W. & Richardson, R.C. (1983). Consciousness and complexity: Evolutionary perspectives on the mind-body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61, 378-95.

Beckermann, A. & Stephan, A. (1994). Stichwort: Emergenz. Information Philosophie, 3, 46-51.

Beckermann, A. (1990). Zur Logik der Identitätstheorie. In G. Pasternack (Hrsg.), Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Beckermann, A. (1992). Supervenience, emergence, and reduction. In Beckermann et al. 1992.

Beckermann, A. (1995). Mentale Zustände - emergent oder neurobiologisch erklärbar? Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften, 6, 79-82.

Beckermann, A. (2000). A perennial problem about the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness: Broad and Levine on the explanatory gap. In Metzinger 2000.

Bieri, P. (1987). Pain: A case study for the mind-body problem. Acta Neurochirurgica, Suppl. 38, 157-64. Deutsche, gekürzte Fassung: Schmerz: Eine Fallstudie zum Leib-Seele-Problem. In Pöppel 1989.

Bieri, P. (1992). Trying out epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis, 36, 283-309.

Birnbacher, D. (1985). Gibt es für das Leib-Seele-Problem eine “Lösung”? In Philosophie des Geistes/Philosophie der Psychologie. Akten des 9. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums 1984. Wien.

Birnbacher, D. (1988). Epiphenomenalism as a solution to the ontological mind-body problem. Ratio (new series), 1, 17-32.

Birnbacher, D. (1990). Das ontologischen Leib-Seele-Problem und seine epiphänomenalistische Lösung. In K.-E. Bühler (ed.), Aspekte des Leib-Seele-Problems. Philosophie, Medizin, Künstliche Intelligenz. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

Birnbacher, D. (1993). Eine Verteidigung des Epiphänomenalismus. In Philosophie Psychischer Phänomene. Vorträge des 9. Hamburger Kognitionskolloquiums vom 8.-9. Januar 1993. Hamburg: Graduiertenkolleg Kognitionswissenschaft 1993.

Birnbacher, D. (2002). Läßt sich Bewusstsein erklären? In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Block, N. & Stalnaker, R. (1999). Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Review, 108, 1-46.

Chalmers, D.J. (2000).What is a neural correlate of consciousness? In Metzinger 2000.

Churchland, P.S. (1988). Reductionism and the neurobiological basis of consciousness. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.

Clark, T.W. (1995). Function and phenomenology: Closing the explanatory gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 241-54.

Elitzur, A. (1989). Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 10, 1-20.

Ellis, R.D. & Newton, N. (1998). Three paradoxes of phenomenal consciousness: Bridiging the explanatory gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5, 419-42.

Ferber, R. (1998). Zenon von Elea und das Leib-Seele-Problem. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 23, 231-46.

Flohr, H. (1993). Die physiologischen Bedingungen des Bewußtseins. In Lenk & Poser 1993.

Fodor, J.A. (1981). The mind-body problem. Scientific American, 244, 114-25.

Foss, J. (1987). Is the mind-body problem empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17, 505-32.

Fox, M. (1978). Beyond materialism. Dialogue, 17, 367-70.

Gomes, G. (1995). Self-awareness and the mind-brain problem. Philosophical Psychology, 8, 155-65.

Goswami, A. (1990). Consciousness in quantum physics and the mind-body problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 11, 75-96.

Gunderson, K. (1970). Asymmetries and mind-body perplexities. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 4, 273-309.

Gustafson, D. (1998). Pain, qualia, and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Psychology, 11, 371-98.

Heidelberger, M. (2002). Wie das Leib-Seele-Problem in den Logischen Empirismus kam. In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Hill, C.S. (2002). Imaginability, conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Studies, 87, 61-85. German translation in  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Honderich, T. (1981). Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry, 24, 277-303.

Howard, D.J. (1986). The new mentalism. International Philosophical Quarterly, 26, 353-7.

Kim, J. (2002). Emergenz, Reduktionsmodelle und das Mentale. In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Kirk, R. (1974). Zombies vs. materialists. Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supp. 48, 135-52.

Kirk, R. (1977). Reply to Don Locke on Zombies and materialism. Mind, 86, 262-4.

Kirk, R. (1979). From physical explicability to full-blooded materialism. Philosophical Materialism, 29, 229-37.

Kirk, R. (1982). Physicalism, identity and strict implication. Ratio, 24, 131-41.

Kirk, R. (1991). Why shouldn't we be able to solve the mind-body problem? Analysis, 51, 17-23.

Kraemer, E.R. (1980). Imitation-man and the 'new' epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10, 479-87.

Kurthen, M. & Linke, D.B. (1989). Der Emergentismus als Scheinlösung des Bieri-Trilemmas. Psychotherapie, Medizinische Psychologie, Psychosomatik, 39, 480-2.

Lahav, R. & Shanks, N. (1992). How to be a scientifically respectable 'property dualist'. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 13, 211-32.

Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354-61. German translation in Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Levine, J. (1993). On leaving out what it's like. In Davies & Humphreys 1993. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Locke, D. (1971). Must a materialist pretend he's anaesthetized? Philosophical Quarterly, 21, 217-31.

Locke, D. (1976). Zombies, schizophrenics, and purely physical objects. Mind, 83, 97-9.

Mayer, U. (2002). Lassen sich phänomenologische Gesetze „im Prinzip“ auf mikro-physikalische Theorien reduzieren? In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

McGinn, C. (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind, 98, 349-66. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

McGinn, C. (1993). Consciousness and cosmology: Hyperdualism ventilated. In Davies & Humphreys 1993.

McGinn, C. (1995). Consciousness and space. In Metzinger 1995b. Also in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 32, 220-30. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

McGinn, C. (2003).                                                      What constitutes the mind-body problem? (Consciousness).                        Nous, 13, 148-62.

McLaughlin, B. (2002). Zur Verteidigung des New-Wave Materialismus. In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Metzinger, T. (1990). Kritierien für eine Theorie zur Lösung des Leib-Seele-Problems. Erkenntnis, 32, 127-45. Reprinted in Acta Universitatis Lodziensis, Folia Philosophica, 8, 151-68.

Metzinger, T. (1991). Das Leib-Seele-Problem in den achtziger Jahren. Conceptus, 64, 99-114.

Nagel, T. (1979). Panpsychism. In Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nagel, T. (1993). What is the mind-body problem? In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Nagel, T. (1994). Consciousness and objective reality. In Warner & Szubka 1994.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1997). Is the naturalization of qualitative experience possible or sensible? In Carrier & Machamer 1997.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (2002). Erklärbare und nicht erklärbare Aspekte phänomenalen Erlebens. In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (2004). Phenomenal essentialism – A problem for identity-theorists. In Schumacher 2004.

Noonan, H.W. (1999). Microphysical supervenience and consciousness. Mind, 108, 755-9.

Papineau, D. (1998). Mind the gap. In Tomberlin 1998.

Papineau, D. (2003). Could there be a science of consciousness? Philosophical Issues, 13, 205-20.

Pauen, M. (1996). Mythen des Materialismus. Der Eliminative Materialismus und die Theorie der psychophysischen Identität. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, XLIV, 77–100.

Pauen, M. (19989. Is there an empirical answer to the explanatory gap argument? Commentary on J. G. Taylor, Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap. Consciousness and Cognition, 7, 202-205.

Pauen, M. (1999). Phenomenal Experience and Science: Separated by a “brick wall”? Commentary on: Stephen E. Palmer, Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 968.

Pauen, M. (2000). Painless Pain: Property-Dualism and the Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 51-64.

Pauen, M. (2003). Is type identity incompatible with multiple realization? Grazer Philosophische Studien, 65, 37-49.

Perkins, M. (1970). Matter, sensation, and understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly, 8, 1-12.

Perkins, M. (1971). Sentience. Journal of Philosophy, 68, 329-37.

Place, U.T. (1977). Twenty years on - Is consciousness still a brain process? Open Mind, 6, 3-10. [See also: Place, U.T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50. German translation in Pauen & Stephan 2002.]

Place, U.T. (1988). Thirty years on - Is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66, 208-19.

Place, U.T. (1989). Thirty five years on - Is consciousness still a brain process? In J. Brandl & W.L. Gombocz (eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 36, 17-29.

Place, U.T. (1995). 'Is consciousness a brain process?' Some misconceptions about the article. In B. Borstner & J. Shawe-Taylor (eds.), Consciousness at the Crossroads of Cognitive Science and Philosophy: Selected Proceedings of the final meeting of the Tempus Project 'Phenomenology and Cognitive Science', Slovenia 1994. Bound with Consciousness Research Abstracts. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic.

Robinson, H. (1976). The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy. Zygon, 11, 346-60.

Robinson, W.S. (1982). Causation, sensation, and knowledge. Mind, 91, 525-40.

Ruhnau, E. (1995). Time-Gestalt and the observer. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Schröder, J. (2002). Phänomenales Bewusstsein, reduktive Erklärung und der Mythos der Erklärungslücke. In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Sellars, W. (1981). Is consciousness physical? Monist, 64, 66-90.

Smith, A.D. (1993). Non-reductive physicalism? In Robinson 1993.

Sperry, R. (1980). Mind-brain interaction: mentalism yes, dualism no. Neuroscience, 5, 195-206.

Squires, R. (1974). Zombies vs materialists II. Aristotelian Society Supplement, 48, 153-63.

Stephan, A. (1992/93). Der Mythos der reduzierbar emergenten Eigenschaften. Conceptus, 68/69, 191-200.

Stephan, A. (1993). C.D. Broads a priori-Argument für die Emergenz phänomenaler Qualitäten. In Lenk & Poser 1993.

Stephan, A. (1994). Theorien der Emergenz – Metaphysik oder? Grazer Philosophische Studien, 48, 105-15.

Stephan, A. (2000). Naturalisierung, Reduktion und reduktive Erklärung. Facta Philosophica, 2, 237-248.

Stephan, A. (2001). How to Lose the Mind-Body Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 61, 277-281.

Stephan, A. (2002). Phänomenaler Pessimismus. In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Strawson, G. (1994). The experiential and the non-experiential. In Warner & Szubka 1994.

Tye, M. (1983). On the possibility of disembodied existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61, 275-82.

Tye, M. (1999). Phenomenal consciousness: the explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion. Mind, 108, 705-25.

Van Cleve, J. (1990). Mind - dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 215-26.

Van Gulick, R. (1985). Physicalism and the subjectivity of the mental. Philosophical Topics, 12, 51-70.

Van Gulick, R. (1992). Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. In Beckermann et al. 1992.

Van Gulick, R. (1993). Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? In Davies & Humphreys 1993. Revised versions in Block et al. 1997.

Van Gulick, R. (2002). Nichtreduktiver Materialismus – noch immer das beste Angebot auf dem Leib-Seele Basar. In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Velmans, M. (1990). Consciousness, brain, and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology, 3, 77-99.

Velmans, M. (1995). The relation of consciousness to the material world. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 255-65.

Velmans, M. (1998). Goodbye to reductionism. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & A. Scott (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Velmans, M.  (2001). A natural account of phenomenal consciousness. Communication and Cognition, 34(1&2), 39-59.

White, S. (1989). Transcendentalism and its discontents. Philosophical Topics, 17, 231-61.

 

3.3 Consciousness as Higher-Order Thought

 

A popular way to make sense of consciousness has been to analyze it in terms of the existence of some higher-order mental state - that is, a mental state that is itself directed at another mental state. Sometimes this higher-order state is taken to be a state of “inner perception” of another mental state, but more frequently (especially in the work of David Rosenthal) it has been taken to be a state of thought about another mental state. The papers cited here develop and critically address these suggestions. The issues are also addressed in chapters of some monographs in section 1.1, including Dennett 1991, Dretske 1995, Gennaro 1996 and Siewert 1994. See also the collection of texts in Gennaro 2004.

 

Aquila, R. (1990). Consciousness as higher-order thought: Two objections. American Philosophical Quarterly, 27, 81-7.

Armstrong, D.M. (1981). What is consciousness? In Armstrong 1981. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Byrne, A (1997). Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts. Philosophical Studies, 2, 103-29.

Carruthers, P. (1989). Brute experience. Journal of Philosophy, 86, 258-69.

Carruthers, P. (1992). Consciousness and concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 66, 41-59.

Dretske, F. (1993). Conscious experience. Mind, 102, 263-83. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Francescotti, R.M. (1995). Higher-order thoughts and conscious experience. Philosophical Psychology, 8, 239-54.

Gennaro, R.J. (1993). Brute experience and the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers, 22, 51.

Gennaro, R.J. (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(4), 581-6.

Güzeldere, G. (1995). Is consciousness the perception of what passes on one's own mind? In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Güzeldere, G. (1996). Consciousness and the introspective link principle. In Hameroff et al. 1996.

Jamieson, D. & Bekoff, M. (1992). Carruthers on nonconscious experience. Analysis, 52, 23-8.

Kobes, B.W. (1995). Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Perspectives, 9, 291-312.

Kriegel, U. (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. Synthese, 134(3), 477-504.

Lycan, W.G. & Ryder, Z. (2003). The loneliness of the long-distance truck driver (Consciousness, mental states, higher-order perception theories, HOP). Analysis, 63(2), 132-6.

Lycan, W.G. (1996). Consciousness as internal monitoring, I. In Tomberlin 1995. Expanded version in Block et al. 1997.

Mellor, D.H. (1980). Consciousness and degrees of belief. In D.H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mellor, D.H., (1977-78). Conscious belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 88, 87-101.

Natsoulas, T. (1992). Appendage theory - pro and con. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 13(4), 371-96.

Natsoulas, T. (1993). The importance of being conscious. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 14, 317-40.

Natsoulas, T. (1993). What is wrong with the appendage theory of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology, 6, 137-54.

Nelkin, N. (1995). The dissociation of phenomenal states from apperception. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 49, 329-59. Reprinted in Rosenthal 1990 and Rosenthal 2000.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). Higher-order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 6, 155-67.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). State consciousness and transitive consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 355-63. Reprinted in Rosenthal 2000.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). Thinking that one thinks. In Davies & Humphreys 1993. Reprinted in Rosenthal 2000.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1995). Moore’s paradox and consciousness. In Tomberlin 1995. Reprinted in Rosenthal 2000.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In Block et al. 1997. Spanish translation in Villanueva & Diaz 1995.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1999). State consciousness and What It’s Like. In Rosenthal 2000.

Rosenthal, D.M. (2002). Explaining Consciousness. In D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

Seager, W. (1994). Dretske on HOT theories of consciousness, Analysis, 54, 270-76.

Shoemaker, S. (1993). Functionalism and consciousness. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester, UK: Wiley.

 

3.4 Consciousness and Intentionality

 

There is plausibly a close relationship between consciousness and intentionality, but what exactly is the relationship? Is consciousness (or the potential for consciousness) required for intentionality? Do conscious states have intentional content, and if so, what sort of intentional content do they have? These questions and others are addressed in the papers in this section.

 

Baldwin, T. (1992). The projective theory of sensory content. In Crane 1992.

Block, N. (1996). Mental paint and mental latex. In Villanueva 1996.

Cam, P. (1984). Consciousness and content-formation. Inquiry, 27, 381-98.

Carruthers, P. (2004). HOP over FOR, HOT theory. In R. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Chalmers, D.J. (2003). The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. (2004). The representational character of experience. In B. Leiter (ed.), The Future of Philosophy. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Clark, R. (1973). Sensuous judgments. Nous, 7, 45-56.

Clark, R. (1981). Sensing, perceiving, thinking. In E. Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Grazer philosophische Studien, 12, 273-95.

Crane, T. (1992). The nonconceptual content of experience. In Crane 1992.

Crane, T. (2003). The intentional structure of consciousness. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford/NY: Oxford University Press.

Davies, M. (1995). Consciousness and the varieties of aboutness. In C. MacDonald & G. MacDonald (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford: Blackwell.

Davies, M. (1996). Externalism and experience. In A. Clark, J. Ezquerro & J.M. Larrazabal (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

DeBellis, M. (1991). The representational content of musical experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51, 303-24.

Esken, F. (1998). Schwierigkeiten mit Glaubenszuschreibungen bei Tieren. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Falk, B. (1993). Consciousness, cognition, and the phenomenal. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 67, 55-73.

Fellmann, F. (1996). Intentionalität und zuständliches Bewußtsein. In Krämer 1996.

Fodor, J. & Lepore, E. (1994). What is the Connection Principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 837-45.

Gennaro, R. (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 581-6.

Gillett, G.R. (1992). Consciousness, intentionality and internalism. Philosophical Psychology, 5, 173-80.

Gunderson, K. (1990). Consciousness and intentionality: Robots with and without the right stuff. In C.A. Anderson & J. Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.

Hamlyn, D.W. (1994). Perception, sensation, and non-conceptual content. Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 139-53.

Hardcastle, V. g. (2004). HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astray. In R. Gennaro (ed.),  Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Jacquette, D. (1984). Sensation and intentionality. Philosophical Studies, 47, 229-40.

Kriegel, U. (2003). Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness? Philosophical Studies, 116(3), 271-307.

Levine, J. (2003). Experience and representation. In  A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

Lloyd, D. (1991). Leaping to conclusions: Connectionism, consciousness, and the computational mind. In T. Horgan & J. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Loar, B. (2003). Transparent experience and the availability of qualia. In  A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

Lowe, E.J. (1992). Experience and its objects. In Crane 1992.

Lycan, W. (2004). The superiority of HOP to HOT. In R. Gennaro (ed.),  Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Lycan, W.G. (1996). Layered perceptual representation. In Villanueva 1996.

Lycan, W.G. (1998). In defense of the representational theory of qualia (Replies to Neander, Rey, and Tye). In Tomberlin 1998.

Maloney, J.C. (1986). Sensuous content. Philosophical Papers, 15, 131-54.

McGinn, C. (1988). Consciousness and content. Proceedings of the British Academy, 74, 219-39. Reprinted in McGinn 1991.

McLaughlin, B. (2003). Color, consciousness, and color consciousness. In  A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

Mellor, D.H. (1977-8). Conscious belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 78, 87-101.

Metzinger, T. (2005). Conscious volition and mental representation: Towards a more fine-grained analysis. In N. Sebanz & W. Prinz (ed.), Disorders of Volition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Natsoulas, T. (1992). Intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 13, 281-308.

Neander, K. (1998). The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representational theories of consciousness. In Tomberlin 1998.

Nelkin, N. (1989). Propositional attitudes and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49, 413-30.

Nelkin, N. (1993). The connection between intentionality and consciousness. In Davies & Humphreys 1993.

Nida-Rümelin, M. 2003). Phänomenale Begriff. In U. Haas-Spohn (Hrsg.), Intentionalität zwischen Subjektivität und Weltbezug. Paderborn: mentis.

Pacherie, E. (1995). Théories représentationnelles de l'intentionnalité perceptive et Leibhaftigkeit de l'objet dans la perception. Archives de Philosophie, 58, 1-12.

Peacocke, C. (1984). Colour concepts and colour experience. Synthese, 58, 365-82.

Peacocke, C. (1992). Scenarios, concepts, and projection. In Crane 1992.

Peacocke, C. (1998). Bewußte Einstellungen, Aufmerksamkeit und Selbsterkenntnis. In Esken & Heckmann 1998. Reprinted [as “Conscious attitudes, attention and self-knowledge”] in McDonald, C., Smitt, B. & Wright, C. (eds.), Knowing our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pendlebury, M. (1987). Perceptual representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87, 91-106.

Pendlebury, M. (1990). Sense experiences and their contents: A defense of the propositional account. Inquiry, 33, 215-30.

Rey, G. (1998). A narrow representationalist account of qualitative experience. In Tomberlin 1998.

Rosenthal, D. (2004). Varieties of higher-order theory. In R. Gennaro (ed.),  Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1998). The colors and shapes of visual experience. In Fisette 1998. Reprinted in Rosenthal 1999.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1999). Why are verbally expressed thoughts conscious? In Rosenthal 1999.

Seager, W. (2004). A cold look at HOT theory. In R. Gennaro (ed.),  Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Searle, J.R. (1989). Consciousness, unconsciousness, and intentionality. Philosophical Topics, 17, 193-209.

Searle, J.R. (1990). Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 585-642.

Searle, J.R. (1994). The connection principle and the ontology of the unconscious: A reply to Fodor and Lepore. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 847-55.

Snowdon, P. (1990). The objects of perceptual experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement, 64, 121-50.

Sosa, E. (1986). Experience and intentionality. Philosophical Topics, 14, 67-83.

Sosa, E. (2003). Privileged access. In  A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

Stalnaker, R. (1996). On a defense of the hegemony of representation. In Villanueva 1996.

Textor, M. (1998). Unbewußte Überzeugungen, subdoxastische Zustände und die Allgemeinheitsprinzipien. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Tye, M. (1992). Visual qualia and visual content. In Crane 1992. Revised version in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

Tye, M. (1994). Do pains have representational content? In Casati, Smith & White 1994.

Tye, M. (1996). Orgasms again. In Villanueva 1996.

Tye, M. (1998). Inverted Earth, Swampman, and representationism. In Tomberlin 1998.

Tye, M. (2003). Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalism? In  A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

Valberg, J.J. (1992). The puzzle of experience. In Crane 1992.

Van Gulick, R. (1988). Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality, and self-understanding machines. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.

Van Gulick, R. (1995). How should we understand the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives, 9, 271-89.

Van Gulick, R. (1995). Understanding the relation between intentionality and consciousness. In Tomberlin 1995.

Van Gulick, R. (2003). Maps, gaps and traps. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Van Gulick, R. (2004). Higher-order global states HOGS: an alternative higher-order model of consciousness. In R. Gennaro (ed.),  Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

 

 

3.5 Dennett on Consciousness

 

An important reductive account of consciousness has been developed by Daniel Dennett over a period of many years, and has received wide attention from other researchers. Because these papers often do not fit naturally into the other subject-oriented sections, we have collected them into a single section here.

 

Akins, K. & Winger, S. (1996). Ships in the night: Churchland and Ramachandran on Dennett's theory of consciousness. In Akins 1996.

Akins, K. (1996). Lost the plot? Reconstructing Dennett's multiple drafts theory of consciousness. Mind and Language, 11, 1-43.

Arbib, M. (1972). Consciousness: The secondary role of language. Journal of Philosophy, 69, 579-91.

Baars, B.J. & McGovern, K. (1993). Does philosophy help or hinder scientific work on consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 18-27.

Baker, L.R. (1995). Content meets consciousness. Philosophical Topics, 22, 1-22.

Block, N. (1995). What is Dennett’s theory a theory of? Philosophical Topics, 22, 23-40.

Bricke, J. (1984). Dennett's eliminative arguments. Philosophical Studies, 45, 413-29.

Bricke, J. (1985). Consciousness and Dennett’s intentionalist net. Philosophical Studies, 48, 249-56.

Cam, P. (1985). Phenomenology and speech dispositions. Philosophical Studies, 47, 357-68.

Churchland, P.S. & Ramachandran, V.S. (1993). Filling in: Why Dennett is wrong. In Dahlbom 1993. Also in Revonsuo & Kamppinen 1994.

Clark, S.R.L. (1993). Minds, memes, and rhetoric. Inquiry, 36, 3-16.

Dennett, D. (2003). Explaining the “Magic” of Consciousness. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology, 1, 7-19.

Dennett, D.C. & Kinsbourne, M. (1991). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 183-247. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Dennett, D.C. (1976). Are dreams experiences? Philosophical Review, 73, 151-71. Reprinted in Dennett 1978.

Dennett, D.C. (1978). Reply to Arbib and Gunderson. In Dennett 1978.

Dennett, D.C. (1978). Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In Dennett 1978.

Dennett, D.C. (1978). Why you can't make a computer that feels pain. Synthese, 38, 415-56. Reprinted in Dennett 1978.

Dennett, D.C. (1979). On the absence of phenomenology. In D. Gustafson & B. Tapscott (eds.), Body, mind and method: Essays in Honor of Virgil Aldrich. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Dennett, D.C. (1979). The onus re experiences: A reply to Emmett. Philosophical Studies, 35, 315-8.

Dennett, D.C. (1981). Wondering where the yellow went. Monist, 64, 102-08.

Dennett, D.C. (1982). How to study human consciousness empirically, or nothing comes to mind. Synthese, 59, 159-80.

Dennett, D.C. (1986). Julian Jaynes' software archaeology. Canadian Psychology, 27, 149-54.

Dennett, D.C. (1988). Quining qualia. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Dennett, D.C. (1988). The evolution of consciousness. In J. Brockman (ed.), Speculations. The Reality Club. New York: Prentice Hall Press.

Dennett, D.C. (1991). Lovely and suspect qualities. In Villanueva 1991.

Dennett, D.C. (1993). Caveat emptor. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 48-57.

Dennett, D.C. (1993). Living on the edge. Inquiry, 36, 135-59.

Dennett, D.C. (1993). Précis of Consciousness Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 889-92.

Dennett, D.C. (1993). The message is: There is no medium. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 919-31.

Dennett, D.C. (1995). Get real. Philosophical Topics, 22, 505-60.

Dennett, D.C. (1996). Bewußtsein hat mehr mit Ruhm als mit Fernsehen zu tun. In C. Maar, E. Pöppel & T. Christaller (Hrsg.), Die Technik auf dem Weg zur Seele: Forschungen an der Schnittstelle Gehirn / Computer. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt (rororo science 60133).

Dennett, D.C. (1996). Seeing is believing - or is it? In Akins 1996.

Dennett, D.C. (2003). Look out for the dirty baby. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(1), 31-33.

Dennett, D.C. (2003). The self as a responding - and responsible - Artifact. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1001, 39-50.

Dennett, D.C. (2003). Who's on first? Heterophenomenology explained. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), 19-30.

Dretske, F. (1995). Differences that make no difference. Philosophical Topics, 22, 41-58.

Emmett, K. (1978). Oneiric experiences. Philosophical Studies, 34, 445-50.

Fellows, R. & O'Hear, A. (1993). Consciousness avoided. Inquiry, 36, 73-91.

Foster, J. (1993). Dennett's rejection of dualism. Inquiry, 36, 17-31.

Gunderson, K. (1972). Content and Consciousness and the mind-body problem. Journal of Philosophy, 69, 591-604.

Jackson, F. (1993). Appendix A (for philosophers). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 899-903.

Kirk, R. (1993). “The best set of tools?” Dennett's metaphors and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Quarterly, 43, 335-43.

Lockwood, M. (1993). Dennett's mind. Inquiry, 36, 59-72.

Lormand, E. (1995). Qualia! (Now showing at a theater near you.) Philosophical Topics, 22, 127-56.

Mangan, B. (1993). Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 1-17.

Marbach, E. (1988). How to study consciousness phenomenologically or quite a lot comes to mind. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 19, 252-68.

Marbach, E. (1994). Troubles with heterophenomenology. In Casati, Smith & White 1994.

McCauley, R.N. (1993). Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on the blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 155-64.

McGinn, C. (1995). Consciousness evaded: Comments on Dennett. Philosophical Perspectives, 9, 241-49.

Radner, D. (1994). Heterophenomenology: Learning about the birds and the bees. Journal of Philosophy, 91, 389-403.

Raffman, D. (1993). Qualms about Quining qualia. In D. Raffman, Language, Music, and Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ramachandran, V.S. (1993). Filling in gaps in logic: Some comments on Dennett. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 165-8.

Rey, G. (1995). Dennett’s unrealistic psychology. Philosophical Topics, 22, 259-90.

Robinson, W.S. (1972). Dennett's analysis of awareness. Philosophical Studies, 23, 147-52.

Robinson, W.S. (1994). Orwell, Stalin, and determinate qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75, 151-xxx.

Rorty, R. (1972). Dennett on awareness. Philosophical Studies, 23, 153-62.

Rorty, R. (1993). Holism, intrinsicality, and the ambition of transcendence. In Dahlbom 1993.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 911-18.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1995). First-person operationalism and mental taxonomy. Philosophical Topics, 22, 319-50. Expanded version in Rosenthal 1999.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1995). Multiple drafts and facts of the matter. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Ross, D. (1993). Quining qualia Quine’s way. Dialogue, 32, 439-59.

Ross, D. (1994). Dennett’s conceptual reform. Behavior and Philosophy, 22, 41-52.

Seager, W. (1993). The elimination of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 345-65.

Seager, W. (1993). Verification, skepticism, and consciousness. Inquiry, 36, 113-36.

Shoemaker, S. (1993). Lovely and suspect ideas. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 903-8.

Siewert, C. (1993). What Dennett can't imagine and why. Inquiry, 36, 93-112.

Sprigge, T.L.S. (1993). Is Dennett a disillusioned zimbo? Inquiry, 36, 33-57.

Toribio, J. (1993). Why there still has to be a theory of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 28-47.

Tye, M. (1993). Reflections on Dennett and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 891-6.

Van Gulick, R. (1995). Dennett, drafts, and phenomenal realism. Philosophical Topics, 22, 443-56.

 

 

3.6 Consciousness: Miscellaneous

 

This section contains miscellaneous philosophical articles on consciousness. These include very broad articles on the subject, as well as articles on smaller specific topics that do not have sections of their own.

 

 

Aleksander, I. & Dunmall, B. (2003). Axioms and tests for the presence of minimal consciousness in agents. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 7-18.

Antony, M.V. (1994). Against functionalist theories of consciousness. Mind & Language, 9, 105-23.

Atmanspacher, H. (2004). Quantum theory and consciousness: An overview with selected examples. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 1, 51-73.

Baars, B. & Dalton, T. (2003). Consciousness regained – The scientific restoration of mind and brain. In R. Evans & T. Dalton (eds.), The Life Cycle of Psychological Ideas: Understanding Prominence and the Dynamics of Intellectual Change. Dordrecht: Kluwer/Academic.

Baars, B.J. (1995). Understanding subjectivity: Global workspace theory and the resurrection of the observing self. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 211-16.

Baars, B.J. (2003). How brain reveals mind - Neural studies support the fundamental role of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), 100-14.

Baas, N. (1996). A framework for higher-order cognition and consciousness. In Hameroff et al. 1996.

Beckermann, A. (1994). Metarepräsentationen und phänomenale Zustände. In Lenk & Poser 1994.

Beckermann, A. (1995). Visual information-processing and phenomenal consciousness. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Bieri, P. (1982). Nominalism and inner experience. The Monist, 65, 68-87. German translation: Nominalismus und innere Erfahrung. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 36, 3-24.

Bieri, P. (1986). Zeiterfahrung und Personalität. In H. Burger (Hrsg.), Natur, Mensch und Zeit. Berlin: Arno Spitz.

Birnbacher, D. (1994). Einige Gründe, das Hirntodkriterium zu akzeptieren. In J. Hoff & J. in der Schmitten (Hrsg.), Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und “Hirntod”-Kriterium. Reinbek: Rowohlt.

Blackmore, S. (2003). Consciousness in meme machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 19-30.

Bouratinos, E. (2003). A pre-epistemology of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(12), 38-41.

Braddon-Mitchell D. (2004). Masters of Our Meanings. Philosophical Studies, 118, 133-52.

Breeur, R. (2003). Consciousness and the self. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 11(4), 415-36.

Burns, J. (1996). The possibility of empirical test of hypotheses about consciousness. In Hameroff et al. 1996.

Cam, P. (1989). Notes toward a faculty theory of cognitive consciousness. In Slezak 1989.

Cassam, Q. (1995). Introspection and bodily self-ascription. In Bermúdez et al. 1995.

Chalmers D. (2004). Epistemic two-dimensional semantics. Philosophical Studies, 118, 153-226.

Chalmers, D.J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 200-19. Also in Hameroff et al. 1996. German translation in Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Chalmers, D.J. (2002). Consciousness and its place in nature. In D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

 

Chisholm, R.M. (1990). Questions about the unity of consciousness. In Cramer et al. 1990.

Church, J. (1998). Two sorts of consciousness? Communication and Cognition, 31, 57-72.

Clark, T.W. (1995). Function and phenomenology: Closing the explanatory gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 241-54.

Clement, F. & Malerstein, A.J. (2003). What is it like to be conscious? The ontogenesis of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 16(1), 67-85.

Cotterill, R.M. (2003). Conscious unity, emotion, dreaming, and the solution of the hard problem. In Cleeremans 2003.

Dalton, T. (2000). The developmental roots of consciousness and emotional experience. Consciousness and Emotion, 1, 55-90.

Davies M. (2004). Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework. Philosophical Studies, 118, 83-131.

de Vignemont, F. (2004). The co-consciousness hypothesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3(1), 97-114.

Dennett, D.C. (1995). Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 4-6.

Dewan, E.M. (1976). Consciousness as an emergent causal agent in the context of control system theory. In Globus, Maxwell & Savodnik 1976.

Dretske, D. (1998). Selbst-Bewußtsein. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Dulany, D. (2003). Strategies for putting consciousness in its place. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 33-43.

Ebeling, H. (1990). Das Subjekt im Dasein. Versuch über das bewußte Sein. In Cramer et al. 1990.

Eilan, N. (1995). Consciousness and the self. In Bermúdez et al. 1995.

Fellmann, F. (1996). Intentionalität und zuständliches Bewußtsein. In Krämer 1996.

Flanagan, O. (1997). Prospects for a unified theory of consciousness or, What dreams are made of. In Cohen & Schooler 1997. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Flohr, H. (1989). Schwierigkeiten der Autocerebroskopie. In Pöppel 1989.

Flohr, H. (1994). Denken und Bewußtsein. In J. Fedrowitz, D. Matejovski & G. Kaiser (Hrsg.), Neuroworlds. Geist - Gehirn - Kultur. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.

Forman, R.K. (1998). What does mysticism have to teach us about consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5, 185-201.

Fox, I. (1985). The individualization of consciousness. Philosophical Topics, 13, 119-43.

Gadenne, V. (1993). Bewußtsein, Selbstbewußtsein und Reflexion. Logos, 1, 82-103.

Gennaro, R.J. (1992). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and episodic memory. Philosophical Psychology, 5, 333-47.

Gray, R. (2003). Tye's representationalism: Feeling the heat? Philosophical Studies, 115(3), 245-56.

Griffin, D.R. (1998). From cognition to consciousness. Animal Cognition, 1, 3-16.

Grush, R. & Churchland, P.S. (1995). Gaps in Penrose's toiling. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Gunther, Y.H. (2004). The phenomenology and intentionality of emotion. Philosophical Studies, 117(1-2), 43-55.

Güzeldere, G. (1995a). Consciousness: What it is, how to study it, what to learn from ist history. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 30-52.

Güzeldere, G. (1995b). Problems of consciousness: Contemporary issues, current debates. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 112-43.

Güzeldere, G. (1997). Introduction: The many faces of consciousness: A field guide. In Block et al. 1997.

Haggard, P. & Johnson, H. (2003). Experiences of voluntary action. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), 72-84.

Hannay, A. (1987). The claims of consciousness: A critical survey. Inquiry, 30, 395-434.

Hardcastle, V.G. (1993). The naturalists versus the skeptics: The debate over a scientific understanding of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 14, 27-50.

Hardcastle, V.G. (1995). The why of consciousness: A non-issue for materialists. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 7-13.

Hardcastle, V.G. (2000). How to understand the N in NCC. In Metzinger 2000.

Harman, W. (1996). Toward a science of consciousness: Addressing two central questions. In Hameroff et al. 1996.

Harnad, S. (1982). Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory, 5, 29-47.

Hershfield, J. (1998). Lycan on the subjectivity of the mental. Philosophical Psychology, 11, 229-38.

Himma, K.E. (2004). Moral biocentrism and the adaptive value of consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 42(1), 25-44.

Hodgson, D. (1995). The easy problems ain’t so easy.Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 69-75.

Holenstein, E. (1996). Die kausale Rolle von Bewußtsein und Vernunft. In Krämer 1996.

Hossack, K. (2003). Consciousness in act and action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2(3), 187-203.

Humberstone L. (2004). Two-dimensional adventures. Philosophical Studies, 118, 17-65.

Humphrey, N.K. (1988). The uses of consciousness. In J. Brockman (ed.), Speculations. The Reality Club. New York: Prentice Hall Press.

Hurley, S. (2003). Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism. In Cleeremans 2003.

Ingarden, R.S. (2002). Open systems and consciousness. A physical discussion. Open Systems & Information Dynamics, 9(4), 339-69.

Jackson F. (2004). Why We Need A-Intensions. Philosophical Studies, 118, 257-77.

Kemmerling, A. (1996). Bewußtsein. In A. Kemmerling, Ideen des Ichs. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Kern, I. (2000). Zwei Prinzipien der Bewusstseinseinheit: Erlebtsein und Zusammenhang der Erlebnisse. Facta Philosophica, 2, 51-74.

Kirk, R. (1992). Consciousness and concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 66, 23-40.

Kirk, R. (1995). How is consciousness possible? In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Kraemer, E.R. (1984). Consciousness and the exclusivity of function. Mind, 93, 271-5.

Kriegel, U. (2003). Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy       , 33, 103-32.              

Kriegel, U. (2003). Intrinsic theory and the content of inner awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 24(2), 169-96.

Kriegel, U. (2004). The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3(2), 171-93.

Kroon F. (2004). A-intensions and communication. Philosophical Studies, 118, 279-98.

Kurthen, M. (1993). Zur Sprachlichkeit des Unbewußten angesichts der orthodoxen Kognitionswissenschaft. In Tress & Nagel 1993.

Kurthen, M. (1995). On the prospects of a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Kurthen, M., Linke, D.B., Reuter, B.M. & Moskopp, D. (1991). Das Subjekt des Todes. Zur aktuellen Kontroverse um hirnorientierte Todesbestimmungen. Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift, 141, 31-2.

Lehrer, K. (2004). Representation in painting and consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 117(1-2), 1-14.

Lenzen, W. (1998). Zombies, Zimbos und das “schwierige Problem” des Bewußtseins. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Levin, J. (1997).Consciousness disputed. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48, 91-107.

Levine, J. (1997). Recent work on consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly, 34, 379-404.

Libet, B. (1995). Solutions to the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 33-5.

Lloyd, D. (1996). Consciousness, connectionism, and cognitive neuroscience: A meeting of minds. Philosophical Psychology, 9, 61-79.

Lormand, E. (1996). Nonphenomenal consciousness. Noûs, 30, 242-61.

Lowe, E.J. (1995). There are no easy problems of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 266-71.

Lurz, Robert W. (1999). Animal Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research, 24, 149-68.

Lycan, W.G. (1998). Phenomenal information again: It is both real and intrinsically perspectival. Philosophical Psychology, 11, 239-42.

Marbach, E. (1984). On using intentionality in empirical phenomenology: The problem of ‘mental images’. Dialectica, 38, 209-29.

Marcel, A. (1988). Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.

Marcel, A.J. (2003). Introspective report - Trust, self-knowledge and science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), 167-86.

Maund, J.B. (1986). The phenomenal and other uses of ‘looks’. Australasian Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 170-80.

McKinnon, N. (2003). Presentism and consciousness (Time). Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(3), 305-23.

Merricks, T. (2003). Maximality and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(1), 150-8.

Metzinger, T. (1994). Zeitfenster im Gehirn und die Einheit des Bewußtseins. In Lenk & Poser 1993.

Metzinger, T. (1995). Perspektivische Fakten? Die Naturalisierung des View from Nowhere. In G. Meggle & U. Wessels (eds.), Analyomen 2. Proceedings of the 2nd Conference “Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy”. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.

Metzinger, T. (1996). Niemand sein. Kann man eine naturalistische Perspektive auf die Subjektivität des Mentalen einnehmen? In Krämer 1996.

Metzinger, T. (1996c). Von der Bewußtseinsethik zur Bewußtseinskultur. Wechselwirkung, 12, 2-8.

Metzinger, T. (2000). General introduction: consciousness research at the end of the twentieth century. In Metzinger 2000.

Metzinger, T. (2003). Der Begriff einer Bewusstseinskultur. In G. Kaiser (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch 2002/2003 des Wissenschaftszentrums Nordrhein-Westfalen. Düsseldorf: Wissenschaftszentrum Nordrhein-Westfalen. S. 150-171.

Metzinger, T. (2003). The pre-scientific concept of a “soul”: A neurophenomenological hypothesis about its origin. In Markus F. Peschl (Hrsg.), Die Rolle der Seele in der Kognitionswissenschaft und der Neurowissenschaft - Auf der Suche nach dem Konzept/Substrat der Seele. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.

Metzinger, T. (2004a). The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective. Networks, 3-4, 33-64.

Metzinger, T. (2004b). La soggettività dell’esperienza soggettiva: Un’analisi rappresentazionale della prospettiva in prima persona. Networks, 3-4, 1-32. Italian translation of Metzinger 2004a.

Michael, M. (2004). The problems with double-indexing accounts of the a priori. Philosophical Studies, 118, 67-81.

Mills, E. (1995). Giving up on the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 26-32.

Moody, T. (1994). Conversations with zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1, 196-200. See also ZOMBIE EARTH: A Symposium on Todd Moody’s Conversations with Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 312-72.

Murata, J. (1997). Consciousness and the mind-body problem. In Ito et al. 1997.

Myin, E. (1994). Over visueel bewustzijn. In J.P. Van Bendegem & G. Cornelis (eds.), Wie mij liefheeft, volge mij niet. Brussels: VUB Press.

Myin, E. (1995). Visuele waarneming, kleuren en bewustzijn. In M. De Mey & E. De Nil (eds.), Perspectiva tussen Aristoteles en Zeki Gent: Communicatie en Cognitie.

Nakagomi, T. (2003). Quantum monadology: a consistent world model for consciousness and physics. Biosystems, 69(1), 27-38.

Narayanan, A. (2002). All there is to the mind is to have the right genes, or, consciousness as a form of genetic engineering. Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, Proceedings, 2464, 78-86.

Natika, N. (1991). Consciousness, qualia, and reentrant signalling. Behavior and Philosophy, 19, 21-41.

Newton, N. (1982). Experience and imagery. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 21, 475-87.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1997). Subjekte von Erfahrung und die Zuschreibung mentaler Eigenschaften. Logos, N.F. 4, 59-81.

Nikolinakos, D.D. (2004). Anosognosia and the unity of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 119(3), 315-42.

Noë, A. (2003). Causation and perception: The puzzle unravelled. Analysis, 63(2), 93-100.

Noordhof, P. (2003). Self-deception, interpretation and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67(1), 75-100.

Oatley, K. (1988). On changing one's mind: A possible function of consciousness. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.

O'Brien, G.O. & Opie, J. (1998). The disunity of consciousness. Australian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 378-95.

Pacherie, E. (1997). Du problème de Molyneux au problème de Bach-y-Rita. In J. Proust (ed.), Perception et Intermodalité, Approches actuelles du Problème de Molyneux. Paris: PUF.

Pauen, M. (1996). Die Logik der Wahrnehmung und das “Rätsel des Bewußtseins”. In Hubig & Poser 1996.

Pauen, M. (1996). Wahrnehmung und mentale Repräsentation. Philosophische Rundschau, 63, 243-64.

Penrose, R. & Hameroff, S. (1995).What ‘Gaps’? - Reply to Grush and Churchland. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 98-111.

Perner, J. & Dienes, Z. (2003). Developmental aspects of consciousness: How much theory of mind do you need to be consciously aware? Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 63-82.

Perry, J. (2004). Precis of 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68(1), 172-81.

Pettit P. (2004). Descriptivism, rigidified and anchored. Philosophical Studies, 118, 323-38.

Pockett, S. (2003). How long is “now”? Phenomenology and the specious present. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2(1), 44-68.

Pockett, S. (2004). Does consciousness cause behaviour? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(2), 23-40.

Poellner, P. (2003). Non-conceptual content, experience and the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(2), 32-57.

Pohlenz, G. (1990). Phänomenale Qualitäten, Erkenntnis und das philosophische Problem der Leib-Seele-Beziehung. Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 97, 69-104.

Pohlenz, G. (1990). Phänomenale Realität und naturalistische Philosophie. Eine systematische Widerlegung der Feigl’schen und Sellars’schen Theorien phänomenaler Qualitäten und Skizze einer alternativen Theorie. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 44, 106-42.

Pohlenz, G. (1992). Kein Platz für phänomenale Qualitäten und Leib-Umwelt-Interaktion? Eine Kritik transzendentalistischer Tendenzen in der modernen Theorie empirischer Wissenschaft. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 46, 363-80.

Pothast, U. (1990). Etwas über “Bewußtsein”. In Cramer et al. 1990.

Prinz, J.J. (2000). A neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 243-59.

Prinz, J.J. (2001). Functionalism, dualism and the neural correlates of consciousness. In W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale an R. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Prinz, J.J. (2003) Consciousness, computation, and emotion. In S.C. Moore and M. Oaksford (eds.), Emotional Cognition: From Brain to Behavior. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Prinz, J.J. (2003). Level-headed mysterianism and artificial experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(4-5), 111-32.

Proust, J. (2000). Awareness of being the actor of one's actions: three levels of analysis. In Metzinger 2000.

Quante, M. (1998). Die Enträtselung des Bewußtseins? Neuere Beiträge zu Philosophie des Geistes (Teil II). Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 52, 610-33.

Revonsuo, A. (1993). Is there a ghost in the cognitive machinery? Philosophical Psychology, 6, 387-405.

Revonsuo, A. (1994). In search of the science of consciousness. In Revonsuo & Kamppinen 1994.

Rey, G. (1995). Towards a projectivist account of conscious experience. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Richards, W. (1984). Self-consciousness and agency. Synthese, 61, 149-71.

Robinson, W.S. (1995). The hardness of the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 14-25.

Rosenberg, G.H. (1995). Rethinking nature: A hard problem within the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 76-88.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1999). Consciousness and its expression. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXII, 294-309. Reprinted in Rosenthal 1999.

Rowland, M. (2003). Consciousness: The transcendentalist manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2(3), 205-21.

Schleichert, H. (1989). The relationship between consciousness and language. In J.R. Brown & J. Mittelstrass (eds.), An intimate relation. Studies in the history and philosophy of science, presented to Robert E. Butts on his 60th birthday. Dordrecht: Academic Publishers .

Schmitz, H. (1996). Bewußtsein als instabiles Mannigfaltiges. In Krämer 1996.

Schroeter L. (2004). The rationalist foundations of Chalmers's 2-d semantics. Philosophical Studies, 118, 227-55.

Seager, W. (1995). Consciousness, information and panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 272-88.

Searle, J.R. (1998). How to study consciousness scientifically. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 353, 1935-42.

Seifert, J. (2004). Consciousness, mind, brain, and death. Brain Death and Disorders of Consciousness, 550, 61-78.

Shan, G. (2004). Quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication. Foundations of Physics Letters, 17(2), 167-82.

Shanon, B. (1998). What is the function of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5, 295-308.

Shear, J. (1995). The hard problem: Closing the empirical gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 54-68.

Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1998). Consciousness: A natural history. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5, 260-94.

Shoemaker, S. (1990). First-person access. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 187-214. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1996.

Shoemaker, S. (1996). Unity of consciousness and consciousness of unity. In Shoemaker 1996.

Shoemaker, S. (2003). Consciousness and co-consciousness. In Cleeremans 2003.

Sleutels, J. (1998). Phenomenal consciousness – Epiphenomenalism, naturalism and perceptual plasticity. Communication and Cognition, 31, 21-56.

Sloman, A. (1994). The mind as a control system. In Hookway & Peterson 1994.

Smart, J. (2004).Consciousness and awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, 41-50.

Smart, J.J.C. (2004). Consciousness and awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(2), 41-50.

Smith, D.W. (1986). The structure of (self-) consciousness. Topoi, 5, 149-56.

Sokolowski, R. (1992). Parallelism in conscious experience. Daedalus, issued as: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 120, 87-103.

Srinivasan, R. (2004). Internal and external neural synchronization during conscious perception. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos,14(2), 825-42.

Stadler, M. & Kruse, P. (1992). Zur Emergenz psychischer Qualitäten. Das psychophysische Problem im Lichte der Selbstorganisationstheorie. In W. Krohn & G. Küppers, Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Stalnaker R. (2004). Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics. Philosophical Studies, 118, 299-322.

Stephan, A. (2004). Phenomenal emergence. Networks, 3-4, 91-102.

Tetens, H. (1996). Die Rettung der mentalen Phänomene? Eine kurze Regieanweisung für einen nicht-reduktiven Materialismus. In Krämer 1996.

Thompson, E., Lutz, A., & Cosmelli, D. (2005). Neurophenomenology: an introduction for neurophilosophers. In A. Brook and K. Akins (eds.), Cognition and Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tienson, J.L. (1987). Brains are not conscious. Philosophical Papers, 16, 187-93.

Tye, M. (1997). The problem of simple minds: Is there anything it is like to be a honey bee? Philosophical Studies, 88, 289-317. German translation in Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Valentine, E. (1999). Popper’s three worlds and attitudes to the explanatory gap. New Ideas in Psychology, 17, 31-9.

Valentine, J.D. (1982). Towards a physics for consciousness. Psychoenergetics, 4, 257-74.

Van Gulick, R. (1989). What difference does consciousness make? Philosophical Topics, 17, 211-30.

Van Gulick, R. (1994). Deficit studies and the function of phenomenal consciousness. In G. Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Velmans, M. (2003). Preconscious free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(12), 42-61.

Warner, R. (1995). Facing ourselves: Incorrigibility and the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 217-30.

Wiehl, R. (1990). Die Komplementrität von Selbstsein und Bewußtsein. In Cramer et al. 1990.

Zemach, E. (1986). Unconscious mind or conscious minds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. In French, P.A., Uehling, T.E. & Wettstein, H.K. [eds.] Studies in Philosophy of Mind.

Ziemke, A. (1996). Kognitive Neurobiologie als Reflexionsproblem. Auf der Suche nach neuen Denkformen neurowissenschaftlicher Forschung. In Ziemke, A. & Kaehr, R (Hrsg.), Selbstorganisation. Jahrbuch für Komplexität in den Natur-, Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften. Band 6: Realitäten und Rationalitäten. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

 

 

 

3.7 Knowing What It's Like and the Knowledge Argument

 

 

An important thread in the philosophical literature on consciousness concerns the relationship between our knowledge of our consciousness and our knowledge of the objective physical world. Thomas Nagel has argued that no amount of objective knowledge enables us to know what it is like to be a conscious being quite different from us. Frank Jackson has argued that someone who knows all the physical facts about the brain might still not know what it is like to see red, and has concluded (via the so-called “Knowledge Argument”; see Ludlow, Nagasawa & Stoljar 2004 for e recent edited collection) that physicalism is false. This section encompasses much of the large body of literature on these issues.

 

Akins, K. (1993). A bat without qualities? In Davies & Humphreys 1993.

Akins, K. (1993). What is it like to be boring and myopic? In Dahlbom 1993.

Alter, T. (1995). Mary's new perspective. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73, 585-84.

Bachrach, J.E. (1990). Qualia and theory reduction: A criticism of Paul Churchland. Iyyun, 281-94.

Bigelow, J. & Pargetter, R. (1990). Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria, 56, 129-47.

Biro, J.I. (1991). Consciousness and subjectivity. In Villanueva 1991.

Biro, J.I. (1993). Consciousness and objectivity. In Davies & Humphreys 1993.

Churchland, P.M. (1985). Reduction, qualia, and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy, 82, 8-28. Reprinted in Churchland 1989.

Churchland, P.M. (1990). Knowing qualia: A reply to Jackson. In Churchland 1989. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Conee, E. (1985). Physicalism and phenomenal qualities. Philosophical Quarterly, 35, 296-302.

Conee, E. (1994). Phenomenal knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72, 136-50.

Cummins, R. (1984). The mind of the matter: Comments on Paul Churchland. Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 791-8.

Davis, L. (1982). What is it like to be an agent? Erkenntnis, 18, 195-213.

Double, R. (1983). Nagel's argument that mental properties are nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives, 9, 217-22.

Flanagan, O. (1985). Consciousness, naturalism, and Nagel. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 6, 373-90.

Foss, J.E. (1987). On the logic of what it is like to be a conscious subject. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67, 205-20.

Foss, J.E. (1993). Subjectivity, objectivity, and Nagel on consciousness. Dialogue, 32, 725-36.

Francescotti, R.M. (1993). Subjective experience and points of view. Journal of Philosophical Research, 18, 25-36.

Furash, G. (1989). Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against materialism. Dialogue, 32, 1-6.

Gadenne, V. (1992). Naturalismus und Subjektivität. Naturalism and subjectivity. Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften, 3, 456-57.

Greimann, D. (2003). Jacksons Argument des unvollständigen Wissens und die Identitätstheorie der Wahrheit. Facta Philosophica, 5, 87-104.

Haksar, V. (1981). Nagel on subjective and objective. Inquiry, 24, 105-21.

Hanna, P. (1990). Must thinking bats be conscious? Philosophical Investigations, 13, 350-5.

Harman, G. (1993). Can science understand the mind? In G. Harman (ed.), Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Hiley, D.R. (1978). Materialism and the inner life. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 16, 61-70.

Hill, C.S. (1977). Of bats, brains, and minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 38, 100-6.

Horgan, T. (1984). Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 34, 147-83.

Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127-36. Reprinted in Lycan 1990 and in Block et al. 1997.

Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. Journal of Philosophy, 83, 291-5. Reprinted in Rosenthal 1991 and Block et al. 1997. Reprinted with a postscript in Moser, P.K. & Trout, J.D. (eds.), Contemporary Materialism. London: Routledge.

Jackson, F. (1994). Finding the mind in the natural world. In Casati, Smith & White 1994. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Jakab, Z. (2000). The ineffability of qualia. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 329-51.

Kekes, J. (1977). Physicalism and subjectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 37, 533-6.

Lahav, R. (1994). A new challenge for the physicalist: Phenomenal indistinguishability. Philosophia, 24, 77-103.

Levin, J. (1986). Could love be like a heatwave? Physicalism and the subjective character of experience. Philosophical Studies, 49, 245-61. Reprinted in Lycan 1990.

Lewis, D. (1983). Postscript to ‘Mad pain and martian pain'. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, D. (1988). What experience teaches. Proceedings of the Russelian Society. University of Sydney. Reprinted in Lycan 1990 and Block et al. 1997.

Loar, B. (1990). Phenomenal states. In Tomberlin 1990. Revised version in Block et al. 1997.

Lycan, W.G. (1990). What is the ‘subjectivity' of the mental? In Tomberlin 1990.

Lycan, W.G. (1995). A limited defense of phenomenal information. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Malcolm, N. (1988). Subjectivity. Philosophy, 63, 147-60.

McClamrock, R. (1992). Irreducibility and subjectivity. Philosophical Studies, 67, 177-92.

McConnell, J. (1995). In defense of the knowledge argument. Philosophical Topics, 22, 157-88.

McCulloch, G. (1988). What it is like. Philosophical Quarterly, 38, 1-19.

McMullen, C. (1985). “Knowing what it's like” and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies, 48, 211-34.

Mellor, D.H. (1993). Nothing like experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 63, 1-16.

Metzinger, T. & Walde, B. (2000). Commentary on Jakab’s „Ineffability of Qualia”. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 352-62. doi:10.1006/ccog.2000.0463

Muscari, P. (1985). The subjective character of experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 6, 577-97.

Muscari, P. (1987). The status of humans in Nagel's phenomenology. Philosophical Forum, 19, 23-33.

Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435-50; German translation in Bieri 1981 und Nagel 1984. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Nagel, T. (1979). Subjective and objective. In Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nelkin, N. (1987). What is it like to be a person? Mind and Language, 3, 220‑41.

Nemirow, L. (1990). Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In Lycan 1990.

Nemirow, L. (1995). Understanding rules. Journal of Philosophy, 92, 28-43.

Newton, N. (1986). Churchland on direct introspection of brain states. Analysis, 46, 97-102.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1995). What Mary couldn't know: belief about phenomenal states. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1998). On belief about experiences. An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58, 51-73.

Papineau, D. (1993). Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71, 169-83.

Papineau, D. (1995). The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Pereboom, D. (1994). Bats, brain scientists, and the limits of introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 315-29.

Pitcher, G. (1970). The awfulness of pain. Journal of Philosophy, 68, 481-92.

Pugmire, D. (1989). Bat or batman. Philosophy, 64, 207-17. Reprinted in Identity, cause, and mind. Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Raymont, P. (1995). Tye's criticism of the knowledge argument. Dialogue, 34, 713-26.

Robinson, D. (1993). Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties. Philosophical Studies, 69, 1-34.

Robinson, H. (1993). Dennett on the knowledge argument. Analysis, 53, 174-7.

Robinson, H. (1993). The anti-materialist strategy and the “knowledge argument”. In Robinson 1993.

Rosenthal, D.M. (1991). The independence of consciousness and sensory quality. In Villanueva 1991. Reprinted in Rosenthal 1999.

Russow, L. (1982). It's not like that to be a bat. Behaviorism, 10, 55-63.

Seager, W.E. (1983). Functionalism, qualia and causation. Mind, 92, 174-88.

Shoemaker, S. (1984). Churchland on reduction, qualia, and introspection. Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 799-809.

Stemmer, N. (1989). Physicalism and the argument from knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67, 84-91.

Sturgeon, S. (1994). The epistemic view of subjectivity. Journal of Philosophy, Vol.CI, 5, 221-35.

Taliaferro, C. (1988). Nagel's vista or taking subjectivity seriously. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 26, 393-401.

Teller, P. (1992). Subjectivity and knowing what it's like. In Beckermann et al. 1992.

Thompson, E. (1992). Novel colours. Philosophical Studies, 68, 321-49.

Tilghman, B.R. (1991). What is it like to be an aardvark? Philosophy, 66, 325-38.

Tye, M. (1986). The subjective qualities of experience. Mind, 95, 1-17.

Tye, M. (1995). What “what it’s like” is really like. Analysis, 55, 125-6.

Warner, R. (1986). A challenge to physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64, 249-65.

Watkins, M. (1989). The knowledge argument against the knowledge argument. Analysis, 49, 158-60.

White, S. (1987). What is it like to be a homunculus? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68, 148-74.

Wider, K. (1989). Overtones of solipsism in Nagel's 'What is it like to be a bat?' and 'The View from Nowhere'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49, 481-99.

 

 

3.8 Absent Qualia and Inverted Qualia

 

 

A common objection to functionalist accounts of mind is that they do not capture all the facts about conscious experience, as we can always imagine the properties described in any given functional account being instantiated with no associated experience at all (the case of “absent qualia”) or with subjective experiences differing between functionally identical systems (“inverted qualia”, or the “inverted spectrum”). Others have disputed this possibility. This section includes papers covering many aspects of this debate.

 

 

Averill, E.W. (1990).Functionalism, the absent qualia objection, and eliminativism. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 28, 449-67.

Block, N. (1980). Are absent qualia impossible? Philosophical Review, 89, 257-74.

Block, N. (1990). Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 53-79. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Bogen, J. (1981). Agony in the schools. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 11, 1-21.

Campbell, N. (2004). Generalizing qualia inversion. Erkenntnis, 60(1), 27-34.

Carleton, L. (1983). The population of China as one mind. Philosophy Research Archives, 9, 665-74.

Chalmers, D.J. (1995). Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. (1981). Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. Philosophical Topics, 12, 121-32. Reprinted in Churchland 1989.

Clark, A. (1985). Spectrum inversion and the color solid. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 23, 431-43.

Cole, D.J. (1990). Functionalism and inverted spectra. Synthese, 82, 207-22.

Conee, E. (1985). The possibility of absent qualia. Philosophical Review, 94, 345-66.

Cuda, T. (1985). Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 111-27.

Davis, L. (1982). Functionalism and absent qualia. Philosophical Studies, 41, 231-49.

Dennett, D.C. (1994). Instead of qualia. In Revonsuo & Kamppinen 1994.

Doore, G. (1981). Functionalissm and absent qualia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59, 387-402.

Elugardo, R. (1983). Functionalism and the absent qualia argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 13, 161-80.

Elugardo, R. (1983). Functionalism, homunculi-heads and absent qualia. Dialogue, 22, 47-56.

Hardin, C.L. (1991). Reply to Levine. Philosophical Psychology, 4, 41-50.

Hardin, C.L. (1997). Reinverting the spectrum. In Carrier & Machamer 1997.

Harvey, J. (1979). Systematic transposition of colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 57, 211-9.

Horgan, T. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 453-69.

Jacoby, H. (1990). Empirical functionalism and conceivability arguments. Philosophical Psychology, 2, 271-82.

Johnsen, B. (1986). The inverted spectrum. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64, 471-6.

Johnsen, B.C. (1993). The intelligibility of spectrum inversion. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23, 631-6.

Kirk, R. (1982). Goodbye to transposed qualia. Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, 82, 33-44.

Kirk, R. (1994). The trouble with ultra-externalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 293-307.

Lanz, P. (1994). Funktionalismus und sensorisches Bewußtsein. In G. Meggle & U. Wessels (eds.), In G. Meggle & U. Wessels (eds.), Analyomen 2. Proceedings of the 2nd Conference “Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy”. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.

Levin, J. (1985). Functionalism and the argument from conceivability. Canadian Journal of Philosophical Supplement, 11, 85-104.

Levine, J. (1989). Absent and inverted qualia revisited. Mind and Language, 3, 271-87.

Levine, J. (1991). Cool red. Philosophical Psychology, 4, 27-40.

Lycan, W.G. (1973). Inverted spectrum. Ratio, 60, 315-19.

Lycan, W.G. (1981). Form, function, and feel. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 24-50.

Marcel, A.J. (1988). Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.

McGinn, C. (1981). A note on functionalism and function. Philosophical Topics, 12, 169-70.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1996). Pseudonormal vision. An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies, 82, 145-57.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1998). Vertauschte Sinnesqualitäten und die Frage der Erklärbarkeit von Bewußtsein. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Pauen, M. (2002). Invertierte Schmerzen. In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Putnam, H. (1981). Mind and body. In Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rey, G. (1992). Sensational sentences switched. Philosophical Studies, 67, 73-103.

Sayan, E. (1988). A closer look at the Chinese Nation argument. Philosophy Research Archives, 13, 129-36.

Schumacher, R. (1998). Visual perception and blindsight: The role of the phenomenal qualities. Acta Analytica, 20, 71-82.

Shoemaker, S. (1975). Functionalism and qualia. Philosophical Studies, 27, 291-315. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984.

Shoemaker, S. (1981). Absent qualia are impossible - A reply to Block. Philosophical Review, 90, 581-99. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984.

Shoemaker, S. (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 357-81. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984 and Block et al. 1997.

Shoemaker, S. (1994). The first-person perspective. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 68, 7-22. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1996 and Block et al. 1997.

Tye, M. (1994). Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness. In Hookway & Peterson 1994.

Tye, M. (1994). Qualia, content and the inverted spectrum. Nous, 28, 159-83.

Van Heuveln, B., Dietrich, E. & Oshima, M. (1998). Let’s dance! The equivocation in Chalmers' dancing qualia argument. Minds and Machines, 8, 237-49.

White, N. (1985). Professor Shoemaker and the so-called 'qualia' of experience. Philosophical Studies, 47, 369-83.

White, S. (1986). Curse of the qualia. Synthese, 68, 333-68. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

 

3.9 Qualia: Miscellaneous

 

 

This section includes miscellaneous articles on qualia, or experiential properties, or phenomenal properties, as well as on specific sorts of experiences, such as color and pain experiences. Note that the division between many of these articles and those on “consciousness” is often only of a superficial nature.

 

 

Addis, L. (1986). Pains and other secondary mental entities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47, 59-74.

Alston, W. (1971). Varieties of privileged access. American Philosophical Quarterly, 8, 223-41.

Aranyosi, I. (2003). Physical constituents of qualia. Philosophical Studies, 116(2), 103-31.

Armstrong, D.M. (1987). Smart and the secondary qualities. In Pettit, P., Sylvan, R. & Norman, J (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.J.C. Smart. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Berger, G. (1987). On the structure of visual sentience. Synthese, 71, 355-70.

Blumenfeld, J.-B. (1979). Phenomenal properties and the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63, 485-93.

Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2003). Qualia and analytical conditionals. Journal of Philosophy, 100(3), 111-35.

Brown, M. (1983). Functionalism and sensations. Auslegung, 10, 218-28.

Burgess, J.A. (1990). Phenomenal qualities and the nontransitivity of matching. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68, 206-20.

Byrne, A. (2003). Consciousness and nonconceptual content. Philosophical Studies, 113, 261-74.

Byrne, A. (2004). What phenomenal consciousness is like. In R. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Clark, A. (1985). A physicalist theory of qualia. Monist, 68, 491-506.

Clark, A. (1985). Qualia and the psychophysical explanation of color perception. Synthese, 65, 377-405.

Clark, A. (1989). The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink. Synthese, 80, 277-304.

Conee, E. (1984). A defense of pain. Philosophical Studies, 46, 239-48.

Delaney, C.F. (1970). Sellars’ grain argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50.

Double, R.1985. Phenomenal properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45, 383-92.

Dretske, F. (2003). Experience as representation (Qualia). Nous, 67-82, Sp. Iss. 13.

Dumpleton, S. (1988). Sensation and function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66, 376-89.

Eshelman, L.J. (1977). Functionalism, sensations, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7, 255-74.

Fox, I. (1989). On the nature and cognitive function of phenomenal content - Part one. Philosophical Topics, 17, 81-103.

Fox, I. (1995). Our knowledge of the internal world. Philosophical Topics, 22, 59-106.

Gadenne, V. (1997). Qualia ohne kausale Wirksamkeit. Logos, N.F. 4, 20-39.

Gilbert, P. (1992). Immediate experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 66, 233-50.

Goguen, J.A. (2004). Musical qualia, context, time and emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(3-4), 117-47.

Goldstein, I. (1994). Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72, 46-62.

Gracia-Carpintero, M. (2003). Qualia that it is right to Quine. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67(2), 357-77.

Graham, G. & Stephens, G.L. (1985). Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists? American Philosophical Quarterly, 22, 73-80.

Graham, G. & Stephens, G.L. (1987). Minding your P's and Q's: Pain and sensible qualities. Nous, 21, 395-405.

Gregory, R.L. (1988). Questions of quanta and qualia: Does sensation make sense of matter - or does matter make sense of sensation? Perception, 17, 699-702.

Gregory, R.L. (1989). Questions of quanta and qualia: Does sensation make sense of matter - or does matter make sense of sensation? II. Perception, 18, 1-4.

Gregory, R.L. (1997). Visual illusions classified. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 1, 190-4.

Griesmaier, F. (2003). On explaining phenomenal consciousness. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 15, 227-42.

Gunderson, K. (1974). The texture of mentality. In R. Bambrough (ed.), Wisdom - Twelve Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hardin, C.L. (1985). The resemblances of colors. Philosophical Studies, 48, 35-47.

Hardin, C.L. (1987). Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48, 281-98.

Hardin, C.L. (1992). Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors. In Beckermann et al. 1992.

Harding, G. (1991). Color and the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics, 45, 289-307.

Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. In Tomberlin 1990. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Heckmann, H.-D. (1986). Was sind Sinnesdaten? Überlegungen zum ontologischen Status und zur semantischen Repräsentation des sinnlichen Gehalts des nicht-kognitiven sinnlichen Bewußtseins. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 27, 125-54.

Heckmann, H.-D. (1998). Qualia-basierte Argumente gegen den Materialismus. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Hill, C. S. (2004). Ouch! An essay on pain. In R. Gennaro (ed.),  Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Hill, C.S. (1988). Introspective awareness of sensations. Topoi, 7, 11-24.

Hodgson, D. (2002). Three tricks of consciousness - Qualia, chunking and selection. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(12), 65-88.

Holborow, L.C. (1973). Materialism and phenomenal qualities. Aristotelian Society Supplement, 47, 107-19.

Holman, E.L. (1987/88). Qualia, Kripkean arguments and subjectivity. Philosophy Research Archives, 13, 411-29.

Horgan, T. (1987). Supervenient qualia. Philosophical Review, 96, 491-520.

Jackson, F. & Pargetter, R. (1987). An objectivist’s guide to subjectivism about colour. Revue International de Philosophie, 41, 160, 127-41.

Jacoby, H. (1985). Eliminativism, meaning, and qualitative states. Philosophical Studies, 47, 257-70.

Jakab, Z. (2003). Intrinsic colours – and what it is like to see them. In Mausfeld & Heyer 2003.

Kaufman, R. (1985). Is the concept of pain incoherent? Southern Journal of Philosophy, 23, 279-84.

Kienzle, B. (1989). Primäre und sekundäre Qualitäten bei John Locke. Studia Leibnitiana, 21, 21-41.

Kim, J. (1972). Phenomenal properties, psychophysical laws and the identity theory. Monist, 56, 178-92.

Kirk, R. (1974). Sentience and behaviour. Mind, 83, 43-60.

Kitcher, P.S. (1979). Phenomenal qualities. American Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 123-9.

Kraut, R. (1982). Sensory states and sensory objects. Nous, 16, 277-95.

Kurthen, M. (1989). Qualia, Sensa und absolute Prozesse. Zu W. Sellars' Kritik des psychozerebralen Reduktionismus. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 21, 25-46.

Leeds, S. (1993). Qualia, awareness, Sellars. Nous, 27, 303-30.

Levin, J. (1991). Analytic functionalism and the reduction of phenomenal states. Philosophical Studies, 61, 211-38.

Levin, M. (1981). Phenomenal properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42, 42-58.

Levine, J. (1995). Out of the closet: A qualophile confronts qualophobia. Philosophical Topics, 22, 107-26.

Levine, J. (1995). Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what? In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Levine, J. (2002). Gedanken über Qualia. In  Pauen & Stephan 2002.

Levin, Y. (2004). Criterial semantics an qualia. Facta Philosophica, 6, 57-76.

Lewis, D. (1981). Mad pain and Martian pain. In Block 1980, reprinted with a postscript in Lewis 1983, German translation in Lewis 1989.

Lewis, D. (1995). Should a materialist believe in qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73, 140-4.

Linsky, B. (1984). Phenomenal qualities and the identity of indistinguishables. Synthese, 59, 363-80.

Loar, B. (2003). Qualia, properties, modality (Physicalism). Nous, 113-129, Sp. Iss. 13.

Lockwood, M. (1993). The grain problem. In Robinson 1993.

Lycan, W.G. (1987). Phenomenal objects: A backhanded defense. In Tomberlin 1989.

Mandik, P. (1998). Handlung und Erfahrung: Über die konstitutive Rolle motorischer Kontrolle bei der Erzeugung räumlicher Qualia. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Margolis (J. (1970). Indubitability, self-intimating states and logically privileged access. Journal of Philosophy, 67, 918-31.

Marras, A. (1993). Materialism, functionalism, and supervenient qualia. Dialogue, 32, 475-92.

McLaughlin, B. (2003). The place of colour in nature. In Mausfeld & Heyer 2003.

Mellor, D.H. (1973). Materialism and phenomenal qualities II. Aristotelian Society Supplement, 47, 107-19.

Metzinger, T. (1998). Präsentationaler Gehalt. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Natsoulas, T. (1974). The subjective, experiential element in perception. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 611-31.

Nelkin, N. (1986). Pains and pain sensations. Journal of Philosophy, 83, 129-48.

Nelkin, N. (1987). How sensations get their names. Philosophical Studies, 51, 325-39.

Nelkin, N. (1989). Unconscious sensations. Philosophical Psychology, 2, 129‑41.

Nelkin, N. (1990). Categorising the senses. Mind and Language, 5, 149-65.

Nelkin, N. (1994). Phenomena and representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45, 527-47.

Nelkin, N. (1994). Reconsidering pain. Philosophical Psychology, 7, 325-43

Newton, N. (1989). On viewing pain as a secondary quality. Nous, 23, 569-98.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1997). The character of color terms: A phenomenalist view. In W. Künne, A. Newen & M. Anduschus (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality and Propositional Attitudes. Stanford: CSLI.

Northoff, G. (1995). Qualia im Knotenpunkt zwischen Leib und Seele: Argumentatives Dilemma in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion über die Subjektivität mentaler Zustände. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Die Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, 26, 269-95.

Northoff, G. (2003). Qualia and the ventral prefrontal cortical function - 'Neurophenomenological' hypothesis. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(8), 14-48.

Perkins, M. (1970). Matter, sensation, and understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly, 8, 1-12.

Perler, D. (1998). Sind die Gegenstände farbig? Zum Problem der Sinneseigenschaften bei Descartes. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 80, 182-210.

Pettit, P. (2003). Looks as powers (Colour problem, biconditionals, qualia). Nous, 221-252, Sp. Iss. 13.

Raffman, D. (1988). Towards a cognitive theory of musical ineffability. Review of Metaphysics, 41, 685-706.

Raffman, D. (1995). On the persistence of phenomenology. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Rey, G (forthcoming). Why Wittgenstein should have been a computationalist (and what a computationalist can learn from Wittgenstein). In D. Gottlieb & J. Odell (eds.), Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science.

Rey, G. (1991). Sensations in a language of thought. In Villanueva 1991.

Rey, G. (1992). Sensational sentences. In Davies & Humphreys 1992.

Rey, G. (1994). Wittgenstein, computationalism and qualia. In Casati, Smith & White 1994.

Rey, G. (1998). Qualia als enger Gehalt. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Richardson, R.C. & Muilenburg, G. (1982). Sellars and sense impressions. Erkenntnis, 17 171-211.

Robinson, W.S. (1998). Intrinsic qualities of experience: Surviving Harman’s critique. Erkenntnis, 47, 285-309.

Schick, T.W. (1992). The epistemic role of qualitative content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 383-93.

Shoemaker, S. (1975). Phenomenal similarity. Critica, 7, 3-37. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984.

Shoemaker, S. (1990). Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement, 50, 109-31. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1996.

Shoemaker, S. (1991). Qualia and consciousness. Mind, 100, 507-24. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1996.

Shoemaker, S. (1994). Phenomenal character. Nous, 28, 21-38.

Shoemaker, S. (1994). Self-knowledge and “inner sense”. Lecture III: The phenomenal character of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 291-314. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1996.

Shoemaker, S. (1996). Intrasubjective/intersubjective. In Shoemaker 1996.

Smart, J.J.C. (1971). Reports of immediate experience. Synthese, 22, 346-59.

Spohn, W. (1997). The character of color predicates. A materialist view. In W. Künne, A. Newen & M. Anduschus (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality and Propositional Attitudes. Stanford: CSLI.

Strawson, G. (1989). Red and 'red'. Synthese, 78, 193-232.

Stubenberg, L. (1996). The place of qualia in the world of science. In Hameroff et al. 1996.

Tetens, H. (1998). Ist sinnliches Bewußtsein rätselhaft? Das Beispiel der Farben. In Esken & Heckmann 1998.

Tolliver, J. (1995). Interior colors. Philosophical Topics, 22, 411-42.

Tye, M. (1995). A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character. In Tomberlin 1995. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness, color, and content. Philosophical Studies, 113, 233-5.

Velmans, M. (1999). Intersubjective science.  Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(2/3), 299-306.

White, S. (1995). Color and notional content. Philosophical Topics, 22, 471-504.

 

3.10 Machine Consciousness

 

Could a machine be conscious? Could there ever be artificial consciousness? In particular, is implementing an appropriate program on a computer in principle sufficient for consciousness? There has been continuing debate on this controversial question, focusing on such issues as Searle's “Chinese room” thought-experiment and the validity of the Turing test, among others. Many of the papers in section 3.8 and elsewhere are also quite relevant here.

 

Angel, L. (1994). Am I a computer? In Dietrich 1994.

Barnes, E. (1991). The causal history of computational activity: Maudlin and Olympia. Journal of Philosophy, 88, 304-16.

Bieri, P. (1988). Thinking machines: some reflections on the Turing Test. In P. Bieri & B. Harshav (eds.), Interpretation in Context in Science and History. Sonderheft von Poetics Today, Volume 9/1. Durham: Duke University Press. German translation: Die Idee einer denkenden Maschine. In N. Oellers (Hrsg.), Vorträge des Germanistentages Berlin 1987, Bd.4, Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Birnbacher, D. (1995). Artificial consciousness. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Block, N. (1981). Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5-43.

Buttazzo, G. (2001). Artificial consciousness: Utopia or real possibility. Spectrum IEEE Computer, 18, 24-30.

Caplain, G. (1995). Is consciousness a computational property? Informatica, 19, 615-9.

Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. (1990). Could a machine think? Scientific American, 262(1), 32-7. Reprinted in Dietrich 1994. German translation: Ist eine denkende Maschine möglich? In Spektrum der Wissenschaft, März 1990, und Singer 1994.

Churchland, P.S. & Sejnowski, T.J. (1992). Silicon brains. Byte, October 1992.

Clarke, J. (1972). Turing machines and the mind-body problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23, 1-12.

Cole, D.J. (1984). Thought and thought experiments. Philosophical Studies, 45, 431-44.

Cole, D.J. (1991). Artificial intelligence and personal identity. Synthese, 88, 399-417.

Cole, D.J. (1994). The causal power of CPUs. In Dietrich 1994.

Copeland, B.J. (1993). The curious case of the Chinese gym. Synthese, 95, 173-86.

Cotterill, R.M.J. (2003). CyberChild - A simulation test-bed for consciousness studies. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(4-5), 31-45.

Cruse, H. (1979). Modellvorstellungen zu Bewußtseinsvorgängen. Naturwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 32, 45-54.

Dennett, D.C. (1987). Fast thinking. In Dennett 1978.

Dennett, D.C. (1994). The practical requirements for making a conscious robot. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 349, 133-46.

Dennett, D.C. (1995). COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots. In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a.

Dennett, D.C. (1997). Consciousness in human and robot minds. In Ito et al. 1997.

Dyer, M. (1990). Intentionality and computationalism: Minds, machines, Searle and Harnad. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2, 303-19. Reprinted in Dietrich 1994.

Farrell, B.A. (1970). The design of a conscious device. Mind, 79, 321-46.

Franklin, S. (2003). IDA - A conscious artifact? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(4-5), 47-66.

Harnad, S. (1989). Minds, machines and Searle. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 1, 5-25.

Harnad, S. (1990). Lost in the hermeneutical hall of mirrors. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2, 321-27.

Harnad, S. (1991). Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. Minds and Machines, 1, 43-54.

Hofstadter, D.R. (1981). Reflections on Searle. In Hofstadter & Dennett 1981.

Holenstein, E. (1987). Maschinelles Wissen und menschliches Bewußtsein. In H. Holzhey & J.-P. Leyvraz (Hrsg.), Körper, Geist, Maschine. Beiträge zum Leib-Seele-Problem. Studia Philosophica, 47. Bern/Stuttgart: P. Haupt.

Holland, O. & Goodman, R. (2003). Robots with internal models - A route to machine consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(4-5), 77-109.

Jacquette, D. (1989). Adventures in the Chinese Room. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49, 605-23.

Juhl, C.F. (1998). Conscious experience and the non-triviality principle. Philosophical Studies, 91, 91-101.

Kirk, R. (1986). Sentience, causation and some robots. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64, 308-21.

Korb, K. (1991). Searle's AI program. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 3, 283-96.

Kurthen, M. & Linke, D.B. (1991). Reproduktion des Bewußtseins? In H.R. Fischer (Hrsg.), Autopoiesis. Heidelberg: Auer.

Kurthen, M. (1989). Bewußtsein der Maschinen? Stuttgart: Enke.

Lycan, W.G. (1979). A new Lilliputian argument against machine functionalism. Philosophical Studies, 35, 279-87.

Lycan, W.G. (1983). Abortion and the civil rights of machines. In N. Potter & M. Timmons. (1985)[eds.], Morality and Universality. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Lycan, W.G. (1983). The moral of the new Lilliputian argument. Philosophical Studies, 43, 277-80.

Maloney, J.C. (1987). The right stuff. Synthese, 70, 349-72.

Manzotti, R., Tagliasco, V. (2002). Si può parlare di coscienza artificiale? Sistemi Intelligenti XIV(1): 89-108.

Maudlin, T. (1989). Computation and consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, 86, 407-32.

McGinn, C. (1987). Could a machine be conscious? In Blakemore & Greenfield 1987. Reprinted in McGinn 1991.

Metzinger, T. (2001). Postbiotisches Bewusstsein: Wie man ein künstliches Subjekt baut und warum wir es nicht tun sollten. In Heinz Nixdorf MuseumsForum (Hrsg.), Computer. Gehirn. Was kann der Mensch? Was können die Computer? Begleitpublikation zur Sonderausstellung „Computer.Gehirn“ im Heinz Nixdorf MuseumsForum. Paderborn: Schöningh.

Moor, J.H. (1988). Testing robots for qualia. In Otto & Tuedio 1988.

Mott, P. (1982). On the function of consciousness, Mind, 91, 423-9.

Newton, N. (1989). Machine understanding and the Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology, 2, 207-15.

Rey, G. (1986). What's really going on in Searle's Chinese Room. Philosophical Studies, 50, 169-85.

Russow, L.M. (1984). Unlocking the Chinese Room. Nature and System, 6, 221-8.

Rust, A. (1987). Künstliche Intelligenz: Menschliches Bewußtsein und Maschine. Studia Philosophia, 46, 113-34.

Searle, J.R. (1980). Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-57.

Searle, J.R. (1987). Minds and brains without programs. In Blakemore & Greenfield 1987.

Searle, J.R. (1990). Is the brain's mind a computer program? Scientific American, 262(1), 26-31. German translation: Ist der menschliche Geist ein Computerprogramm? In Spektrum der Wissenschaft, Oktober 1992, und Singer 1994

Sloman, A. & Chrisley, R. (2003). Virtual machines and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(4-5), 133-72.

Steels, L. (1993). Is artificial consciousness possible? In G. Tratteur (ed.), Consciousness and Cognition. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Stubenberg, L. (1992). What is it like to be Oscar? Synthese, 90, 1-26.

Tae, K.S., Youn, H.Y. & Park, G.L. (2004). On negation-based conscious agent. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 3043, 114-21.

Van de Vete, D. (1971). The problem of robot consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 32, 149-65.

Van Gulick, R. (1988). Qualia, functional equivalence, and computation. In Otto & Tuedio 1988.

White, P. (1983). Beliefs about conscious experience. In Underwood & Stevens 1983.

Wilks, Y. (1984). Machines and consciousness. In Hookway 1984.

 

 

3.11 Selection: The Problem of Consciousness in Psychology & Cognitive Science

 

 

This section includes a selection of papers on consciousness and related subjects in cognitive psychology and in cognitive science in general. This small selection is very far from complete.

 

Ahsen, A. (1991). A second report on AA-VVIQ: Role of vivid and unvivid images in consciousness research. Journal of Mental Imagery, 15, 1-31.

Ahsen, A. (1991). Imagery and consciousness: Putting together poetic, mythic and social realities. Journal of Mental Imagery, 15, 63-97.

Albuquerque, J., Deshauer, D. & Grof, P. (2003). Descartes' passions of the soul - seeds of psychiatry? Journal of Affective Disorders, 76(1-3), 285-91.

Aleksander, I. & Dunmall, B. (2003). Axioms and tests for the presence of minimal consciousness in agents. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 7-18.

Alkire, M.T., Haier, R.J., Fallon, J.H., & Barker, S.J. (1996). PET imaging of conscious and unconscious verbal memory. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 448-62.

Allen, G.E. (1987). Materialism and reductionism in the study of animal consciousness. In Greenberg & Tobach 1987.

Allport, D.A. (1979). Conscious and unconscious cognition: A computational metaphor for the mechanism of attention and integration. In L. Nilsson (ed.), Perspectives on Memory Research. Hillsdale, New Jersey: L. Erlbaum.

Anderson, J. R. (1984). The development of self-recognition: A review. Developmental Psychobiology, 17, 35-49.

Andrade, J. (2000). Using anesthetics to assess the role of conscious processes in learning. In Metzinger 2000.

Andrews, K. (2003). Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation. In  A. Jokic & Q. Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

Antrobus, J.S., Singer, J.L. & Greenberg, S. (1966). Studies in the stream of consciousness: Experimental enhancement and suppression of spontaneous cognitive processes. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 23, 399-417.

Arhem, P. & Liljenstrom, H. (1997). On the coevolution of consciousness and cognition. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 187, 601-12.

Arnheim, R. (1994). Consciousness: An island of images. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 14, 121-27.

Arvidson, P.S. (1992). On the origin of organization in consciousness. Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology, 23, 53-65.

Arvidson, P.S. (1996). Toward a phenomenology of attention. Human Studies, 19, 71-84.

Aurell, G. (1979). Perception: A model comprising two modes of consciousness. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 49, 431-44.

Aurell, G. (1989). Man's triune conscious mind, parts I, II, and III. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 68, 747-54; 78, 31-39; 81, 463-66.

Baars, B. J. (1993). Putting the focus on the fringe: Three empirical cases. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 126-36.

Baars, B. J. (1993). Why volition is a foundation issue for psychology. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 281-309.

Baars, B.J. & Mattson, M.E. (1981). Consciousness and intention: A framework and some evidence. Cognition and Brain Theory, 4, 247-63.

Baars, B.J. & McGovern, K. (1996). Cognitive views of consciousness: What are the facts? How can we explain them? In Velmans 1996.

Baars, B.J. (1983). Conscious contents provide the nervous system with coherent, global information. In Davidson et al. 1983.

Baars, B.J. (1986). What is a theory of consciousness a theory of? The search for criterial constraints on theory. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 1, 3-24.

Baars, B.J. (1987a). What is conscious in the control of action? A modern ideomotor theory of voluntary action. In D. Gorfein & R. Hoffman (eds.), Learning and Memory: The Ebbinghaus Centennial Symposium. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Baars, B.J. (1987a).Momentary forgetting as an erasure of a conscious global workspace due to competition between incompatible contexts. In M.J. Horowitz (ed.), Conscious and unconscious Influences on Emotional Processes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baars, B.J. (1987c). Biological implications of a global workspace theory of conscious experience. In G. Greenberg and E. Tobach (eds.), Language, Cognition, Consciousness: Integrative Levels. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

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Whittlesea, B.W.A. & Dorken, M.D. (1997). Implicit learning: Indirect, not unconscious. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4, 63-7.

Wilber, K. (1979). A developmental view of consciousness. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 11, 1-21.

Wilson, D.L. (1978). Brain mechanisms, consciousness, and introspection. In A. Sugarman & R. Tarter (eds.), Expanding Dimensions of Consciousness. Springer.

Wilson, T.D. (1997). The psychology of metapsychology. In J. Cohen & J. Schooler 1997.

Wippich, W. (1992). Implicit and explicit memory without awareness. Psychological Research, 54, 212-24.

Wong, P.S., Bernat, E,. Bunce, S,.& Shevrin, H. (1997). Brain indices of nonconscious associative learning. Consciousness and Cognition, 6, 519-44.

Woody, J.M. & Phillips, J. (1995). Freud's project for a scientific psychology after 100 years: The unconscious mind in the era of cognitive neuroscience. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 2, 123-34.

Wright, W. (2003). Projectivist representationalism and color. Philosophical Psychology, 16(4), 515-33.

Yamadori, A. (1997). Body awareness and its disorders. In Ito et al. 1997.

Yates, J. (1985). The content of awareness is a model of the world. Psychological Review, 92, 249-84.

Young, A.W. (2003). Face recognition with and without awareness. In Cleeremans 2003.

Zelazo, P.D. & Frye, D. (1997). Cognitive complexity and control: A theory of the development of deliberate reasoning and intentional action. In M. Stamenov (ed.), Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Zelazo, P.D. (1996). Towards a characterization of minimal consciousness. New Ideas in Psychology, 14, 63-80.

Zelazo, P.R. & Zelazo, P.D. (1998). The emergence of consciousness. In Jasper, Descarries, Castellucci & Rossignol.

 

 

 

3.12 Selection: The Problem of Consciousness in the Neurosciences

 

This section includes a selection of papers addressing the problems related to consciousness from the perspective of neuroscience. These include neuroscientific theories of consciousness, articles on the binding problem, papers on blindsight and other specific phenomena, and papers addressing the general question of what neuroscience can tell us about consciousness, among other things. Again, this section is very far from complete.

     

 

Aitkenhead, A.R. (1993). Conscious awareness. In P. Sebel, B. Bonke, & E. Winograd (eds.), Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Albert M.L., Silverberg R., Reches A., & Berman M. (1976). Cerebral dominance for consciousness. Archives of Neurology, 33, 453-4.

Andrade, J. & Jones, J.G. (1997). Awareness in anesthesia. In G. Hall & M. Morgan (eds.), Short Practice of Anesthesia. Chapman and Hall.

Andrade, J. (1993). Consciousness: current views. In J.G. Jones (ed.), Depth of Anesthesia. Boston/Toronto/London: Little, Brown and Company.

Andrade, J. (1995). Learning during anesthesia: A review. British Journal of Psychology, 86, 479-506.

Andrade, J. (1997). Investigations of hypesthesia: Using anesthetics to explore relationships between consciousness, learning, and memory. Consciousness and Cognition, 5, 562-80.

Andrews, T.J. & Blakemore, C. (1999). Form and motion have independent access to consciousness. Nature Neuroscience, 2, 405-6.

Arhem, P. (1996). Vertical information flow in the brain: on neuronal micro events and consciousness. Biosystems, 38, 191-8.

Atkin, A. (1992). On consciousness. What is the role of emergence? Medical Hypotheses, 38, 311-4.

Austin, G., Hayward, W., & Rouhe, S. (1974). A note on the problem of conscious man and cerebral disconnection by hemispherectomy. In M. Kinsbourne & W. Smith (eds.), Hemispheric Disconnection and Cerebral Function. Charles C. Thomas.

Azzopardi, P. & Cowey, A. (1998). Blindsight and visual awareness. Consciousness and Cognition, 7, 292-311.

Azzopardi, P., & Cowey, A. (1997). Is blindsight like normal, near-threshold vision? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 94, 14190.

Baars, B. (2003). Working Memory requires conscious processes, not vice versa: A Global Workspace account. In Osaka, N. (ed.),  Neural Basis of Consciousness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Baars, B.J. & Newman, J. (1994). A neurobiological interpretation of the global workspace theory of consciousness. In Revonsuo & Kamppinen 1994.

Bachmann, T. (1997). Visibility of brief images: the dual-process approach. Consciousness and Cognition, 6, 491-518.

Barbur, J.L., Watson, J.D.G., Frackowiak, R.D.G. & Zeki, S. (1993). Conscious visual perception without V1. Brain, 116, 1293-302.

Barbur, J.L., Weiskrantz, L., & Harlow, J.A. (1999). The unseen color aftereffect of an unseen stimulus: Insight from blindsight into mechanisms of color afterimages. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 96, 11637-41.

Barlow, H. (1997). Single neurons, communal goals, and consciousness. In Ito et al. 1997.

Barr, W. B. (1998). Neurobehavioral disorders of awareness and their relevance to schizophrenia. In X. Amador & A. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis, Oxford University Press.

Bates, D. & Cartlidge, N. (1994). Disorders of consciousness. In E. Critchley (ed.), The Neurological Boundaries of Reality. Farrand.

Bayne, T. (2004). Phenomenal holism, internalism, and the neural correlates of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies,         11, 32-37.

Baynes, K. & Gazzaniga, M.S. (1999). Consciousness, introspection, and the split-brain: the two minds/one body problem. In Gazzaniga 1999.

Beaumont, J. (1981). Split brain studies and the duality of consciousness. In Underwood & Stevens 1981.

Beck, F. & Eccles, J.C. (1992). Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA, 89, 11357-61.

Beck, H. (1976). Neuropsychological servosystems, consciousness, and the problem of embodiment. Behavioral Science, 21, 139-60.

Berezin, A.A. (1992). Correlated isotopic tunneling as a possible model for consciousness. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 154, 415-20.

Berlucchi, G. & Agliotti, S. (1997). The body in the brain: neural bases of corporeal awareness. Trends in Neurosciences, 20, 560-4.

Berti, A. & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). Visual processing without awareness: Evidence from unilateral neglect. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 4, 345-51.

Berti, A. (2004). Cognition in dyschiria: Edoardo Bisiach's theory of spatial disorders and consciousness. Cortex, 40(2), 275-80.

Bisiach, E. & Berti, A. (1995). Consciousness in dyschiria. In Gazzaniga 1995.

Bisiach, E. & Geminiani, G. (1991). Anosognosia related to hemiplegia and hemianopia.

Bisiach, E. & Rusconi, M.L. (1990). Breakdown of perceptual awareness in unilateral neglect. Cortex, 26, 643-49.

Bisiach, E. (1988). The (haunted) brain and consciousness. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988.

Bisiach, E. (1992). Understanding consciousness: Clues from unilateral neglect and related disorders. In Milner & Rugg 1992.